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Abstract 
 
                   Accounting standards setters have progressively moved towards decision-useful, 
investor-focused fair value accounting standards for general purpose financial reporting 
(GPFR). With some qualification, the case is made that this development is positive for 
accounting as a discipline. This paper develops a referent theory of accounting to 
contextualize standards setters’ implicit direction, derived from existing research and 
literature. A central element in the development of this theory is the case made for 
‘investor-as-GPFR user’. Against this, stakeholder theory and positive accounting 
theory will be identified as confounding influences on the development of a general 
theory of accounting. The argument is for the investor, both current and potential, as 
the sole legitimate user of GPFR. The practical implications of the theory are 
considered against the prevailing debate over optimal accounting valuation method; the 
debate between fair value measurement and historical cost. The case is made that a 
number of ostensible dichotomies in accounting thought, such as between relevance 
and accountability, are substantially reconcilable. The mutual exclusivity often implied 
of accounting information relevance and accountability-cum-reliability is rejected. The 
development of a general theory of accounting is timely as such a referent theory is 
necessary to legitimize standards setting and secure accounting’s place in an 
increasingly diverse financial information market. Inferentially, trends in the evolution 
of fair value standards reflect the dominant concern to meet threats to the discipline as 
a whole; this standard setting trend qualified in speed and degree by the narrow 
interests of ‘constituents’. 
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 6 
Introduction 
Accounting as an academic discipline is in its infancy, a fact reflected in the 
absence of a general theory of accounting (Higson, 2003). This lack of a referent 
theory has occasioned considerable sub-optimal theorizing (Inanga and Schneider, 
2005; Walker, 2003; Watts and Zimmerman, 1979; Newman and Mellan, 1967; 
Samuels, Rickwood and Piper, 1989; Lewis and Pendrill, 2004; Zeff, 1971; 
Cannon, 1962; Flegm, 2000). Some part of the problem is that accounting as a 
discrete field of academic enquiry is nascent, where it is no more than a modern 
attachment to a technical specialization that is concerned with simply ‘doing’ 
without inquiry into the basis for that activity (Stamp, 1984; Cannon, 1962). We 
might view positivist accounting theory, in particular, as an entailment of 
technical, mechanistic self-perception of accounting (Whittington, 1987; Sterling, 
1979; Henderson and Pierson, 1983; Mattessich, 1995). Against this view, 
accounting standards setters have progressively worked towards a general theory 
of financial accounting for GPFR. These initiatives are most clearly identifiable in 
their operational form, the conceptual framework (Barth, 2000; Gjesdal and 
Liang, 2007). 
 
The case will be made that, notwithstanding the considerable resources 
committed to the research and development of a conceptually coherent framework 
for general purpose financial reporting, the efforts of standard setters to date have 
been sub-optimal, substantially due to political constraints (Horngren, 1973; 
Solomons, 1979; Peasnell, 1982; Miller and Redding, 1988). This has left extant 
concepts’ statements incoherent and underspecified (Levitt, 2007). Beyond the 
political constraints imposed on the development of a coherent theory of 
accounting by partisan ‘constituent’ interests, this confounding influence has been 
compounded by the seasonal nature of the theoretical predilections of the 
academy, and of the conflicts between these predilections (Arai, 1970). 
 
I make the case that, where positive accounting theory obstructs a coherent 
theory of accounting by its purported objectivity, it is stakeholder theory that has 
been, and remains, most profoundly disruptive of progress towards a general 
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theory of accounting. In its purely positivist mode stakeholder theory seems to tell 
us no more than that numerous groups are interested in financial reports and what 
their interest is (Whittred, Zimmer, Taylor and Wells, 2004). In this sense it 
provides a simple description of an all too obvious reality. However, stakeholder 
theory, if it is to be considered a theory at all, must add to this literally 
unremarkable observation, that each interested party should have their interest 
satisfied by GPFR (Staunton, 1982). This normative proposition lies, variously, 
between underspecification, in versions of the theory advanced by Freeman 
(1984), Freeman, Hicks and Parner (2004), Benston (1982), Stamp (1980), Owen, 
Swift and Hunt (2001), Tricker (1996), Renman (1968) and Steadman and Green 
(1997) and the pursuit of an ulterior agenda by Tinker (1980) and Gray, Owens 
and Maunder (1987).1 In the first instance we are provided no means to weigh the 
competing interests and their information demands. Moreover, no mechanism is 
offered to arbitrate between conflicting information needs (Jensen, 2001; Stittle, 
2003). Higson (2003, p.28) observes that: 
 
“If standards are produced on the basis of compromise between contending 
views, it should be remembered that advances in knowledge seldom come about 
on the basis of democracy.” 
 
 Notwithstanding the unsuitability of stakeholder theory as applied to GPFR 
the theory remains influential on standard setters and their operative conceptual 
frameworks.  
 
                                                 
1
 The distinction I draw here between stakeholder theorists is essentially a matter of degree. General or 
tacit allowances of diverse users are vague in the described sense of under-specification of 
responsibilities to particular stakeholders. Extremist stakeholder theory proponents make active 
attempts to obfuscate the particular claims of primary stakeholders. This is in evidence in Tinker’s 
(1980) thought and that of Gray, et al (1987; 1988). Tinker tells us that corporations owe society for 
the demands they place on society for necessary resources. If this is not an argument restricted 
exclusively to externalities it is unclear how the price the corporation pays in the marketplace for 
resources consumed fails to discharge this obligation. If it is an argument based on the benefit to 
corporations of collectively funded goods, such as education and law enforcement, then it is, 
presumably, an argument for taxation. If the argument is nothing more than that society is a 
precondition for socialized capital then it is true but trivial. I suspect the argument is significantly 
rhetorical in the sense that it implies corporations are getting more than they pay for which, from an 
empirical perspective, is, at best, overdetermined. This view may associate profit per se with 
profiteering. 
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By means of a logical analysis of existing literature this discussion will 
deduce a coherent general theory of accounting.2 Hendriksen (1970, p.1) 
describes a theory as: 
 
“A coherent set of hypothetical, conceptual and pragmatic principles 
forming the general framework of reference for a field of enquiry.” 
 
This definition offered by Hendriksen encapsulates the central idea 
articulated by the FASB (1976). This is the objective of the proposed theory. 
Most directly, I will operate on financial accounting although the proposed theory 
can be extended equally to other areas of accounting. Chapter one addresses the 
history of developments in accounting theory in general. Chapter two narrows the 
historical focus to the particular inputs to regulation and the development of 
conceptual frameworks. Chapter three develops from chapters one and two to 
establish an internally consistent theory of accounting, describing a user of GPFR 
as a basis for the proposed theory (Beaver and Demski, 1974). By narrowing 
GPFR user to investors, as the sole legitimate GPFR user, with supporting 
arguments for this limitation, it is possible to move closer to a coherent theory 
(Levitt, 2007; Brown, 2005). Chapter four investigates the relation between the 
proposed theory and financial accounting valuation bases. In particular, the debate 
between fair value proponents and historical cost advocates will be interrogated 
against the implications of the expounded theory. 
 
i. Methodology: Objective sense of the proposed theory 
 In developing a normative theory of accounting there is a need to establish 
a minimum descriptive foundation of the world in which such a normative 
imperative applies. Where unspecified axioms have considerable precedent in 
academic accounting of the critical theoretical variety, it is not what I intend 
                                                 
2
 The basis for this approach has support from Higson (2003); Chambers (1955); Abdel-Khalik and 
Ajinka (1979); Hendriksen (1982), Henderson and Pierson (1983), and Staubus (1999), amongst 
others. 
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here.3 I do not intend to posit a prescription of how economies should operate. In 
this sense the proposal is for a normative general theory of accounting that 
operates on the organization of economic systems as currently instantiated. This 
entails the stipulation of capitalism or, more precisely, it is defined by the 
essential nature of the private corporation in the mixed economy. Where critical 
accounting theory implicitly or explicitly may challenge the private company and 
profit per se it is the purpose here to contextualize the proposed theory against 
socialized private capital (the Corporation) as an objective identity. This follows 
the lead of Moonitz (1961) and Sprouse and Moonitz (1962), whose basic 
propositions were influential on the Trueblood Report (1973) and subsequent 
reports produced by the AICPA and FASB. 
 
 From this base it follows that the corporation must be defined. It is 
identifiable as a discrete legal entity established to aggregate capital contributions 
to be applied to a singular objective (Enthoven, 1973; Clarke and Dean, 1993; 
Giroux, 1999). This objective may have myriad components, operate in 
multifarious businesses, and periodically prioritise particular methods for 
achieving its objective, such as increasing profile, sales, profits or reputation, but, 
always, the corporation seeks to maximize risk-adjusted returns to investors as its 
objective (Salvary, 1979). It must do this or it would be uncompetitive in the 
market for investment funds. In simple, if purist terms, the corporation whose 
objective function is not to maximize risk-adjusted returns to the providers of 
capital simply does not exist; it never attracted the support of investors (Jensen, 
2001). 
 
 With the essence of the corporation established, we must now turn to 
consider the function of financial accounting in relation to the described object 
world. In light of the preceding descriptive characteristics we are drawn to 
                                                 
3
 Laughlin (1987, p. 482) argues that critical theory is motivated by a desire for a “truer, freer, and 
more just life for all.” I read this as critical theory “aims at good things and only good things. That 
is, it does not aim at operationalising bad things, not even occasionally or inadvertently. So: “It 
intends the industrious pursuit of positive outcomes (although not positivist), fully accounting for 
justice, virtue and decency to all people, all of the time.” Naturally all of the objectives of critical 
theory must remain undefined as objectivity is the vice of reifying positivists. 
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conclude the priority of the investor-as-user. Assuming the corporation we are 
able to infer the priority of the investor as the primary focus of financial 
accounting information. Its distinguishing essential characteristic is the separation 
of management from ownership in the rise of the corporation. What has not been 
established, to this point, is the singularity of the investor’s status as GPFR user. 
In this regard stakeholder theory has been important in informing conceptual 
frameworks for accounting standard setting (Laughlin, 1987). I propose 
reconciling stakeholder theory’s only coherent form, which is also its most 
comprehensive formulation, with the case for the investor as sole GPFR user. 
 
 The reconciliation of stakeholder theory with contemporary developments 
in standard setters’ conceptual frameworks’ interpretation of GPFR users as 
investors involves an inquiry into the foundations of the social contract (Staubus, 
1961). Further, it dictates investigating the nature of the dependency of the 
corporation on society. From this base it is necessary to examine the corporation’s 
duties to society as logical inferences from the nature of the described 
relationship. It is also necessary to consider the mechanisms that would best 
discharge those obligations. 
 
 The allowance that society is a precondition for socialized capital does not 
entail any necessary obligation (Friedman, 1985; Brown, 2005). It makes no 
obvious sense to argue from a precondition to an obligation in terms of the 
corporation, as do Gray, et al (1987). If a company has an obligation to society it 
must logically consist in one of three categories: 
1. Negative externalities: Essentially this situation is where the company is 
not paying for the full cost of its impact on society (Mobley, 1970).  
2. Monopoly/monopsonistic power: Again, the company is essentially not 
paying its way by dint of the extraction of economic rents from other 
members of society due to its market power. Ideally, this would find a 
more consistent, even response in preventative/punitive regulation. 
3. Licensing fee: This includes paying taxes and obeying laws. Taxes are 
justified on the grounds that the company is a direct and indirect 
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beneficiary of numerous public goods, such as law enforcement and 
education (Salvary, 1979). 
 
Regardless of whether we allow implicit/explicit obligations on corporations to 
society in toto, nothing of this issue importantly informs the view that such a duty 
could or should be discharged at the level of GPFR (Bromwich, 1992). Simply, 
the inference from stakeholder theory to a more extensive GPFR user definition 
than investor is a non-sequitur. 
 
 Beaver (1981) describes the multiple functions of financial reports. They 
are involved in the redistribution of wealth, they (inter alia) dictate resource 
allocation, and they eliminate or reduce the ability of companies to signal the 
market by accounting choice. The implicit focus of stakeholder theory in relation 
to GPFR is dispersing resource allocation. It is not very obvious why stakeholder 
theorists would want a competitive market at the point of GPFR user 
determination where this could only aggravate the subjectivity of reported 
accounting numbers. Deductively, the only plausible explanation is a virulent 
anti-capitalism that prefers any corruption of the relationship between capital and 
its claim to profits. Moreover, such a ‘scramble’ for user status and GPFR 
information determination would only serve, albeit perhaps wider, sectional 
interests, it would not advance broader societal interests in, for example, the 
profitability of a company as the basis for inference to the appropriate level to tax 
the corporation. (This is discussed further in chapter three). 
 
 Having established the investor as user, it is here that we turn to questions 
of stewardship, accountability and prospectivity of (and for) the entrusted 
aggregated capitals. Historically, the stewardship component of accountability has 
been prioritized to the exclusion of value relevance or prospective information. 
The case for this truncated parameter to accountability has largely turned on the 
historically favoured qualitative characteristic -reliability. Recent initiatives by 
major standard setters to elevate relevance and comparability over reliability, 
subject to execution issues, arguably extend the accountability of managers to 
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investors. They become accountable not only for the company’s past 
(stewardship) but also its future (relevance), subject to qualification in relation to 
unforeseeable events outside of the control of the company. This suggests an 
important debate in accounting revolves around a false dichotomy; accountability 
versus decision-usefulness. Whether we prefer accountability or decision-
usefulness, nothing of the investor as user offers us an independent reason to hold 
such a preference. I make the case that the bifurcation between accountability and 
decision-usefulness is a factation that more accurately describes the dichotomy 
between stewardship and predictive value and that, in creating polar opposition of 
decision-usefulness with accountability, an attempt is made to oblige proponents 
of decision-usefulness to discount the account function of GPFR. 
 
 The proposed general theory of accounting is normative and, necessarily, 
positive. The distinction between positive and normative theories is an uncertain 
thing (Whittington, 1987; Arrington and Francis, 1989). Always in theory, we 
must grant that at some, ideally rude level, there is an (some) assumption(s) 
(Stanley, 1968; Abdel-Khalik and Ajinka, 1979). It is the extent to which the 
axioms of a theory, the sui generis components, are rudimentary that determine its 
veracity. Against this point, it is a risk that putative theories may say too little to 
be more than descriptions. It is possible to see this risk realized in new accounting 
history’s elevation of particularism in history. An example of this is Stephen 
Walker’s (2004) article on the genesis of the accounting profession in the United 
Kingdom. We are told of many particular causes for the professionalisation of 
accounting, including specific individuals’ motivation and agency (Walker, 
2004). Such ‘theory’ simply describes its subject and, even then, in merely, 
unavoidably, sketched terms. Of more direct relevance is positivist stakeholder 
theory. This tells us many groups with an implicit/explicit stake in the corporation 
are interested in it and what they do with the information they require. This 
appears to be nothing more than an uncontroversial description. Inference from 
interest in a company to a claim on that company elevates the liability of 
corporations to sectional demands without providing any clear reason for this 
sanction. 
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 It follows from this that it is unproductive to describe a theory as positive 
or normative, except as a short-hand for the magnitude of the specific theory’s 
reliance on assumptions about the world (Arrington and Francis, 1989). Even the 
value relevance literature of the ‘positivist’ mode assumes inter alia market 
efficiency. It seems that a rather fine distinction between a moral descriptivism 
and an overtly phenomenological descriptivism is the basis for the 
positive/normative bifurcation. In this light then, the proposed theory is motivated 
by dual intentions of creation and discovery. Its axioms must necessarily be 
assessed by ‘taste-test’, although no attempt at obfuscation of these will be made. 
The ‘discovery’ component of the theory can be evaluated for coherence and 
logical structure. What is proposed is a theory fully consistent with socially-
constructed objects that operates to optimize the coherence of existing social 
entities. I do not propose retreating into un/underspecified moral positivism, as 
critical theorists are apt to do. This is the sense in which the proposed theory 
contains an objective dimension. 
 
 The described logical coherence anticipates an argument that, at its core, 
will be syntactical. Stipulating capitalism, I proceed to describe the operation of 
the corporation as an element of that system. Deduction and abduction from this 
base inform the inference of investor as GPFR user. Implications of the proposed 
theory must, necessarily, be assessed, at least in part, by induction as the interests 
of the investor are not logically derivable in a complete sense. We need to be 
cognizant of the possibility of variability in human behavioral responses to any 
particular presentation of accounting information (Lee and Tweedie, 1990). In 
relation to this empirical research, the market is well met by positivist accounting 
research. 
 
What is envisaged from the preceding discussion is that a general theory of 
accounting will be enunciated in terms that broadly support the direction being 
taken by the major accounting standards setters, the FASB and IASB. On the 
basis of the proposed theory these standards setters’ movement towards fair value, 
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prioritizing the investor and decision-usefulness, may acquire a coherent 
conceptual foundation (Stanton 1997; Johnson, 2005; Hague, Jones, Milburn and 
Walsh, 2006; Young, 2006). This has been somewhat underspecified (or implicit) 
in the development of concepts’ statements (Whittington, 2008). I do not intend 
much more here than a coherent rationale for existing developments in financial 
accounting. Some minor adjustments are proposed and it is useful to render 
explicit the theoretical precepts underlying developments in conceptual 
frameworks that can only be inferred at this point. The proposal is for pure theory 
as a departure from the sub-optimal trajectory of current conceptual framework 
formation (Wells, 2003; Walker, 2003; Dean and Clark, 2003). This position 
acknowledges the constraints acting on operationalization and yet it offers the 
prospect of establishing an unselfconsciously rarefied theoretical base to 
accounting. The function of such a development may lie in the need to qualify 
departures from the ‘ideal’ state, announced against the motivations for that 
departure. This issue is particularly instructive of the inferred motivation behind 
standards setters’ dilution of the qualitative characteristic, reliability, concomitant 
with the elevation of representational faithfulness. 
 
 The method of enquiry employed here follows that proposed by Moonitz 
(1961) and Sprouse and Moonitz (1962). This discussion describes the general 
social, economic and political environment in which accounting operates, 
defining accounting’s objective function as a derivation from that environment. 
The approach operates in the manner proposed by Hendriksen (1982) (as cited in 
the introduction) and Chambers (1955), by advancing a theoretically coherent 
foundation for the development of accounting standards. In contrast to the general 
historical approach to accounting theory, the articulation of existing practice, the 
approach proposed here is derived from primitive axioms. This acknowledges and 
adjusts for the limitations of atheoretical, ex posteriori empirically-determined 
‘theory’ promulgation (Whittington, 1985). These limitations include the ad hoc 
nature of the development of practice and the inability of such an approach to 
address new problems and situations arising out of a dynamic business 
environment. 
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 Dominant trends in the development of Conceptual Frameworks have 
broadly followed Sprouse’s (1978, p. 70) view, originally articulated with 
Moonitz (1962) in approximate terms, that: 
 “A conceptual framework has been described as a “constitution”, a 
coherent system of interrelated objectives and fundamentals that can lead to 
consistent standards and that prescribes the nature, function, and limits of 
financial accounting and financial statements.” 
 
This view, that accounting needs to serve the objectives of its economic 
environment in a consistent manner, was largely rejected officially at the time of 
its publication. The Accounting Principles Board (APB) felt that it moved too far 
from Generally Agreed Accounting Practice (GAAP). They were also concerned 
that an overarching set of principles guiding accounting standards would conflict 
with GAAP, at the time an amalgam of elements drawing on, and prioritizing, 
diverse, underdeveloped, sub-theoretical parts.4 Notably, the timorous nature of 
the APB in developing and promulgating standards was influential in its demise. 
Subsequent to this, as reflected in the Trueblood Committee Report (1973) (and 
subsequent reports, official pronouncements, and the FASB-developed 
Conceptual Framework (1974-1985), the view gained traction. Developments in 
conceptual frameworks and standards have demonstrated a marked and 
progressive trend towards coherence, notwithstanding historical cost’s persistence 
in what is generously styled ‘mixed attribute accounting’. 
 
 The primitive assumptions or axioms do not offer any view of the existing 
environment. They simply operate from a description of that environment, 
inferring optimal accounting for that environment. This may appear in conflict 
with the basic case made herein against historical practices of determining 
standards from empirical evidence of existing practice. This ostensible theoretical 
                                                 
4
 The objection that a coherent theory would conflict with GAAP, which was internally conflicted, 
seems axiomatic. It is circular in the sense that it asserts that something coherent will conflict with 
something that is incoherent. Where there is an undeniable truth to this assertion, it tends to leave 
one with the sense of no substantial increment to their knowledge. 
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inconsistency, that is, deriving ‘an ought from an is’, is obviated by the qualitative 
nature of the assumed descriptive characteristic. We can allow that capitalism, the 
substantially private control of productive resources, is a socially constructed state 
of grace yet still acknowledge from its base there are certain objective 
implications. Within the capitalist scheme markets are the principal mechanism 
for exchange, for example. There is no particular obligation to provide 
independent arguments for private capital. We do not need to justify capitalism 
before expounding its technical elements. Thus, the ‘is’ is the existing 
environment in the generic sense described by Sprouse and Moonitz (1962). It 
consists in free labour (non-slave labour), market-based exchange and the 
predominance of private capital in productive resources (Sprouse and Moonitz, 
1962). Allowing that environment, without preferring it or arguing for it, 
objective identities and relations can be extracted from it. 
 
The basic intuition here is that any objection to the described system as a 
whole would be optimally targeted at the system in contention and not some 
apparatus of it, unless the apparatus is the singular or primary source of objection. 
The idea that it is productive to corrupt or disrupt a system of social and economic 
organization, a mode of production, through indirect means presupposes some 
unspecified teleology justifies any kind of vilification of that system. Beyond the 
dishonesty of such an approach, it appears arrogant and susceptible to the 
challenge that it relies on ad hominem fallacy. Simply, an objection to GPFR as 
the foundation for an attack on capitalism is a circuitous route to take. In this 
sense, the use of stakeholder theory by critical theorists is viewed here as a 
device, conscripted for the harm it may inflict on the operation of markets and 
private capitals. There is no obvious, theoretically coherent commitment to 
stakeholder theory exhibited by its proponents. 
 
 The proposed theory, as described, will be primarily an a priori deductive 
argument, operating from rudimentary assumptions about the world but 
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substantially informed by a description of that world.5 From its sui generis base, it 
develops with an eye to the creation of a coherent, consistent whole. This 
foundation will be augmented (in chapter Four) by an examination of its 
implications in terms of the accounting valuation debate. This aspect of the 
discussion continues in the deductive mode but this is augmented by reference to 
existing empirical work. If the theory is to be instructive it must have practical, 
testable consequences. To a considerable degree empiricism in support of the 
theory must be promissory, absent its implementation. The utility of empirical 
work is it offers, at the minimum, the prospect of falsifiability for the theory. 
Specifically, falsification in the present context consists in somewhat limited 
speculative counterfactualism from the theory’s axioms to its probabilistic 
implications. Where it must be granted that this is ‘weak-form’ falsifiability, the 
alternative is that no innovation or development is ever justified because it is 
unproved. 
 
ii. Summary 
 Methodologically, a priori theorizing is the approach preferred here for 
the development of a normative general theory of accounting. It is necessary to 
look beyond the existing practice of accounting to develop a coherent theory of 
accounting. It is, at least, highly improbable that accounting, as practiced, could 
inform a theoretically coherent body of knowledge. Far more probable is the view 
that accounting practice has evolved from a political/cultural foundation, with 
conflicting priorities accommodated in an ad hoc and pragmatic manner. 
Moreover, it cannot, by the nature of its development, offer a referent base from 
which to evaluate and address new, evolving issues. For this reason the logical 
coherence of a theory drawn from elemental postulates is indicated, presenting the 
case for a deductive theory of accounting. This does not obviate the need to test 
the referent theory ex post, that is, empirically, against the self-described 
characteristics of its environment. This will involve an assessment of its success 
in satisfying its articulated objectives, including its targeted users and its 
                                                 
5
 Support for this approach comes from Moonitz (1961); Sprouse and Moonitz (1962); Staubus 
(1999); and Loftus (2003). 
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contribution to optimal market equilibria for securities prices as the objective 
function of accounting. The motivation behind this approach follows Kinney 
(2001), Albrecht and Sach (2000), and Belkaoui (1989), asserting the need to re-
establish accounting’s position in the market for financial information  
 
iii. Scope and limitations: Defining the research parameters 
 Accounting theory, as exemplified by the development of conceptual 
frameworks, has been frustrated in its progress by the too-extensive scope of its 
objectives.6 This fact is tacitly acknowledged by standards setters who have 
confined their focus to profit-orientated entities. Where standards setters may 
allow that optimal accounting standards would extend to cover the public sector 
and not-for-profit entities, practical constraints have informed the decision to 
focus exclusively on profit-orientated entities. Differences between these entities 
support the view that public and not-for-profit sector financial reports have 
different and more diverse constituencies (Herz, 2006; Simpkins, 2006; GASB, 
2002; 2004). Furthermore, the objectives of these sectors are different to those of 
profit-orientated entities (Czerawski, et al, 2008; GASB, u.d.). It follows from this 
that a single set of multi-sectoral standards would be harder, if not impossible, to 
achieve, necessarily incorporate more diverse treatments and, by, these means, 
frustrate compatible international accounting standards. I follow this narrow focus 
for IASs in the development of a general theory of private sector financial 
accounting and reporting. 
 
 It is further observable that standards setters are not committed to creating 
a set of compatible, coherent global standards for profit-orientated entities as an 
ultimate teleology. It is their intention to tackle this area of GPFR first with a 
view to extending from the fundamentals developed in relation to profit-orientated 
entities to incorporate standards applicable to public and not-for-profit sectors 
(FASB, 2008). The narrower focus is anticipated as a first step. It is the product of 
                                                 
6
 This forms an independent, pragmatic reason to prefer a narrow definition of GPFR user but it is 
not the central basis for the proposed general theory of accounting. To employ this as an argument, 
in the context of a deductive theory, would be misguided. However, it is not so clearly obvious 
that it is wholly useless to support the theory ex post. 
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pragmatic considerations, accommodating the fact that the development of 
universal accounting standards would be necessarily glacially slow, having to 
accommodate a substantially more complex array of variables. Tentatively, it is 
(or may be) plausible to anticipate extension of the proposed theory by 
recharacterising ‘user’ as ‘beneficiary’. This has more generic implications and 
separates GPFR from conceptual determination about the unargued for base of 
whom it is that uses such accounting information. An implication of this is that a 
conceptual foundation to the legitimacy of user use will be required. Use is seen, 
in this scheme, as no claim to rights at all. 
 
            The view that sectoral accounting standards must necessarily develop 
along separate, at least bifurcated trajectories, for profit-orientated entities and 
government and not-for-profit sectors, is a controversial one. One view is that 
optimal accounting standards need to accommodate all sectors (Walker, 2003; 
Wells, 2003). Against this view, Mack and Ryan (2004) argue for the separate 
development of standards for profit-orientated entities as private sector principles 
are not applicable to public sector reporting. Instead, accountability (stewardship 
in this case) for the management of public funds is more important for the public 
sector. Hopwood (1984) also rejects the value of SAC-2, which elevates decision-
usefulness, as inapplicable to the public sector. The Governmental Accounting 
Standards’ Board (GASB) argues that, in contrast to the FASB SAC-1, investors 
and creditors are not the primary target of public sector financial reporting (Ewer, 
2007). Society in general is the user of public sector accounting information 
(Ewer, 2007). 
 
 In its white paper Why Governmental Accounting and Financial Reporting 
is-and Should Be-Different (2007), the GASB detail the distinction between 
public and private sectors. The public sector has a greater propensity to longevity, 
a wider range of stakeholders and different revenue generating processes. 
Similarly, the not-for-profit sector cannot be meaningfully represented in 
standards produced for profit-orientated entities as assets’ revenue-generating 
abilities are not instructive of those assets role in fulfilling the goals of the 
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organization (Cordery and Baskeville, 2005). This concern is expanded by 
Simpkins (quoted in Sutcliffe, 2007), who argues that the pervasive cash-flow 
focus of IASB and FASB financial reporting objectives is an insufficient basis for 
the not-for-profit sector. A wider range of users need to be accommodated in not-
for-profit sector reporting. Principal concerns of third sector ‘financial’ reporting 
(and accounting) need to focus on stewardship and progress towards goals. 
 
 A further limitation to the discussion is that although the proposal is for a 
general theory of accounting, I will not be assessing the theory against the full 
range of its implications. This is a necessary concession to logistical constraints. 
Where some of the proposed theory’s implications are undemanding to infer, I 
will not expound those implications, or the reasons for those implications, in 
relation to, for example, the entity/proprietorship basis to accounting standards. 
Similarly, the discussion will not address the merits of consolidation of 
‘controlled’ entities into ‘parent’ company accounts. The theory purports 
generality so it must have pervasive implications to satisfy this purport. In this 
sense, although the topicality and central importance of measurement bases 
recommends inquiry into this area, it does constitute a pragmatically-imposed 
constraint on the proposed thesis. 
 
 Finally, and purely as a pragmatic device, the discussion switches between 
the IASB and FASB in its consideration of Conceptual Frameworks and 
regulation development, as though they were synonymous. In a significant, 
historical sense this is a misrepresentation. It is only subsequent to the 2002 
Norwalk agreement (Memorandum of Understanding, AICPA, 2008) and more 
particularly the establishment of the IASB/FASB (2005) joint project that the 
respective Conceptual  Frameworks became functionally identical (Whittington, 
2007a). In 2006 the FASB and IASB published the first draft chapters of their 
joint Conceptual Framework (IASB, 2006a). The greater resource base of the 
FASB, and its longer heredity than the IASB, tends to have supported the FASB 
Conceptual Framework as a starting point for the development of international 
accounting standards (Whittington, 2007b). What may be said now is that the 
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treatment of the two boards as functionally identical captures the essence of the 
situation. This should be qualified to the extent that IFRS’s appear to have moved 
ahead of SFAS’s, reflected inter alia in the more extensive IFRS application of 
fair value to non-financial assets (Whittington, 2007b)7. This situation is in 
contrast to concerns raised that the IASB may experience inertia, constrained by 
the need for agreement between diverse national representatives (Sunder, 2007; 
Dye and Sunder, 2001). 
 
iv. Summary 
 The discussion advances a coherent, substantially a priori, deductive 
theory augmented by reference to valuation methods. It respects the self-imposed 
parameters of major standards setters, confining its consideration to profit-
orientated entities. Further limitations include the inability to falsify the theory 
due to the general unavailability of observation sets relevant to an innovative 
theory. Part of this is due to the uncertainty of behavioral responses to particular 
information. Behaviorism could confound the operationalisation of the theory or, 
allowing a purest view of market efficiency, render the theory moot in terms of 
implications. Moreover, doubt must always attend the application of evidence 
from market efficiency of accounting theory and standards due to the dual 
hypothesis problem. That is, we can never be entirely confident of the substance 
of market efficiency without a corresponding confidence in the nominated model 
of risk assessment. Absent this, market efficiency becomes a tautology. The 
proposition of normative accounting standards presupposes the utility of such 
accounting standards and concomitant financial reporting to enhance the  
                                                 
7
  
As at 2005 minor differences existed between (FASB) SFAS-157, Fair Value Measurement, 
paragraph 5, and the IASB fair value definition. These included: 
FASB IASB 
1. Explicit exit price specification 
 
 
2. Reference to transactions between 
market participants as the basis for fair 
values 
 
3. Liabilities measured at transfer value                         
                                    
1. No explicit specification of exit or 
entry price 
 
2. Transactions between Knowledgeable 
parties in an arms length transaction   
 
 
3. Liabilities at settlement value 
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(Source: IASB, 2007e). 
 
efficiency of substantially efficient markets if it aims at decision-usefulness. If 
market efficiency is stipulated then all fair value measurement offers financial 
accounting is a more robust accountability function over historical cost (qualified 
by the potential of third-level fair valuations, if poorly specified, to confound the 
‘account’ function). These limitations place the principal onus on deduction and 
counterfactual inference to establish the veracity of the theory. 
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Chapter One 
Developments in Accounting Theory: Its relation to Users of financial 
accounting information. 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 This chapter charts the development of theoretical accounting by the 
academy. Such developments fall into three dominant eras. The briefest of these, 
the normative era spanning 1955 to 1970, stands as the only exception to 
theoretical approaches generally confounding normative theory development. 
This chapter serves two basic purposes. It identifies an important cause in the 
failure to identify a general theory of accounting and challenges the singular 
legitimacy of accounting positivism. 
 
1.1 Historical Background  
 Accounting evolved as a technology for recording financial transactions. 
From its historical foundations it has become central to the development of 
socialized capital, bridging the information gap between owners of capital and its 
managers. This basic characterization, the agency relationship, was generally 
unquestioned until the 1960s (Arai, 1970). General Purpose Financial Reports 
were assumed to target equity investors and creditors (Gray, et al, 1987). The rise 
of stakeholder theory and subsequent development of critical accounting theory 
challenged traditional GPFR user assumptions, as these theories argued for an 
extension to GPFR user status. These developments contributed to factors 
confounding the development of a general theory of accounting. Subsequent and 
parallel to these developments, following the period 1956-1970, in which 
normative accounting theories rose to the fore, Positive Accounting Theory 
emerged, rapidly assuming a dominant position in theoretical accounting research 
(Henderson, Pierson and Harris, 2004; Parker, 1999). The succession of 
theoretical approaches to accounting has created an environment in which 
sectarian interests have been able to enlist disparate conceptual credentials in 
pursuit of self-interest. The contribution of the academy, outside of the normative 
period, to a general theory of accounting has been almost singularly negative. The 
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role of the academy in accounting theory development has forced implicit moves 
by standards setters towards coherence (Bradbury’s (2008) inference from 
Whittington, 2008). 
 
 GPFR historically evolved with the socialization of capital to meet the 
information needs of investors due to their separation from management in the 
rise of the corporation. The industrial revolution led to the rise of factories in 
contrast to the preceding period in which cottage industry and agriculture had 
predominated. Business scale increased from the pre-industrial, agrarian era, 
resulting in scale increases in business’ capital requirements. The priority 
accorded stewardship is an anachronism dating to the feudal era (Kam, 1986; 
Most, 1982). Although the first joint stock company was formed in the UK in 
1553, with the first modern corporation dating to 1600 in the form of the East 
India Company, prior to 1775 commercial accounts were generally kept for an 
owners own use, with no external user to consider. The industrial revolution, 
dating to about this time, separated financing from management (Most, 1982; 
Enthoven, 1973). This development entailed a demand for audited financial 
reports. From 1800 to 1900 corporations in the United Kingdom increased from a 
few hundred to tens of thousands (Most, 1982). Financial reporting in the UK, as 
the progenitor of the corporation in its approximately modern form and as 
antecedent of the progressive development of financial reporting for the corporate 
entity, was substantially unregulated in the nineteenth century (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1979). Subsequent ‘watershed’ developments in accounting theory 
and regulation have been, and continue to be, responsive to the prevailing socio-
economic environment (Salvary, 1979), as will be detailed below. 
 
 Key developments in theory and practice have generally been reactive to 
negative economic developments (Dean and Clarke, 2003). One instance was the 
rail company boom in the US, of the period 1830, until its successive collapses in 
the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s, in which individual companies attempted to support 
inflated share prices by paying dividends out of capital (Cain and Hughes, 2006; 
Fogel, 1970). This practice was, at least in part, instrumental in aggravating the 
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financial market disruption that accompanied the bursting of the rail company 
share price bubble (Giroux, 1999). Later, in the 1930s, the first attempts to 
develop a coherent theory of accounting were made as a response to the 1929 
stock market collapse and subsequent Great (economic) Depression (May and 
Sundem, 1976). This influence led to an increasing recognition, reflected in 
regulation, of the need to augment Balance Sheet financial statement reporting 
with an income statement (Hendriksen, 1982). It also resulted in the 1933 
Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Commission Act (1934), establishing 
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), with responsibility for the oversight 
of financial accounting and reporting (Bush, 2005; Giroux, 1999). The Great 
Depression lent impetus to the project for the development of a conceptual 
framework for accounting. The widespread social harm caused by the Great 
Depression established a key foundation for society’s interest in financial 
reporting. This entailed regulation and the development of A Tentative Statement 
of Accounting Principles Underlying Corporate Financial Reports in 1936, 
published by the American Accounting Association (Wolk, Dodd, and Rozycki, 
2008). 
 
 A sporadic succession of attempts to formulate and articulate a general 
theory of accounting occurred between the 1936 AAA publication and the 
formation of the FASB in 1973. Attempts in the intervening period were 
substantially without immediate influence on the broad direction of accounting, 
until theoretical developments dating from Moonitz (1961) culminated in the 
Trueblood Committee report in 1973. Much of the theorizing of this period too 
obstinately held to the view of its function as an articulation and structuration of 
existing practice.8 Departures from this ill-defined atheoretical approach included 
the AICPA Accounting Research Report No. 1 The Basic Postulates of 
Accounting by Moonitz (1961) and Accounting Research Report (AICPA) No. 3 
A Tentative Set of Broad Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises, by 
Sprouse and Moonitz (1962). It is notable that these attempts to develop a general 
                                                 
8
 It is observable that Chambers’ Continuously Contemporary Accounting (COCOA) was not 
culpable of the charge that it was timorous in this regard. His theory will be discussed later in this 
chapter as an example of theory development in the ‘normative era’ of academic accounting. 
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theory of accounting encountered resistance from the Accounting Principles 
Board (APB) (AICPA, 1962). Their basic objection was that such an approach 
would come into severe conflict with existing accounting practice. The generally 
descriptive, traditional empirical approach to accounting by the APB was 
important in its demise and replacement by the FASB, from 1973. The FASB was 
established on the basis of the Wheat Committee Report (1971) and proceeded to 
act on recommendations in the AICPA Trueblood Committee Report (1973) to 
establish a conceptual framework from 1974. 
 
 The underlying socio-economic environment has had an important impact 
on developments in accounting theory and regulation (Enthoven, 1973). The Penn 
State collapse sharpened the focus on the limits to established accounting 
standards and practice. Elevated inflation from the early 1970s through to the 
early 1980s played an important role in challenging established accounting 
practice. In particular, the perception of the progressively declining relevance of 
historical cost accounting caused the growth in rival accounting measurement 
bases (Mattessich, 1995). Inflation receded in the early 1980s along with the 
threat to historical cost accounting as a measurement base. However, current cost 
accounting variants had rooted themselves as alternative measurement bases. 
Subsequent to this the Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s further threatened 
historical cost, leading to the gradual, progressive trend towards fair value 
accounting measurement by standards setters. The Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis 
had been aggravated by the transaction basis of historical cost accounting. 
Companies were able to select performing investments for realization, presenting 
an unduly positive view of companies’ financial performance and position. 
Further, no write-down in retained assets’ value was required under historical 
cost.9 Possibly the most recent major ruction influencing accounting regulation 
has been the Enron collapse (2000) (and other significant collapses subsequent to 
this), resulting in public funding for the FASB. 
                                                 
9
 Provision for impairment existed under historical cost measurement but to make the case that 
deficient practice was responsible for corrupting historical cost accounts of the period, we must 
conclude historical cost reliability, defined around the verifiability of past transactions, is 
compromised. That the sense of reliability historical cost promotes is dubious does nothing to 
challenge its centrality in the claim of historical cost proponents to conceptual superiority. 
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 Support for fair value was augmented by the 1994 release of the AICPA 
Jenkins Report. More so than in preceding reports, the case was made for the 
assumption of broadly efficient markets. This was undoubtedly due to the 
development of finance and economic research establishing a general acceptance 
of the broad efficiency of markets subsequent to its formal presentation by Fama 
in 1969. By the time of Jenkins Report the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
had survived challenges of the late 1970s and 1980s and was essentially capital 
markets’ orthodoxy. Although Jenkins remained at least tacitly committed to 
multifarious GPFR users, the clear commitment to capital market efficiency lent 
momentum to the promotion of fair value accounting measurement and the 
primacy of the investor as GPFR user. In the period subsequent to this, successive 
reports, exposure drafts and standards have increased the prominence of fair 
value. This gives rise to reason to believe that full fair value is the ultimate 
teleology that major standards setters are targeting. A parallel development has 
been the progressive narrowing of the GPFR user classification. As of 2008 the 
IASB interprets the primacy of GPFR user as investor, both current and potential, 
whereas the FASB still includes creditors in its primary-user definition as well as 
investors. Later, I make the case that the continued inclusion of creditors is 
unhelpful for coherent GPFR theory development and that it is unjustified. 
 
1.2 The Academy 
1.2.1 Introduction 
 Academic accounting is a relatively new phenomenon. Notwithstanding 
its youth and theoretical underdevelopment, or perhaps because of it, academic 
accounting has been influential in frustrating the development of a coherent 
theory of accounting (Inanga and Schneider, 2005; Walker, 2003). In the modern 
era the academy has attempted to operate on accounting from diverse, unrelated 
and often conflicting atheoretical or sub-theoretical perspectives (Higson, 2003). 
Three distinct, if not entirely temporally discrete, predominant theoretical 
approaches have been adopted over the twentieth and early twenty first centuries. 
The first was the substantially atheoretical derivation of theory from practice. The 
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intermediate period was predominated by normative accounting theories and 
spanned (approximately) from 1956 to 1970 (Parker, 1999; Arai, 1970). From 
1970 to the current time Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) has prevailed 
(Henderson, et al, 2004). The succession of dominant theoretical veins, combined 
with the definitional aversion of the first and last approaches to the development 
of a general theory of accounting has confounded such a development. Further, 
tensions between competing theories within each era have prevented the 
development of a coherent general theory of accounting. Notwithstanding this, 
standards setters have made progress towards a coherent conceptual framework, 
although, without the explicit theoretical articulation that may have obtained from 
a less politicized environment. 
 
 I eschew a discussion of the stewardship (conservatism, historical cost) 
versus decision-usefulness (relevance, fair value) debate in relation to the 
academy. In broad terms the academy has persisted with stewardship until recent 
times, with none of the mainstream eras systemically favouring a change in this 
state. This is less obviously true of the normative era but it remains so in the 
current (PAT) period. On this basis it seems salient to consider 
stewardship/decision-usefulness in terms of regulation and its theoretical 
information as it demonstrates a clear trend from stewardship to decision-
usefulness. 
 
 The relationship of theory as developed by the academy and the broader 
environment in which it exists, including the parallel development of regulation of 
accounting, is uncertain but it is not unitary. The broad socio-economic 
environment impacts both academia and regulation, creating an endogenous 
connection between academic theory and regulation, relative to each other and the 
prevailing environment (Schroeder, et al, 1991). It is worth noting that nothing 
about the successive mainstream academic theories offers unequivocal support for 
a stewardship or decision-usefulness preference as the paramount objective of 
GPFR. In general terms these rival objective functions of accounting seem more 
directly linked to the wider environment. Nowhere is this more clearly in 
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evidence than between PAT theorists Watts and Barth. Neither can say we ought 
to prefer stewardship/conservatism or decision-usefulness/fair value yet it is 
possible to derive the conclusion that Watts favours conservatism, historical cost 
and stewardship where Barth (2000) feels we ought to aim at decision usefulness 
and fair value. They seem to want to couch their inherently normative positions 
behind in putatively objective terms. 
 
 In Watts’ (1977) case the objective appears to be a ‘least harm’ view of 
regulation. He argues that the market would satisfy the demand for financial 
information without regulation. Costs of capital, balanced against costs of 
information provision, would ensure that optimal information is provided to 
GPFR users. Given this premise it is understandable that he would want standards 
as remote from representational faithfulness as possible so as to avoid disrupting 
voluntary GPFR market operation. This is as close as regulation can come to 
functional non-existence whilst existing. The opportunity for the market for 
financial information, as a subset of the market for capital, to signal by the 
provision of presently regulation-specified information would, on Watts’ view, 
qualitatively distinguish companies. They could rationally determine the optimal 
level of information provision, balancing costs of information production and 
presentation against cost of capital. In this sense Watts’ argument for 
conservatism in accounting standards is more accurately viewed as an argument 
against regulation. It is not so surprising that a theorist arguing against theoretical 
normativity in general would object to the inherent normativity of accounting 
standards. Similarly, standards are not something that are under any imminent 
threat, much as Watts no doubt feels they ought to be, thus his objective is best 
achieved by accounting regulation impotence. 
 
 Conversely, Barth seems to find much to like about decision-usefulness, 
fair value and relevance. We are told that prescription in accounting, such as is 
contained in accounting standards, is not the domain of academics. Their purview 
is simply to describe the world. They cannot offer indications in terms of 
regulatory prescriptions as this requires contemplation of a complex range of 
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variables that are properly the domain of regulators who must consider all 
permutations and their impact on society as a whole (Barth, 2000). Barth does not 
tell us why this larger range of variables is beyond the academy. We are not told 
why academic accounting cannot operate to empirically assess the value of 
particular regulation against the regulators’ own articulated objectives. It appears 
it is something that only regulators can do and then, presumably, by some arcane 
or abstruse process that does not entail objective empirical analysis. There is no 
obvious reason why positivist academics cannot contribute to an assessment of 
accounting prescription against the articulated objectives of that prescription 
(regulation). What Barth (2000) seems to be saying is that by her self-defined 
parameters to academic accounting research, after a certain level of complexity of 
the variables in contemplation, her methods, requiring statistical tractability, are 
of no value. This then, according to Barth, precludes them from academic 
consideration.  
 
 Similarly, no new insights obtain from the subsidiary ‘paradigms’, 
stakeholder and critical theories, as stewardship and decision-usefulness are both 
generally drawn as considerations, centrally linked to the investor. Conversely, 
neither necessarily relate exclusively to the investor. It is reasonable to interpret 
indifference of these subsidiary schools to the stewardship/decision-usefulness 
debate. Having said this, in a quite different sense, fair value as a conclusion 
achieved via decision-usefulness, instantiates market prices as objective values. A 
general aversion of critical theorists to the market, as the centerpiece of 
capitalism, underwrites these academics’ aversion to decision-usefulness. 
Inferentially then, criticalist support for stewardship and historical cost is (at least) 
implicitly more in the nature of an objection to fair value. 
 
1.3 The Modern Era: Accounting as G[A]AP (to 1956).10 
 In the pre-1956 period of the twentieth century, academic accounting was 
largely descriptive of the practice of accounting (Chambers, 1982). This 
                                                 
10
 The distinction here is between general accounting practices as opposed to any coherence 
implicit in agreement. This is reflected in the aggregation of diverse, often conflicting, accounting 
practices that formed the basis of theory in this period. 
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essentially narrative approach was unconcerned to interrogate its own process for 
rigour and coherence. This issue is alluded to by Chambers (1982), who 
bemoaned the lack of deliberate, systematic thinking underlying accounting 
theory as the articulation of practice. If it is purely utilitarian in design, then no 
explicit laws underpin it. Practice does, however, presuppose implicit postulates 
(Chambers, 1982). Plainly, only some untenably vague postulate, such as the 
argument from conservatism could be inducted as a theoretical commitment 
(Newman and Mellan, 1967). This is approximately implied empiricism. It could 
be articulated as a simple modus ponens, such as: 
 
1. Existing practice has survived and evolved over a long period of time. 
2. Longevity requires the usefulness and success of the surviving technology. 
3. Thus: Accounting as it is, is accounting as it should be as its longevity 
licenses its value. 
4. Thus: The sole legitimate domain of academic enquiry in accounting is to 
expound existing practice. 
 
This general approach is overdetermined in a number of regards. It is not clear 
that longevity entails the optimality of current practice. It is not clear how a 
purely historical, ex posteriori approach to theory could address evolving 
problems in a dynamic environment (Whittington, 1985). Myriad causes may 
inform extant accounting, thus we cannot know whether its usefulness and 
success are the products of capture, (that is it may have greater or lesser service 
potential to particular vested interests), or some other factor confounding its 
objective superiority. From this, we must reject the conclusion deduced at 4 also 
as overdetermined. However, as previously noted, it was this approach that 
prevailed in the first half of the twentieth century. Paton and Littleton (1940) 
articulated this position, advancing the view of accounting as centrally concerned 
with stewardship, accrual accounting, matching and measurement in terms of 
historical cost (Beaver, 1981). 
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There are reasons to doubt the quality of this early approach to accounting 
inquiry. It is only possible to very loosely infer the theoretical basis to such an 
approach. More than this, it is not clear that the putative theoretical base, the 
argument from conservatism, is particularly coherent as a relation to accounting 
theory. In the first instance, if existing practice is optimal, what incremental 
advantage is there in articulating that practice? Such practice evolved in the 
absence of its articulation. It is not clear how perfection could be improved upon. 
This objection may overstate the case in two regards. It may be that some pre-
existing articulation of existing practice is allowed and that current ‘best practice’ 
is optimal. We can allow these objections and still find reason to reject the 
guiding atheoretical intuition informing the codification of existing practice. 
Existing practice is the progeny of myriad, conflicting traditions. Existing 
accounting practice’s development was ad hoc and its ‘principles’ existed, 
oftentimes, in tension with each other. How, for example, can true and fair be 
reconciled with a transaction-basis accounting where, but for realization, the value 
of an asset held by a company is almost invariably some multiple or fraction of 
the dated transaction price? If true and fair is not faithful representation then what 
other thing is it? 
 
1.4 The rise of normative accounting theories 
 During the period of incumbency of traditional inductive empirical 
accounting theory, and subsequent to it, academic accounting turned to focus on 
normative accounting theory from around the mid-1950s (Staubus, 1961; Zeff, 
1982). Approximately from 1956 to 1970 normative accounting theorists came to 
the fore, trying to develop a general theory of accounting (Henderson, et al, 
2004). This approach operated in a prevalently deductive mode and oscillated 
between the true income approach (versus historical cost) and the ‘user needs’ 
approach (Whittington, 1985). Amongst academics contributing to the 
deductive/normative approach to accounting theory was Chambers. His proposed 
accounting system prioritized investor needs which he assumed would be best met 
by Continuously Contemporary Accounting (CoCoA). As an archetypal example 
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of the internal coherence obtaining from such a theory, and the possible 
limitations of it, the discussion turns to consider Chambers’ theory. 
 
1.4.1 Continuously Contemporary Accounting 
 My argument for a coherent theory of accounting is similar in motivation 
to that of CoCoA.11 The central intuition motivating CoCoA was that investors 
need to know the exit value of the company at any point. Underlying this view 
was Chambers’ preference for information on firm adaptability relative to a 
dynamic business environment. Where the present discussion differs is in the 
referent basis to reporting as an issue tied to investor interest in the firm as a 
dynamic element of its environment. Fundamental to this position is that investors 
specifically exchange the adaptability of cash for the expectation of superior 
returns particular to the ‘going concern’ assumption of specific firms. The view I 
take is that there is no rational basis unseating the ‘going concern’ assumption in a 
general sense, without independent, firm-specific reason to do so. 
 
  CoCoA was widely questioned subsequent to its formulation and 
articulation. Chambers (1976) identifies a number of characterizations of the 
approach that challenge its operationalization. The Sandilands Committee Report 
(UK) (1975) raised the concern that if the dollar equivalents of a firm’s assets 
rises faster than the index used to measure changes in the purchasing power of 
money, this would lead to unrealized holding gains recorded in the balance sheet. 
There is nothing untoward in this unless an assumption of the transaction basis of 
historical cost accounting is made as a non-negotiable dogma. Chambers (1976) is 
untroubled by this. It appears to be that the Committee was asserting that 
Chambers’ proposal to improve on historical cost was flawed as it was not type-
identical with historical cost (or, at least, it did not use all of the same 
assumptions as historical cost). It is difficult to know how, or to what purpose, 
Chambers may have responded to such an observation. 
                                                 
11
 Some problems with CoCoA may have resulted in its failure to gain widespread support but 
more probably its conflict with entrenched interests was responsible for this. The theory has been 
more widely vilified than is justified. Chambers details the misconceptions surrounding his 
proposal for accounting.  
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 The Sandilands Report also observed that a problem existed with non-
vendibles, that is, firm-specific (often) intangible assets. Although Chambers 
responded that a firm’s acquisition of such assets as goodwill and research and 
development acts to reduce the ability of the firm to respond to short-term 
circumstances, and might therefore be valued at zero at the acquisition year-end, 
this is the least satisfactory of Chambers’ responses. The exit price-basis proposed 
by Chambers to entity valuation strangely oscillates between excessive optimism 
and excessive pessimism. We can infer from the exit price basis to a liquidation 
basis to accounting (at least in terms of the balance sheet). By adding that 
liquidation is sub-optimal, given any incremental cash-generating faculty that a 
company has in relation to the asset over its salvage value, and further stipulating 
CoCoA’s principal relevance where liquidation is circumstantially imposed, we 
must, in Chambers’ scheme, infer zero valuation to firm-specific intangibles. This 
appears to depart from faithful representation. Conversely, exit prices, realized by 
dint of necessity, would place in question the conservatism (standard usage) 
inherent in the excess of pessimism described. We have, in effect, a salvage 
valuation basis, disrupting the going concern assumption without evidence to 
assume that the entity’s viability is in doubt. In general terms such valuations 
would be most relevant in times of sustained market dysfunction, rendering 
salvage values obsolete due to the widespread need to liquidate.12 
 
 If we allow that the criticism of excessive optimism applies only to special 
market situations, and that we cannot normalize a system of accounting around 
such special cases, we must still acknowledge that this is the general circumstance 
of CoCoA’s greatest relevance. That is, an accounting valuation-predicated on a 
liquidation basis will be most apposite to a period of trend decline in the 
economic cycle. Perhaps more importantly, notwithstanding its name CoCoA 
must, for practical purposes, be continually contemporary accounting. Allowing 
                                                 
12
 Essentially, CoCoA would be most relevant in a fast moving, declining market. The values it 
delivered as measures of firm adaptability would not be reliable indicators of realization values 
due to an implied assumption that realization en masse would further erode values. This condition 
of obsolescence would be further exacerbated by the continual nature of financial reporting against 
the continuous movement in markets. 
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the logistical constraint to periodic reporting we are left with a valuation basis that 
is, whilst generally glum, not nearly glum enough when the circumstances 
occasioning its greatest relevance become generalized. 
 
 A final reason to reject Chambers CoCoA is that the theory aims at 
accounting valuation coherence and standardization yet fails to deliver it. 
Chambers (1976) claims that mixed attribute measurement (Net present value, 
value-in-use, realizable value and replacement cost, or historical cost) are 
replaced by a singular method. Assets particular to an entity must be valued at nil 
or on a salvage basis where they have a residual value. Thus we would end up 
with a balance sheet that reports the scrap value of a company. Essentially, this 
would value firm-specific intangibles at nil, firm-specific physical capital at 
salvage, and generic assets at market less disposal costs. Importantly, none of this 
is fatal to the theory only so long as the balance sheet is regarded as a minimum 
guarantee of value in normal market conditions. This seems too specific a set of 
circumstances to recommend the theory for the general purpose. 
 
 Beyond Chambers’ contribution other notable academics involved in the 
normative period include Staubus, Sterling and Hendriksen. In Staubus’ case his 
argument was primarily targeting decision-usefulness. The common theme in this 
approach to accounting theory and research is that it makes the case for an 
axiomatic formulation of accounting. This entails the advantage of generality 
which is highly economical for developing systems (Mattessich, 1955). This, 
Mattessich argues, brings order to the ad hoc. Against this view Dean and Clarke 
(2003) and Salvary (1979) argue that such an approach makes accounting a 
simulacrum of the thing it purports to represent. Their view is that it disrupts 
faithful representation and that the conceptual framework project itself is 
fundamentally ill-conceived. Further, they argue that the existing social, cultural, 
political environment in which business operates provides the necessary concepts 
and constraints for veridical financial reporting. On this view conceptual 
frameworks actually constrain coherent, useful financial accounting and reporting. 
 
 36 
 There are some concerns that may be raised in relation to the objections to 
normative accounting theories by academics rejecting the idea of those theories 
per se. Their argument is inherently founded on an at least loose empiricism in 
their inference to the inefficacy of existing and past conceptual frameworks. This 
is not inherently problematic except that their empirical bases are politically 
influenced, evolving and inchoate standards of the past and (then) present. 
Alternatively they are the normative theories of the 1950s and 1960s which can 
only be challenged counterfactually (speculatively) or deductively. As in the case 
of Chambers theory (previously discussed), these accounting systems have not 
been categorically invalidated. Implicit in the preceding discussion of Chambers 
theory, the only substantive challenge to it is that it presupposes an objective 
function of the balance sheet that is not a necessary conclusion. 
 
 The second issue is that financial reports are always, and necessarily, 
incomplete representations of a company’s operations. They cannot be 
comprehensive descriptions. It is the role of a normative accounting theory to 
establish parameters to support the maximum possible veracity of those 
summaries. It follows that Mattessich’s (1995) view is correct that care must be 
taken not to impound systematic measurement, information selection, or 
representation bias into the nominated model. The model must provide us with a 
good sense of the essence of the thing it represents. 
 
During the period in which normative accounting theory rose to the fore in 
academic accounting, from the 1960s until the present, a parallel, subsidiary 
development in academic theory gained significant influence in the form of 
stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory’s significance to accounting theory lay in 
the basis it created to underpin a diverse GPFR user definition. This influence is 
evident in a number of official reports including: Trueblood (AICPA, 1973), The 
Corporate Report (ASSC, 1975), the Stamp Report (1980), the Conceptual 
Frameworks of the IASB (1989) and FASB (at least until recent times), and The 
Solomons Report (Solomons, 1989), amongst others. These reports identify a 
diverse range of financial accounting and reporting
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turn, has been obstructive of coherent accounting theory development due to the 
diversity of objectives it entails (Jensen, 2001; Beaver and Demski, 1974). 
 
From the 1970s, critical theory developed in the academy, challenging the 
prevalent views held by existing academics about ontology, epistemology and 
methodology. This emerging paradigm exacerbated the influence of stakeholder 
theory by employing it to license its anti-capitalist-motivated agenda. It argued for 
particularism, embracing a heterogeneous range of research methodologies 
(Parker, 1999; Funnell, 1996; Tinker, 1980).  Moreover, it engaged stakeholder 
theory in a virulent attack on the existing economic system. Important academics 
operating in this mode include inter alia Laughlin (1987), Tinker (1980), 
Arrington and Francis (1989). Their use of stakeholder theory was and remains 
arguably a pragmatic tool applied to frustrate the relationship between capital and 
profit. There is no clear objective causally linking critical theory to stakeholder 
theory. In this sense it is possible to infer that stakeholder theory is employed as a 
device rather than a conviction. 
 
1.5 The rise of PAT and its claim to singular legitimacy 
 The prevailing contemporary academic accounting theory arose from 
about 1970 (Henderson, et al, 2004; Parker, 1999).  This was the date from which 
positivist empiricism gained currency, later being formalized by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986). Chua (1986) qualifies a generally critical view of PAT, 
arguing it introduced rigour to academic accounting. This is somewhat true yet 
positivism also made the case that it was an entire paradigm, sufficient as a basis 
to underpin all accounting research. It is this latter claim that challenges the 
proposition of normative accounting theory. PAT argues that the normative 
theories of accounting advanced through the 1960s were developed from the basis 
of assumptions about the users and functions of accounting information that were 
never objectively established and that all subsequent theoretical developments 
from such foundations have no validity. Gonedes and Dopuch (1974) make the 
case that the normative theories of the 1950s and 1960s could be used to justify 
any argument. The positivist tells us, unlike earlier empiricism, that standard 
 38 
development is not within the remit of academic accounting (Gonedes, 1975). 
Instead accounting research should concentrate on the behaviors of accountants 
and issuers in terms of their choice of accounting treatments and presentations 
(Gonedes and Dopuch, 1974; Gonedes, 1975; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
 
 PAT as developed by Watts and Zimmerman (1986) purports to offer no 
prescriptions for accounting practice. Its claim is to simply describe, explain and 
predict practice (Gonedes and Dopuch, 1974). It is empirically based, in contrast 
to preceding a priori normative, deductive accounting theories (Whittington, 
1987). However, PAT must make assumptions, including what constitutes an 
interesting question and the efficient market hypothesis. PAT relies on the 
assumption of market efficiency as the foundation for its typical correlation 
analysis to derive probabilistic inferences (Whittington, 1987). The distinction 
between deductive and inductive, between normative and descriptive theories is 
one of degree. The positivist’s claim to objectivity, in this light, is ambitious. 
 
 The PAT theorists’ objections to normative theory, arguing for the limited 
impact it has had on practice (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979), is, in one sense, 
untrue and in another, inferentially overdetermined. In the first case normative 
theories, such as Staubus’ decision-usefulness theory of accounting and Sprouse 
and Moonitz’s (1962) call to reference accounting’s objective function against 
derivation from essential elements of its environment, have substantially informed 
developments in accounting standards. This relation of accounting to its 
environment was officially propounded in the Trueblood Committee Report 
(1973) and, subsequently, was influential in the development of the FASB 
conceptual framework from 1974-1985. It is undemanding to infer the significant 
influence such developments have had on practice. The second basis to reject 
Watts’ and Zimmerman’s (1979) inference is that even if there had been no 
influence of normative theory on practice it is overdetermined to argue the 
worthlessness of this class of theory. It is plausible to assume that no such theory 
sufficient to alter practice was developed. Lee and Tweedie (1990) argue that 
many accounting theorists of the normative mode prescribed solutions without 
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establishing user needs or decision models. This may, equally, be used as an 
argument for perfecting such a general theory of accounting, employing such user 
decision models and needs as an information base for normative theory. 
 
 What PAT theorists seem to want to argue against is regulation per se.  
Watts (1977) makes the case that in unregulated markets audited GPFRs lower 
agency costs. He cites substantially unregulated nineteenth century UK 
corporations as evidence of this proposition. This view, that unregulated financial 
reporting would deliver optimum information levels, is supported by Gonedes 
(1975), Berry and Waring (1995), and Edwards (1989). It operates on the 
assumption that a failure to regulate would incentivise the company to optimize 
(and increase in such instance) information production to lower the cost of capital. 
This view holds that companies would aim at Pareto optimization as a rational 
choice (Aivizian and Callen, 1983).  
 
This hypothesis is strained at the outset by its confusion of legal and 
natural personalities. To say ‘the company’ ought (would), if it is to be considered 
rational, deliver the information required by the market such that the furnished 
information had no negative implications for the value of the company, either in 
terms of the excess cost of capital from under-delivery or the excess cost of 
production from information overproduction, presupposes a legal fiction is 
personally motivated. Simply, the company is the aggregation of its investors’ 
contributed capital. Thus the argument is trivial. It is, in approximate terms, the 
position that investors (the company) are interested in their own interests and will 
target their own utility maximization. While I do not challenge this undemanding 
proposition, it is unclear that it is anything but a tacit rejection of the agency 
theory context that it implicitly recruits as an axiom. 
 
Watts (2003) argues that agency costs of debt could be controlled far 
better by covenants restricting dividends to a predetermined maximum percentage 
of profit. We must assume that he means debt covenants should include the basis 
for calculating profit and, also, that company returns of capital are (should be?) 
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governed by terms contained within debt covenants. What emerges is that Watts 
is opposed to regulation as an instantiation of a normative accounting theory. It is 
available to infer that he comes by his championship of conservatism for the same 
reasons. He defines conservatism as: 
 
“…the differential verifiability required for recognition of profits versus 
losses”. 
  
His explanation for the survival of conservatism is that it best addresses 
contracting and litigation risks (Miller and Young, 1997). It seems reasonable to 
ask if this control of litigation risk comes at the cost of saying too little. Watts 
(2003) tells us that the elimination of conservatism is likely to impose additional 
costs on investors and the economy.13 Furthermore, conservatism is unlikely to 
have unintended [any consequences at all additional to an unregulated market for 
GPFR?] consequences. We might inquire here if this is an implicitly normative 
argument for conservatism. It seems Watts (2003) is arguing from a fundamental 
objection to inevitably normative accounting standards to the conclusion that such 
standards, if we cannot get rid of them, should be as far from the margins of 
informational relevance as possible. That is, they should be kept out of harm’s 
way. This is an argument against regulation simpliciter. 
 
 What Watts (1979), Watts and Zimmerman (1986), and Sunder (2007) 
seem to hold ideal is voluntary financial reporting. This, it is implied, can be read 
in terms of ‘body language’ or silences (signaling).  It seems curious that Watts’ 
implied objection to fair value co-exists with his conviction that markets will 
deliver financial information efficiently. GPFR standards will never be exhaustive 
of all possible useful information and signaling is still possible with incremental 
information over that which is required by standards. However, standards do 
allow for managers’ accountability to shareholders for minimum information 
provision and subsequent sanctions. 
                                                 
13
 Curiously, Watts’ empiricism seems to let him down here. He seems to be saying he thinks this 
is the case, he is not telling us he has observed that the increase in costs is a probabilistic inference 
in any statistical sense. 
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 The case is made by Parker (1999) that the abandonment of the normative 
accounting theory project of the 1950s and 1960s, and the rise of positivism from 
1970, produced accounting based on scientism (Wells, 2003; Gambling, 1974). 
This scientism leverages off the success of the methods of the physical sciences 
(Ryan, 1980). There is no automatic sequitur in the translation of the success of 
these methods in relation to physical matter, to social relations.  Notional 
objectivity sponsored the view of accounting theory progress with ostensible 
rigour inherent in statistical testing of large samples in support of theories 
(Sterling, 1979; Parker, 1999). PAT also produced predictive models of economic 
and social behavior. Despite this, Parker (1999) argues that academic accounting 
has been in a stasis due to the reluctance of PAT researchers to translate their 
research into evidence for accounting policy development. From the preceding 
paragraph then, we would like to know, on the basis of evidence, why accounting 
should target conservatism. It almost seems as though positivists end their 
contribution without articulating their last sentence. This proposition is nowhere 
more in evidence than in Barth’s (2000) previously discussed article Valuation-
based Accounting Research: Implications for Financial Reporting Opportunities 
for Future Research. 
 
 One further challenge that has been made to positivism is that advanced by 
Christensen (1990). He argues that PAT can more accurately be described as 
sociology of accounting and accountants rather than an accounting theory. 
Notwithstanding Watts and Zimmerman’s (1990) counter to Christensen’s 
challenge, that accountants are essential to accounting simpliciter, and that the 
distinction between the study of accounting theory and accountants entails an 
arbitrary dichotomization, PAT does appear to be essentially ethnographic in 
nature. We might say here that Watts (2003) isolates a precondition of accounting 
as the thing itself. Although this may not be universally disagreeable as a 
characterization, it is unlikely to be one that sits well with positivists. We might 
add that it is inchoate as an ethnography as it does not go inside of its subject. 
Where Watts and Zimmerman (1990) contend that debt and compensation 
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contracts, and political processes explain accounting choices, and that these 
supply the only important questions, it is likely that we can enhance the function 
of accounting by reducing accounting choices. This is one objective function of a 
coherent theory of accounting. 
 
 An objection to PAT that Chua (1986), raises is that it is founded on a 
dubious ontology and discredited epistemology. PAT assumes an orderly view of 
society, discounting the view of conflict in social relations of classical political 
economy (Chua, 1986; Cooper and Sherer, 1984). This is done by positivists 
without specific arguments for this ontological commitment. Further, it assumes 
realism of the ‘objects’ of its investigation, clashing with the socially constructed 
view of the world advanced by criticalists and post-modern theories (Chua, 1986). 
The positivist does not need to rely on such a strong claim as the assumption of an 
orderly society so much as a general tendency towards order, underwritten by 
mutual assurance in Hobbes’ ‘comfortable seats’. The only caveat to the guiding 
positivist intuition is that society supplies sufficient, appreciable net benefits to (at 
least) the majority of its members. I expound a realist ontology in chapter three. 
At this point I will not challenge Chua’s (1986) ontological objection (inferred: 
from parsimony). It is simply the purpose here to identify the existence of this 
objection to positivism. 
 
 In relation to Chua’s (1986) objection to the positivist epistemology, that 
PAT relies on a now discredited commitment to verificationism, this objection is 
rejected. The verificationism of the logical positivist school has been shown to 
make overdetermined positive statements about the certainty with which we may 
know a thing. However, there is no clearly identifiable need for positivism to 
make such confident assertions. The practical implications of verificationism can 
be otherwise obtained from Popperian falsificationism or the instrumentalism of 
Milton Friedman (Henderson and Pierson, 1983). Unless I have missed 
something, the falsificationism or instrumentalism that Chua (1986) finds more 
epistemologically justifiable are no more than more cautious approaches to the 
same basic sense that obtains from verificationism. The former two are licensed 
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by ‘justified true belief’ rather than an explicit assertion of facticity and that is the 
sum of their practical differences. To describe this as a fundamental theoretical 
flaw is to hang too much hope for the critique of positivism on a negotiable, 
malleable tenet. Given the penchant of positivism for correlation analysis its 
descriptivism is really only probabilistic inference from inductivism in any event. 
 
 Chua’s (1986) concession to PAT, that it introduced rigour to accounting 
research, has some merit and it is in this that positivism has a contribution to 
make to general accounting theory; as a methodology. Provided PAT operates on 
externally sourced questions, such as those posed by regulators, and does not a 
priori determine the interest inhering in the questions it asks, such research can 
potentially provide empirical evidence concerning a normative theory, against the 
referent theory’s self-described view of the world. For these reasons, and as a 
counterweight to questionable theoretical developments that consist in a 
substantial part of post-structural and critical accounting theory research, PAT has 
a useful contribution to make to the development of academic and practical 
accounting. What is less certain is that PAT constitutes an entire paradigm. As 
Whittington (1987) argues, PAT has some fairly incoherent epistemological 
commitments. Although I have rejected Chua’s challenge (above), a priorism is 
spurned selectively by positivism, with deductive logic deemed unproductive yet 
mathematics and, more particularly probability, held to be legitimate tools. The 
key point is that positivism in accounting does not own its essence and it cannot if 
it is to sustain its claim to singular accounting theory legitimacy. Reason seems to 
exist for positivists to relax this assumption. 
 
1.6 Agency theory 
 Notably, the discussion has not directly addressed agency theory to this 
point. The discussion has implied and assumed the principal/agent relationship 
and its entailment that each party would behave as rational economic agents 
concerned to maximize their own utility in their mutual relations (Whittington, 
2008). This axiom is unproblematic in two independent regards. In the first 
instance the guiding intuition of the agency relationship can be inferred of all 
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arguments proposed for any classification of GPFR users, however broad or 
narrow. Regardless of our user definition we suppose each group so defined will 
use the information for their own ends. For it to be otherwise we would have to, 
for example, assume environmentalists only interest in company financial 
reporting was to be secure in the knowledge that investors were achieving 
sufficient returns. Naturally any claim to user status is motivated by the claimant 
groups’ own interests. Inferentially, the pursuit by each group of its optimal utility 
presupposes that groups’ individual interests will not feature in rival claimants 
calculations. For this reason the agency theory assumption of opportunistic 
behavior between diverse groups is uncontentious between the various theoretical 
protagonists and may therefore be stipulated. Secondly, for present purposes high 
specification of the agency relationship is not required. Simply, I make the case 
that soundly theoretically grounded GPFR can offer some minimum guarantee of 
control over managers behaving without regard to multiple period employment, 
without constraint by personal beliefs or informal social sanctions.14 These 
considerations obviate the need to expound agency theory at length. 
 
1.7 Summary: The influence of the academy and influences on the academy 
The discussion to this point has described the major developments in the 
accounting theory of the academy. These developments have reflected movement 
from inductive empiricism through to normative (or prescriptive) accounting 
theory. The final (and current) mainstream theory guiding academic accounting 
has been the new empiricism of positive accounting theory. Where the earlier 
period of empiricism held an at least tacit view that prevailing best practice 
formed the basis to develop accounting principles around it, contemporary 
empiricism (ostensibly) offers no opinion on this, they hold their function as 
purely descriptive and predictive. Subsidiary theoretical developments have 
occurred parallel to these prevalent academic accounting theory developments 
since the 1960s. Stakeholder theory gained significant influence over the academy 
from the 1960s and, from the 1970s, critical accounting theory began to develop 
                                                 
14
 Arguably, the assumption of single-period temporal parameters around employment of agents, 
inherent to agency theory, asserts an unsustainable view of human rationality. For this reason my 
basic stipulation of agency theory is ‘weak-form’. 
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to challenge the mainstream. The influence of these schools of thought on the 
development of a general theory of accounting is considered further in chapters 
two and three. 
  
 The academy and more particularly accounting academics have exerted 
some influence on accounting practice and regulation. This influence has, 
notwithstanding the normative period of academic accounting of the 1950s and 
1960s, been substantially obstructive to the development of a general theory of 
accounting. In some sense accounting academia may be too self-conscious 
because of the comparative youth of accounting as a discipline beyond practice. 
In contrast to critical theorist perceptions it is not so clear mainstream 
accounting’s retreat into credentialism through scientism, that is the aping of the 
methods of physical science, is motivated by capitalism’s legitimization 
(Richardson, 1987). Had the academy been so motivated it would have 
maintained the course of normative accounting. The basic problem with this 
criticalist view is that we must first be convinced of their view that accounting has 
evolved to certify capitalism. I argue that it is no less likely that it does nothing 
more cynical than adopt the context of its environment. Moreover, mainstream 
accounting theory seems to reflect more volubly a lack of any clear intent rather 
than an ulterior motive. If we are to allow the criticalist view we must also allow 
that the ‘hegemony’ interprets as much power to accounting as the criticalists do 
themselves. It is difficult to see how the hegemony could not secure similar 
advantages with any other, similarly abstruse system of financial accounting. 
Further, such power would have had no reason to belay forcing a ‘conducive’ 
normative theory if it had such agency. Notwithstanding the confounding nature 
of the academy, and possibly in part because of it, standards setters have 
progressively charted an independent trajectory, quietly establishing an 
understated coherence to their conceptual frameworks and standards. This is 
something Whittington (2008) implies is a standard setters ‘secret agenda’ 
(Bradbury, 2008). 
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Chapter Two 
The Development of the Accounting Conceptual Frameworks 
2.0 Introduction 
 Accounting regulation and its referent theoretical foundations have 
reflected the influence of the academy to a degree but standards setters, from no 
later than the early 1970s, have contained this influence with remarkable success. 
We can date the earliest attempts to develop a conceptual framework to the 1930s 
but the influence of such a theory only comes into evidence subsequent to the 
Wheat and Trueblood Committee Reports and the establishment of the FASB in 
1973. Where the academy has been influenced by seasonal attachment to diverse, 
and oftentimes nebulous and conflicting theories, regulation has substantially 
developed a distinct and progressive trajectory. The linearity of this trajectory, 
contra Watts and Zimmerman (1986), has been informed by the central intuition 
behind the normative accounting theories of the third quarter of the twentieth 
century. It reflects directional coherence in the often subtle devices it has 
employed to progressively narrow the relevant variables involved in the 
formulation of a conceptual framework. Against the substantial success of 
standards setters in quarantining regulation from accounting academy influence, 
political forces have partly frustrated, if not confounded, the development of a 
coherent conceptual framework (Gerboth, 1973). Notwithstanding political 
influences, arising out of the competing demands of a diverse constituency, 
regulators have moved quietly towards an understated coherence to conceptual 
frameworks and standards development and promulgation (Dalessio, Seiler and 
Jones, 1999).  
 
2.1 A brief history of developments in regulation and its theoretical base 
(Conceptual frameworks)15 
 In the wake of the 1929 US (and global) stock market crash the US 
government moved to increase regulation of financial markets. This led to the 
1933 Securities Act and its 1934 amendment creating and empowering the SEC 
                                                 
15
 Appendicies one and two provide a brief sketch of developments in accounting regulation and 
theory. 
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with oversight of financial reporting (Beaver, 1981; Fogarty, Hussein and Ketz, 
1994; Giroux, 1999). The 1933 Act supported a preference for investor-focused 
financial reporting (Beaver, 1981). It was in this context that the demand for a 
general theory of accounting arose (Most, 1982).  No longer was existing 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice considered adequate, as it was seen as 
implicated in the economic malaise of the time. The widespread economic and 
social harm caused by the market breakdown provided an insight into the ability 
of financial market turmoil to spread across society as a whole, causing high 
levels of unemployment (Carcello, 2007; May and Sundem, 1976; Sunder, 2007). 
This environment led the AAA, formerly the American Association of University 
Instructors in Accounting, to issue A Tentative Statement of Accounting Principles 
Underlying Corporate Financial Statements in 1936 (Wolk, et al, 2008). This is 
the earliest authoritative, explicit promotion of a deductive approach to 
accounting theory, supporting the post-1933 shift in regulatory focus to investors 
and creditors (as distinct from management) and the information focus of GPFR 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1979). Revisions followed in 1941, 1948 and 1957 (Zeff, 
1979). Parallel developments occurred when the American Institute of 
Accountants (AIA) produced A Statement of Accounting Principles in 1938 (Zeff, 
1979). 
 
 These early developments were advanced sporadically in the subsequent 
period until the establishment of the FASB in 1973. From 1939 until the 
establishment of the FASB in 1973, regulation of accounting fell, under the 
auspices of the SEC, to the Committee on Accounting Procedures (CAP) and, 
from 1959 to 1973, to the Accounting Principles Board (APB) (Burton, 1978). 
The AIA (later, AICPA), under urging from the SEC, established the CAP which, 
during its incumbency, produced fifty-one research bulletins. Despite this, CAP 
failed to develop a coherent accounting structure, causing it to be replaced by the 
APB in 1959 (Weinstein, 1987). The APB was tasked to develop a conceptual 
framework for accounting. 
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 Over the period 1959 to 1973, the APB adopted a pusillanimous approach 
to the development of a conceptual framework (Burton, 1978). Its approach was 
largely a product of its environment in that it tended to formalize existing practice 
(as in the previously described inductive-empirical period), without any explicit 
theoretical base to operate from. The motivation behind the formation of the APB, 
as successor to the CAP, had been the unsatisfactory nature of existing practice. 
When, in 1961 and 1962, Moonitz and Sprouse and Moonitz produced AICPA 
accounting research papers no.s 1 and 3 on accounting postulates and principles 
the APB rejected them as “too radically different [from existing practice] for 
acceptance at this time” (Zeff, 1979, p. 212). The 1965 issue of AICPA Research 
Study No. 7 Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice for Business 
Enterprises (Grady, 1965), took a more conservative tack than the 1961 and 1962 
research studies. Subsequently, the AAA monograph A Statement of Basic 
Accounting Theory (ASOBAT) (AICPA, 1966) took a more radical stance, 
advocating current cost accounting (Lewis and Pendrill, 2004). 
 
 The 1966 ASOBAT may be seen as an important turning point in a sense. 
It rejected past approaches, including Grady’s report (1965), aimed at justifying 
existing practice and assuming its value. This challenged the approaches of Paton 
and Littleton. In this monograph a substantially deductive approach was 
employed. The 1966 ASOBAT also took the view of accounting as a financial 
information reporting system. The aim of it was, as such, to provide economic 
information to allow informed judgments and decisions by information users. The 
case the committee producing ASOBAT (1966) made for current cost was its 
relevance to users (AAA, 1966). It also held that while there were many users, 
their needs were similar (Trueblood Report, 1973; Young, 2006). This device 
gained currency from this point, muting the implication of diverse information 
needs from diverse users. 
 
 In 1970, after five years of study and a succession of drafts, the APB 
produced Statement No. 4 Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying 
Financial Statements of Business Enterprises (Accounting Principles Board, 
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1970; Beaver, 1981; Zeff, 1979). The APB acknowledged its statement was 
largely descriptive of existing practice and not, as had been sought, prescriptive. It 
centred essentially on what accounting was at the time, some of which was 
inconsistent with other parts. It was not very useful as a tool in setting standards 
(Johnson, 2004). It did, however, initiate the move to elevate the information 
perspective over that of stewardship in accounting standards (Beaver, 1981). The 
general lack of achievement of the goal to establish a conceptual framework by 
the (voluntary) APB led to growing criticism of it within and beyond the 
accounting profession (Zeff, 1979; Weinstein, 1987). This led the AICPA to 
commission two major studies. These were to become synonymous with their 
authors, former SEC Commissioner Francis Wheat (The Wheat Committee 
Report, 1972) and the Trueblood Committee Report (1973), led by former 
Institute President, Robert Trueblood (Zeff, 1979). 
 
 The 1972 issue of the Wheat Committee Report and 1973 issue of the 
Trueblood Committee Report, respectively recommended replacing the APB with 
the FASB and provided the postulates giving direction to the (subsequent) FASB 
conceptual framework project. The Wheat Committee recommended the creation 
of a seven-man, full-time Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to 
replace the volunteer-staffed APB. It was proposed that the FASB would be 
established under the auspices of the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), 
composed of representatives of the AICPA, FEI (Financial Executives 
International), AAA and NAA (National Accounting Association). The Financial 
Accounting Standards Advisory Committee (FASAC) was also established, to 
provide research on questions of interest to the FASB (Schroeder, et al, 1991). 
Initially the FAF was to have a budget of between two and a half and three 
million dollars, composed of contributions from the preparer community. The 
APB terminated itself on the thirtieth of June 1973 to be replaced by the FASB on 
July the first (Zeff, 1979). 
 
 The FASB gained support from the SEC when, in December 1973, the 
SEC issued ASR No. 150, declaring that the, “standards and practices 
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promulgated by the FASB in its statements and interpretations will be considered 
by the Commission as having substantial authoritative support and those contrary 
to such FASB promulgations will be considered to have no such support” (SEC, 
quoted in Zeff, 1979, p. 219). From this base the FASB began work on the 
development of a conceptual framework based, in substantial part, on the 
recommendations of the Trueblood Committee. Progressively from this date the 
conceptual framework has shown an increasing focus on prospective, decision-
useful information that, while conceding multiple users, increasingly prioritised 
the investor and creditor as the target of GPFR. These trends were reflected in the 
post-Trueblood era in the 1976 Conceptual Framework for Financial Accounting 
and Reporting issued by the FASB. This trend was confirmed in the following 
year by a committee of the AAA’s issue of Statement on Accounting Theory and 
Acceptance (Zeff, 1979; Shillinglaw, 1979). 
 
 From ‘Trueblood’ (1973) the priority accorded financial reporting 
information related to, “information useful in making economic decisions”. It may 
be suggested that this does little to narrow the field of required information or, at 
least specified, within financial reports. The case may be made that all users of 
financial reports are concerned to do so because of economic decisions. Whether 
the issue is a wage claim, litigation or a demand for the company to act to remedy 
harm caused to society or the environment, the decision will, in some sense be 
economic. This is somewhat true, but by specifying economic decisions inference 
to the priority of purely economic decisions is available. This is one of the devices 
I suggest standards’ setters have used so that it suggests its preferred 
interpretation. Clearly, given such an interpretation, investors and creditors are 
implicitly preferred over other potential users.  
 
 Over the period to the late 1970s the user definition of GPFR was little 
changed in its formal enunciation. Despite this, subtle shifts in emphasis occurred 
within the explicitly acknowledged stakeholder conception of users. We see an 
important shift around and following the 1973 Trueblood Committee Report. In 
that report, following from Moonitz and Sprouse (1962), diverse users included 
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external users who had limited authority to command information, who rely on 
that information for economic decisions. However, these reports recommended 
accent on prospective information, including forecasts and historical cost 
augmentation with current values where historical cost is inadequate (Most, 
1982). This is an implicit argument for investors and creditors as users, signalling 
a significant move in future trends in standards. Furtherance of this trend was in 
evidence in the 1978 Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC No. 1) 
by the FASB. Explicit reference to users as investors, creditors and others making 
economic decisions, combined with the investor user primacy principle (FASB, 
1978, paragraph 34) affirmed the narrowing of GPFR users (Stanton, 1997). 
Where SFAC No. 1 identified 24 user groups it identified common information 
needs, consistent with those of sophisticated investors. Decision-usefulness 
emerged from SFAC-1 as a priority as well (Schipper and Vincent, 2003). 
 
 From 1974 to 1985 the FASB developed SFACs (the conceptual 
framework) numbers 1-5 (Zeff, 1979; Mattessich, 1997). SFAC-2 (1980) 
Qualitative Characteristics specified the objective function of GPFR as serving 
the public interest by providing financial information that enables the efficient 
allocation of resources (Flegm, 2000). This embodied the previously discussed 
reconciliation of stakeholder theory in its widest sense with investor as sole GPFR 
user. We also see an attempt by the AAA (1980) to reconcile the dual priorities of 
relevance and reliability. This was done by their discussion proposing that 
verifiability, possibly the most rigid plank in the defence of historical cost when, 
as it is commonly interpreted, it is held to be achieved only as an historical, 
documented transaction price, is interpreted as meaning a value that occurs where 
experts working independently of each other arrive at a similar valuation 
(Henderson, Pierson and Harris, 2004). SAC-3 also explicitly elevated relevance 
and prospective information, identifying a predictive and confirmatory function 
for such information. This basic view informs an element of my reconciliation of 
relevance with a comprehensive sense of accountability. 
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 In the socio-economic context of successive challenges posed to historical 
cost by inflation through the 1970s and the Savings and Loan crisis of the late 
1980s, the impetus from historical cost accounting valuation to fair value was 
spurred by the AICPA Jenkins Committee Report (hereafter: Jenkins, 1994, cited 
in, Colson, 2005). Another environmental development informing Jenkins was the 
prior and contemporary developments in finance theory, supporting the general 
proposition of market efficiency. Significant implications of this for Jenkins and 
of Jenkins for accounting were the support it lent to fair value accounting 
measurement, investor-as-user, and decision-usefulness as the priorities of 
financial reporting. Jenkins (1994; 1995) held that the central function of GPFR 
lay in its facilitation of efficient capital allocation by investors and creditors. 
Jenkins (1994) held that financial reporting was important to capital allocation in 
deep and liquid markets, phraseology that was to inform the specification of the 
preferred (first level) of fair valuation in subsequent accounting standards. Jenkins 
(1994) employed the ‘principal user’, possibly dating to ‘Trueblood’, to describe 
investors, creditors, and their advisors (Luscombe, 1995). This replaced a similar 
operation in earlier articulations of accounting concepts, whereby myriad users 
were acknowledged but it was held all user needs would be met by information 
sufficient for investors as the holders of residual interest in the corporation. This 
further supported the priority attached to prospective information, with constraints 
proposed on information only where it would compromise the reporting entity’s 
competitive position (Jenkins, 1994). 
 
 The trend towards fair value measurement by accounting standards setters 
that begun in the late 1980s continued through the 1990s, resulting in a shift 
towards standards requiring fair value (Ramana and Watts, 2007; Hitz, 2007). The 
traditional priority of stewardship was progressively eroded, from no later than 
the Trueblood Committee report (1973)16, in favour of decision-usefulness and 
relevance (Hitz, 2007). This underpinned the move to fair value which was 
demonstrated to have greater relevance by much of the empirical work of the 
                                                 
16
 Although APB Statement No. 4 could be said to have identified and advanced the information 
perspective, it did so timorously (Beaver, 1981). 
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academy. This was, in turn, an emerging trend concomitant with the trend towards 
international accounting standards, beginning in 1973 with the establishment of 
IASC. The trends more immediately corresponded and supported each other with 
the initiation of the IASC conceptual framework in 1989 (Whittington, 2008). 
This articulated the main purpose of GPFR as providing decision-useful 
information and, whilst acknowledging many users, held that they were typically 
investors (Alfredson, Leo, Picker, Pacter, Radford, and Wise, 2007). This initial 
stage supported mixed-attribute accounting but with a trend towards fair value 
(Nobes and Parker, 2004; Chorafas, 2006: Whittington, 2008). 
 
The development of international accounting standards for financial 
reporting has been accompanied by a progressive commitment to fair value 
(Alfredson, et al, 2007; Turley, 2008). This trend towards fair value is reflected in 
a succession of standards allowing or requiring full fair value measurement. The 
1998 IASC Draft IAS 39 proposed full fair value as an option (Camfferman and 
Zeff, 2006). The IASC successor organization, the IASB, Joint Working Group 
(JWG) proposed fair value for all financial instruments regardless of the purpose 
for which they were held (Chorafas, 2006). In 2006 Herz, Chairman of the FASB, 
found fair value to be the most relevant measure of all assets and liabilities (White 
and McNally, 2006). By 2005 International Accounting Standards (IAS) requiring 
the use of at least some fair value measurement included: IAS’s 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 
20, 26, 33, 36, 38, 39, 40, and 41 and International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) 1, 2, 3, and 5. Standards requiring fair value by reference to another 
standard included: IAS 2, 21, 27, 28, 31, and 32, and IFRS 4 and 7. Standards not 
requiring any fair valuation measurement largely included statements of items 
pertaining to current period cash, such as the statement of cash-flows, income 
taxes and borrowing costs. Also standards in which no relevance to measurement 
arises, fall outside of the influence of fair value measurement, such as standards 
pertaining to accounting policies and the presentation of statements (Deloitte, 
2008). 
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These trends in International accounting standards setting development 
have been mirrored (or mirror those) by the FASB. The move towards 
convergence, manifested in the Norwalk agreement between the FASB and the 
IASB in 2002, and the joint standards development project from 2005, has 
ensured a closing gap between the competing standards (Whittington, 2008). Each 
standard setter must be cognizant of relevant developments and measure their 
own pace against that of the other. The FASB’s movement towards increased use 
of fair value is reflected in a number of developments in its standards. These 
include:  
 
• Financial Accounting Standard (S)FAS 115 (1994) in which US 
GAAP requires fair value for many investments. 
• FAS 133 (2000) Requires fair value for derivatives. 
• FAS 157 and SFAC (Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts) 
7 (2006) establishes a common definition of fair value (White and 
McNally, 2006). 
• FAS 159 (2007) expands the ability to use fair value for certain 
financial assets and liabilities (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). 
 
The preceding list is not exhaustive of instances of the growing influence of fair 
value in US (FASB) accounting standards and it does not reflect the fact that the 
standards are, at this juncture, mixed attribute. What is in evidence is the clear 
trend in standards, both of the FASB and IASB towards fair value accounting 
measurement. 
 
2.2 Broad trends in the development of conceptual frameworks 
 The broad trends in conceptual framework development involve the 
fundamental precepts that inform accounting regulation development. These 
include such objective functions as stewardship counter-posed with decision-
usefulness. Also, the development of conceptual frameworks concerns itself with 
qualitative characteristics and the tension between these. This issue has been 
central to the relevance/reliability debate. A derivation of this conceptual-level 
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debate is the valuation debate between fair value and historical cost. In broad 
terms the debate has been for traditional accounting, entailing the priority of 
stewardship, reliability and historical cost, over the ascendant decision-usefulness, 
relevance and fair value. There is no precise tipping point between these rival 
approaches. It is not even possible to locate the first seed of the latter’s 
ascendance to prominence in certain terms. All that can be done is to chart 
approximately the rise of decision-useful, relevant, fair value accounting against 
traditional stewardship-focused, ‘reliable’, historical cost. 
 
 There was no clear challenge to the traditional, feudal foundations of 
accounting until the 1950s, when the academy advanced the idea that accounting 
should be decision-useful (Morley and Stamp, 1970).17 If we unshackle the 
operative term ‘useful’ from its substantially redundant attachment ‘decision’ we 
are left with the unremarkable conclusion that (at the very least, implicitly) the 
theories of Chambers (CoCoA) and Staubus (the decision-usefulness theory of 
accounting) were the genesis of decision-usefulness against the incumbent 
stewardship delimited ‘accountability’ view of accounting.18 I pose challenges to 
the ostensible distinction between accountability and relevance. I define relevance 
as a synonym of decision-usefulness combined with stewardship. We would be 
logically drawn to conclude this even if our decision was just whether or not 
management had discharged its duties in relation to the stewardship of resources 
entrusted to them. We do not really see a substantial reflection of this move 
towards decision-useful accounting in ‘official’ views until the 1966 publication 
of ASOBAT, the 1970 APB Statement No. 4 and the Trueblood Committee 
Report of the AICPA (1973) (Storey and Storey, 1998; Coy, Fischer, and Gordon, 
2001). I infer this period is the tipping point between traditional accounting and 
                                                 
17
 It is argued by Kam (1986) that stewardship was inherently conservative to pre-empt the 
stewards’ risk of overstating the value of an estate, with concomitant later period value 
diminution. Likewise, from the nineteenth century, auditors observe that there is little risk of being 
sued for understating company values. This approach effectively mitigates the risk of errors in 
accounting by means of saying nothing relevant at all, expressed in terms of historical cost. 
 
18
 It seems likely that useful information must also be decision-useful. Confirmatory value cannot 
be segregated from decision-usefulness or else there is no utility to the confirmation. At the least, 
confirmation provides some foundation to assess prospective information (IASB, 2008b). 
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the new era of investor-focused information in the US, a trend that would become 
international only later. 
 
 In terms of the previously described eras of regulation development, 
promulgation and research by the CAP and APB, they were a substantially non-
normative, descriptive approach. It was this reluctance to prescribe accounting 
regulations that led to the demise of first CAP, and latterly, after it had also failed 
to make significant headway improving existing practice, the APB. CAP survived 
from 1939 to 1959 and its successor, the APB spanned from 1959 until, following 
the Wheat Committee recommendation, it was replaced by the FASB. While it is 
not possible to assess the impact of the academy in any precise way, abductively, 
we might infer both were products of their broader environments. The 1929 stock 
market crash gave impetus to standards’ development but, without a significant 
heredity immediately prior to this point, offered little specification of what 
standards might look like (May and Sundem, 1976). In this context it is 
unremarkable that standards setters would attempt to move cautiously, codifying 
existing practice. The difficulty that lay in this approach was that existing practice 
was the operationalisation  of diverse, inconsistent traditions in accounting and, 
therefore, its formal articulation was essentially descriptive, and then, descriptive 
of all too many options. These problems were almost certainly compounded by 
the volunteer status of the respective Boards’ members. 
 
 I locate the impetus to change to more overtly prescriptive accounting 
regulation to the period 1966 to 1973. At the beginning of this period the AAA 
produced a monograph A Statement of Basic Accounting Theory in 1966. This 
appears to be the genesis of the priority accorded to investors and creditors 
(Young, 2006). This monograph also promoted decision-usefulness, establishing 
the origins of the regulatory trend towards prospective information. It is 
noteworthy that this trend occurred despite widespread resistance (Young, 2006). 
Sixty per cent of respondents to the FASB in the 1974 discussion memorandum 
on financial reporting objectives opposed the provision of decision-useful 
information (Armstrong, 1977). This trend in regulatory focus was tacitly 
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supported by APB Statemnent No. 4 Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles 
Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises (1970) (Zeff, 1979; 
Johnson, 2004). 
 
 Following the Wheat Committee-recommended establishment of the 
FASB, this organization moved to develop a conceptual framework to identify 
principles from which it would develop its standards (Giroux, 1999). The 
conceptual framework project, beginning in 1974, shortly after the 1973 
establishment of the FASB, largely operationalised recommendations developed 
in the 1973 Trueblood Committee Report. Trueblood continued the recently 
developed trend in accounting regulation focus, advancing the priority of 
investors and creditors as financial reporting users. Trueblood was influenced by a 
stakeholder conception of users, although this was qualified by the priority 
attached to investors and creditors (Parker, 1982). This committee also stated that 
the, “basic objective of financial statements is to provide information useful for 
making economic decisions” (Trueblood, 1973). Trueblood’s focus was on 
prospective information with a concomitant challenge to historical cost and its 
auxiliary assumption of matching (Flegm, 2000; Hawkins, 1973). Objections have 
been raised to Trueblood’s findings that the correct financial information 
communication would mechanistically entail correct resource allocation. The 
FASBs direction was clearly established in its Statement of Financial Accounting 
Concept No. 1 (SFAC No. 1), targeting (explicitly), “investors and creditors and 
other users.” Although SFAC 1 identified thirty-four user groups, the 
acknowledged priority was investors and creditors. This was reinforced at 
paragraph 34 by the stated aim of GPFR to aid, “rational investment, credit and 
other similar decisions.” SFAC 1 (1978) also specified a preference for external 
users without the power to require information, favouring investors. This affirmed 
the trend since 1966. From this time a functionally linear trend in accounting 
regulation from its historical bases of stewardship, historical cost and reliability to 
relevance, decision-usefulness and fair value occurred.19 
                                                 
19
 This is a slightly anachronistic usage, where current cost and other variants of contemporary 
values were proposed in the intervening period. I use it here as a short-hand. 
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 The search for a conceptual framework began in earnest from the 1970s. It 
is argued that this development was a reaction to external events, with particular 
significance attached to the collapse of Penn State (1975) and the perceived role 
of existing accounting practice in this (Dean and Clarke, 2003; Salvary, 1979). 
Undoubtedly the external economic environment acts on accounting and 
accounting regulation but this analysis ignores the importance of the FASB’s 
concern for its own prospects as an institution. The aggressive pursuit of a 
conceptual framework may be seen, in this light, as much as a reaction to 
exigencies created by competing political imperatives. Empirical evidence of the 
risk to the survival of a regulator of accounting is available in the demise of the 
CAP and APB. In this sense the FASB’s active pursuit of prescriptive accounting 
theory and standards may be viewed as a necessary, pragmatic policy of self-
interest. 
 
 Following the Trueblood Committee Report (1973) a succession of 
official reports were produced as a response to the recommendations of 
Trueblood. In 1975 the accounting standards steering committee (ASSC) 
produced the Corporate Report. This affirmed the decision-usefulness objective of 
financial reporting proposed by Trueblood and also recognized many GPFR users, 
qualified by acknowledgement that their information needs were similar. The 
novelty of the Corporate Report consisted in its view of a ‘national interest’ view 
of stakeholdership. This curiously may be used to support the priority of the 
investor as user of GPFR. In 1980 The Stamp Report was the Canadian Institute 
of Chartered Accountants (CICA) response to Trueblood, essentially supporting 
the general trend towards the decision-usefulness of GPFR. Subsequently, in 1988 
the McMonnies Report of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland 
(ICAS) and the Solomons Report (Solomons, 1989) supported the general 
movement towards relevance, decision-usefulness and prospective financial 
information (Smith, 1996). 
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 From the 1990s the FASB pushed for greater use of fair value accounting 
standards. This was mirrored in developments in the international accounting 
standards of the IASC. The 1989 IASC Framework for the Preparation and 
Presentation of Financial Statements affirmed decision-useful, investor-focused 
information. As previously described, these trends found support in the Jenkins 
Committee Report (AICPA, 1994) which made the case for market efficiency and 
fair values. Progressively the FASB and IASB (post-2000, as successor to the 
IASC) consciously moved to reflect common values and accounting treatments. 
To the current period we observe a progressive narrowing of GPFR user 
definitions, reflected in 2008 in the FASB characterization of primary users as 
investors and creditors and, in the IASB pronouncements, as current and 
prospective investors (Whittington, 2008). This conclusion obtains only from the 
primary user device. Lenders are still explicitly identified as users, as are 
creditors, that is, parties such as employees and suppliers owed, in general, short-
term debts by the company. We also observe the elevation of relevance and 
concomitant deflation of reliability. Reliability is now a secondary qualitative 
characteristic, or enhancing characteristic, forming one part of representational 
faithfulness. 
 
 The significance of the changed primary qualitative characteristic 
reliability, to representational faithfulness (OC 2-14; BC 2.13-BC 2.24, FASB, 
2008), in the IASB discussion paper and ED, is that it mutes the mutual 
exclusivity of relevance and reliability (IASB, 2005). The trend towards 
representational faithfulness as a primary quality of financial reporting began as 
early as the late 1980s (Hendriksen and Van Breda, 1992). This is consistent with 
the IASB’s prioritization of relevance in its qualitative characteristic hierarchy 
(Whittington, 2008). Faithful representation includes the elements: verifiability, 
neutrality and completeness (IASB Framework, 1989, QC 16). Further, the 
definition of verifiability has assumed the form:  
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“Verifiability implies that different knowledgeable observers would reach the 
same general consensus, although not necessarily complete agreement…[as to 
value measurement]” 
 (IASB Framework, 1989, QC 23).   
 
 This uncouples reliability from representational faithfulness, derived from past 
transaction-based historical cost by employing an indirect definition of 
verifiability (Whittington, 2008). This has been an important move by standards 
setters in the trend towards the coherence of singular measurement. Notably, 
assets are no longer “the result of past transactions”, with IASB Framework 49(a) 
eliminating this as redundant (Whittington, 2008). Where this is semantically and 
grammatically reasonable it is unlikely that this change was motivated by 
pedantry. It is more plausible to infer this is an element of standards setters’ 
attempt to undercut historical cost. 
 
2.3 Summary of broad trends in regulation development 
 In broad terms, regulators moved from a descriptive operation of 
accounting regulation development from existing practice to an investor-focused, 
decision-usefulness perspective. This development dates to the period of the mid-
1970s. This trend has reduced the influence of stewardship as an element of 
accountability and its reliance on, and implicit support for, historical cost 
accounting measurement, matching (of revenues and expenses), its transaction-
basis to accounting measurement and its assertion of reliability. In its stead 
regulators have moved to prefer relevant, prospective, decision-useful information 
that is investor-focused. This trend has been augmented by the relegation of 
reliability as an element of representational faithfulness rather than a primary 
qualitative characteristic in its own right (Whittington, 2008). 
 
2.4 Political influences on regulation 
 Throughout its history, accounting regulation has been subject to a diverse 
range of political influences (Solomons, 1979; Tan, 2007; Elbannan and 
McKinley, 2006). Partisan constituents have pursued their sectoral interests in 
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preserving existing accounting foundations and in challenging those foundations 
and treatments (Iqbal, Melcher and Elmallah, 1997; Miller and Redding, 1988; 
Benston, Bromwich, and Wagonhofer, 2006). The influence of culture on 
accounting has also been observed (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2002). Accounting is 
generally acknowledged as a societal institution and its democratic legitimization 
operates to justify this fact (Ordelheide, 2004; Solomons, 1979). That is, the 
legitimacy of accounting establishes an onus on accounting to satisfy society’s 
requirements of it. One central structural political influence on accounting has 
been the move towards common global standards. An under-acknowledged cause 
of this trend is Markowitz’s portfolio theory (Clark, Hebb, and Wojcik, 2007).20 
This, in turn, has at least implicitly supported the move to standardize accounting 
about a fair valuation basis. Politics have had a complex series of influences on 
accounting regulation. The preceding discussion suggested political 
considerations caused the FASB to forge ahead with a distinct prescriptive 
approach to regulation that departed markedly from existing practice. Other 
influences can be seen in the lobbying of industry groups, including opposition to 
a move away from historical cost by bankers and protest against the expensing of 
employee stock options, proposed by SFAS (FASB) 123. Against this background 
standard setters, since 1973, have made consistent, often discrete progress 
towards a coherent conceptual framework and fair valuation in accounting 
standards. This is, in part, due to their legitimacy agenda, which has made the 
Board substantially non-partisan (Fogarty, 1992). This does not entail that it has 
not been unconstrained, as is reflected in resistance to a number of FASB 
proposed standards. It is reflected in the fact that the FASB has promoted 
controversial standards, some of which it has had to back down on, that I infer the 
organization’s freedom from bias. This inference is conditioned by limitations to 
the FASB’s power. 
 
                                                 
20
 Portfolio theory creates an important pressure for cross-sectional comparability. This is 
significant for international accounting standardization because optimal geographical (and 
concomitant sectoral) diversification indicates international investment allocation. This, in turn, 
indicates the need for standardized financial reporting. 
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 Some reasons exist to infer that the contemporary accounting valuation 
debate, consistent with past debate, observes a sub-optimal trajectory. It has been 
argued that the FASB has fallen captive to constituent groups (Levitt, 2007; 
Stigler, 1971; Richardson, 1981). Also, it is notable that PriceWaterhouse 
Cooper’s opposition to regulation, proposing self-regulation by the accounting 
profession, has been in evidence from at least the start of the shift in regulators’ 
intentions towards current and, more recently, fair values, that is, since the mid-
1980s (Berton and Schiff, 1990). This general influence of the profession on the 
regulator has been an enduring factor confounding the independent operation of 
the Board and its progress towards a coherent conceptual framework and 
standards derived from such (Levitt, 2007). 
 
 The potential for improvement in this condition arose with preparer-
community independent funding for the FASB provided under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX).21 However, the introduction of public funding, compared with 
independent funding, continues to constrain the independence of the FASB 
(Levitt, 2007). The case has been made that the FASB, and FAF (Financial 
Accounting Foundation) Trustees who select the members of the FASB, should 
possess a demonstrable regard for the investing public. Levitt (2007) has proposed 
a mission statement prioritizing the investing public to help to avoid the present 
convolution in accounting standards, instantiating transparent, comprehensive and 
cohesive accounting information. Present standards’ complexity reflects diverse 
constituents’ demands (FASB, 2002). 
 
 This general situation feeds into accounting debate as the generative 
theories of particular standards, however ill-defined, are progressively perverted 
by compromises to vested interests (IASB, 2006b). It follows from this that 
empirical evidence for, for example fair value, is modeled and tested around 
dilute, confused forms of the original theoretical foundations (Herz and 
                                                 
21
 An interesting if tangential question is whether ‘constituent’ demands have grown in 
disproportion to evolving standards, subsequent to the levy-based FASB vote from public funds, 
established under SOX. Certainly, this would entail valuable leverage to donees of the marginal 
FASB funding, especially given the ability of the preparer community to protest the inefficacy of a  
substantially better financed FASB. 
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MacDonald, 2008). The growing size of FAS-133 Accounting for Derivatives 
reflects this influence (Levitt, 2007). Once a relatively brief document, FAS-133 
continues to grow into (presently) over eight hundred pages of rules and 
interpretations. This development reflects the importance attached to partisan 
constituencies in the evolution of accounting regulation, in what has been a 
persistently highly politicized field (Tan, 2007). Bratten (2004) argues that the 
litigious US environment poses unique risks of rent-seeking behavior against 
auditors if the move to principles-based accounting is too precipitous. In this 
context, auditor demand for rules establishes a significant source of the 
complexity in US accounting regulation. 
 
 The case may be made that the described situation exemplifies accounting 
standards’ setting as an area that is uniquely vulnerable to capture (Levitt, 2007; 
Stigler, 1971). The aggregate importance of financial accounting relevance to the 
investing public must exceed the gains secured by particular vested interests as 
those interests gain only as a function of their ability to exploit the agency 
relationship for economic rents from such exploitation, less transaction costs and 
‘disinformation’ costs of exploitation. In the case of accounting regulation the 
concentration of vested interests, coupled with the structure of regulation and the 
regulator’s dependence on preparer funding, functionally assure the capture of the 
regulator, at least partially. In this context it is not obvious that the existing 
structure of regulation is conducive to the development of a general theory of 
accounting for business enterprises or, that even if this is achievable, the 
principles of such a theory will translate into standards. This, however, stands as 
an argument for levy-based funding of the standard setter, directly channeled to 
that body, sufficient that it is not dependent on the preparer community. The case 
for fair value, except as it has manifested under the current structure as a dilute 
component of mixed attribute accounting, is not centrally conceptually implicated 
in this issue. 
 
 In general terms the debate between fair value and historical cost 
proponents is highly political (Zeff, 1991; Fearnley and Hines, 2003). Frequently 
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arguments are employed to confuse important issues rather than address them. 
The following discussion considers the rival positions. An assessment of the 
merits of the respective arguments is made. This references back to the postulates 
and principles described in the preceding chapter.  
 
 Beyond ‘constituent’ resistance the tension between private standards 
setting and government control of the regulatory process has been influential on 
the FASB (CFO, 2007). Prior to 2002, funding for the FAF, the parent body of the 
FASB, was sourced from product sales and voluntary contributions. Subsequent 
to the enactment of SOX (2002), section 109, funding came via a levy paid by 
public issuers. The SEC controls this funding, requiring annual budgets from the 
FASB for SEC approval. In 2007 the Commission delayed Board funding for four 
months, until it was granted greater power by the FASB to determine the 
composition of the Board (Rappeport and Leone, 2007). This poses risks to the 
neutrality of the FASB as the SEC is subject to direct political pressure from 
constituent-enlisted Senators and Congressmen. The specialized nature of 
political interest in accounting issues, which is largely reactive to lobbyist 
pressure or adverse economic circumstances, has shown a tendency to 
compromise the integrity of ostensibly democratic influence exerted over the 
SEC, through Congress. 
 
 The politics of accounting regulation has been significant in the 
development of international accounting standards (Zeff, 2002; Chorafas, 2006; 
Alexander and Archer, 2000; Street, 2007; Benston, et al, 2006). The IASB has 
been beset by risks of interference, constraining its ability to too tightly specify 
standards or eliminate accounting options (Zeff, 2002). The organization has 
encountered aggressive responses to any requirements it has attempted to impose 
that constituents find objectionable. Through to the late 1990s the IASC 
(predecessor to the IASB) was regarded very much as an inferior standard setter 
by the FASB and SEC (Volcker, 2001). At this point it was a voluntary 
organization, composed of up to eighty members that was, in general, viewed as 
producing minimal substantial contributions to standards development. Being 
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composed of numerous member countries, the IASC had difficulty achieving 
significant progress (Street, 2007). Further, some professional bodies selected 
delegates as a reward for service to accounting in general rather than due to 
participation in national standard setting, potentially being represented at the 
IASC by people without any interest or proficiency in the standard setting process 
(Street, 2006). 
 
 Under the leadership of the UK, that which was known as G4+1 evolved 
as a rival international standard promulgator. This ‘union’ was composed of 
English-speaking countries with broadly consistent views on the objective 
functions of financial accounting. Tension arose between the respective bodies, in 
particular, when G4+1 proposals were assumed under the IASC banner without 
acknowledgement (Zeff, 2002). The European Commission moved from effective 
disdain for the IASC to a supportive position, largely as a reaction to concerns 
that their standards setting autonomy would be subsumed by US GAAP 
(Camfferman and Zeff, 2006). A realization by the major standards setters that 
conflict between them would be mutually damaging led to the IASC’s acceptance 
of its need for structural change, promoted to it by the SEC and FASB (Zeff, 
2002).  In 2000 the IASB assumed a structure similar to the FASB, paving the 
way for concord in subsequent years, facilitating continuing progress towards 
convergence. 
 
 The political influences that beset the IASC (and, later, the IASB) were 
distinct from, but no greater than, domestic political pressures on the FASB. 
Through the 1990s the FASB had to retreat from a number of proposed standards, 
including: their proposal to take fair value adjustments to marketable securities 
into income, the mandatory twenty year maximum amortization of acquired 
goodwill, and expensing Employee Stock Options (ESO’s) (Zeff, 2002). 
Lobbyists enlisted the support of numerous government agencies, including 
Senators, the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, The 
Secretary for the Treasury, and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (Zeff, 
2002). In the 1990s pressure for more ‘pragmatism’ on the part of the Board led to 
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an increase in Board representatives from industry, from one to two (Mattli and 
Buthe, 2005). The requirement for a simple Board majority (4-3) was replaced 
with a supermajority (5-2) requirement when instituting standards due to lobbyist 
pressure (Mattli and Buthe, 2005). The power of the US enforcement mechanism, 
through the ability of the SEC to suspend trading in non-(FASB) compliant 
companies is positively related to the strength of lobbying in the US (Zeff, 2002). 
 
 Additional factors motivating convergence were the 1997 Asian crisis and, 
in 2001, the collapse of Enron. The Asian crisis, precipitated by a slump in 
Thailand’s sharemarket, had far-reaching affects. The ‘contagion’ crisis 
demonstrated a need to increase financial reporting rigour (and financial asset 
market regulation) to developing countries, providing independent support for the 
development of IFRS’s. Enron can be said to have qualified the self-assurance of 
the FASB, and the SEC in the FASB. This qualification was influenced by the 
somewhat disingenuous “rules versus principles” debate.  The disingenuity was in 
that the implied mutual exclusivity takes a gratuitously simplistic stance, that the 
conceptual framework is, in one breath, viewed as a peculiarly American vice, 
and in another, a virtue of non-American accounting regulation. Nonetheless, 
Enron precipitated SOX and a more ‘sheepish’ FASB and renewed plaudits for 
principles-based regulation (Millstein, Bajpas, Berglof, and Claessens, 2008). 
These factors were significant in the impetus behind the new (2000) IASB and its 
role in standards setting. 
 
 It was in this context, and in the FASBs explicit responsibility to converge 
with IASB standards, that control of domestic political forces operated to 
commend FASB support for the International standards setter (Zeff, 2002; 
Camfferman and Zeff, 2006; Benston, Bromwich, Litan and Wagenhofer , 2006; 
Street, 2006). This, in turn, required an international organization more effectively 
structured than the IASC to advance accounting standards standardization (Street, 
2007). The IASC need for a 75% majority to pass standards, the lack of standards 
setting inclination or aptitude of many delegates, and the cumbersome size of the 
IASC, led to US (FASB; SEC) pressure to transform the IASC into a smaller 
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Board of professionals, supported by an expanded staff (Street, 2007). These 
initiatives resulted in the replacement of the IASC with the IASB in 2000 (Zeff, 
2002; Street, 2007; Volcker, 2001).  Subsequent to this development, progressive 
steps towards common standards is in evidence. Standards are now developed 
endogenously between the FASB and IASB, in a functionally continuous 
feedback loop. 
 
The conventional view of accounting (GPFR) is that it should account for 
the managements’ stewardship of investors’ contributed capital using historical 
cost. This has served a variety of interests well. This has led those interests 
attending their own advantage in historical cost accounting to resist developments 
in regulation away from traditional accounting foundations. An important group 
who resist the trend towards fair value is the banking sector. I identify this group 
for separate consideration as it is instructive of the importance of the narrowest 
possible user definition. The banking industry has expressed general objections to 
any movement away from historical cost accounting, using their creditor status to 
advance arguments that are inseparable from their issuer role. In effect this 
revisits the now widely discredited consideration of managers as users. That is, 
their resistance to fair value relates essentially to the heightened volatility fair 
value entails for their financial assets (Alkon, 2006). 
 
 The banking industry has expressed concern that the increased volatility of 
fair value accounting for financial instruments will adversely impact their cost of 
capital (Alkon, 2006). This, it is argued, has resulted in increased share price 
volatility subsequent to FAS 133, a standard introducing fair value accounting for 
derivatives.22 Evidence collected by Alkon (2006) suggests no such realized (in 
the share price) volatility would occur as markets had already priced it in. What is 
not clear is why banks felt any increased share price volatility would be 
unjustified as a reflection of inherent industry risk, enabling the more efficient 
allocation of capital (away from the banking sector). Further, the concern raised 
                                                 
22
 This standard introduced a scale of varying degrees of fair value relative to the ‘hedge’ or 
speculative character of particular derivatives. 
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by banks that fair values may cause breaches of reserve requirements, as they 
could not control recorded accounting values by retention or realization, is an 
argument against bank prudential regulations simpliciter or at least an argument to 
lower reserve asset ratios.  
 
Banks specifically argued that the market value of their loan portfolios 
may not reflect their full economic value to the bank (Carroll, Linsmeier, and 
Petroni, 2002). This is an argument for a firm-specific discounted cash-flow 
advantage in holding a particular asset. Another argument made by the banking 
industry was that, in their capacity as creditors, the conservatism of the historical 
cost realization basis for recognition better enabled them to assess the credit risk 
of potential debtors (O’Brien, 2005). This argument offers the appearance of 
disingenuity as it presupposes banks’ credit risk modeling cannot adapt to any 
change in accounting numbers. The assumption that this provides a margin of 
safety is uncertain. It is almost certainly untrue of the historical costs of newly 
established companies in sharply falling markets. Moreover, the heterogeneous 
nature of historical cost valuations provides a highly variable safety margin where 
there is no obvious reason why banks could not lend against fair values at a 
reduced percentage of that value. This argument importantly identifies the reason 
for the priority I have given to a narrow user definition. The argument confounds 
accounting regulation progress in that it frustrates identification of the substantive 
reasons for objection to particular regulations. Thus, an independent basis for the 
user-as-investor is its practical advantage. 
 
 Another ‘user’ group that has identified itself as such is Financial 
Executives International (FEI). They have argued for historical cost measurement 
(Cunningham, 2004). As former CEO of FEI, Cunningham argued on behalf of 
her members, in the 2004 issue of Financial Executive article “Fair Value. Fair 
for whom?”, that relevant information that was not reliable was useless (Toppe-
Shortridge, Schroeder, and Wagoner, 2006). The disingenuity of this argument 
against fair value was reflected in her subsequent acknowledgement that financial 
analysts would prefer to retain the competitive advantage they had in deriving fair 
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value information from historical cost accounting reports (Fink, 2006). This is 
effectively an argument for industry enclosure by proxy rather than a concern for 
the relevance or reliability of accounting information. FEI has been remarkably 
consistent in their opposition to developments in accounting regulation, reflected 
in (then) FEI President Phil Livingston’s opposition to expensing ESOs (Zeff, 
2002). Again we see a diverse GPFR user definition confounding coherent 
standard development, elevating the particular interests of the ostensible user. It is 
not clear that analysts as users are other than derivative users and that this 
derivation is a function of investors-as-users. 
 
 The persistent resistance of FEI to accounting change is admittedly 
extremist. The voluble objections of Livingston to expensing ESOs reflected the 
general commitment of the organization to financial reporting opacity and 
obfuscation. To argue, as Livingston did, that the treatment of such employee 
compensation in the US was not going to change, that it was an intractable issue 
(Zeff, 2002), and that the IASB should therefore leave it alone, transpired not only 
to be incorrect, it was manifestly partisan. The comment was made against the 
backdrop of the rise of technology companies and their penchant for ESO 
largesse. That an organization of (presumed) credibility could argue so insistently 
for the vested interests of ‘employees’ (management) of technology companies 
(amongst others) should have been reasonable grounds to discredit the views of 
the organization. Their argument was predicated on an heredity of theft 
concealment and the putative right that heredity warranted to its continuation. 
Nonetheless, the organization has been a vocal and influential participant in the 
politics of accounting regulation. 
 
 The role of politics on accounting regulation took one of its most extreme 
manifestations in the vociferous protests following the FASB ED (1993) proposal 
to expense ESOs (Ratliff, 2005). The exposure draft (ED) (1993) that proposed a 
requirement to expense ESO was diluted in SFAS 123 to a recommendation to 
expense ESO. Various suspect arguments were raised including: 
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1. That ESOs do not need to be expensed as their impact is already reflected 
in the subsequent dilution of equity investors’ interests upon issue of securities, 
pursuant to the terms of the options or, as is now the case, reflection of the impact 
is made by the fully diluted basis (Hagopian, 2006). 
2. Where options have no intrinsic value, that is, where the current market 
price is equal to or greater than the issue price, they entail no cost to shareholders. 
3. Stock options are impossible to value where they are subject to certain 
restriction/conditions that do not apply to market-traded options. 
4.  It was argued that expensing ESOs would have a detrimental impact on 
US business by lowering earnings, reducing innovation and competitiveness in 
the international marketplace (Ratliff, 2005; Schroeder and Schauer, 2008). 
 
In relation to these arguments, number one, while true, it is always true of any 
expense that it will dilute the claims of shareholders. It is not obvious what 
construction might be put on employee compensation other than viewing it as an 
expense. In relation to point two (above), if the options have no value, thus 
entailing no cost to the company, why do employees want them? Further, if 
employees were to be paid the equivalent value in cash, and we grant that options 
are not an expense to the company, why are salaries an expense? Protests over 
SFAS 123 delayed the implementation of obligatory ESO expensing. It also 
involved intervention by politicians (Ratliff, 2005). In relation to point 4, this 
assumes a profound level of market inefficiency. It is not clear that the change 
would have a significant impact and, if it did, whether that impact would have 
been broadly negative. It may have anticipated the deflation of the ‘tech bubble’. 
 
2.5 Summary  
 A diverse range of political influences impact accounting regulation. This 
has been seen in arguments for and against specific accounting treatments and 
changes in these over time. These political forces have operated on and between 
standards setters with, until recently, an implicit ‘demarcation dispute’ between 
the IASC and FASB (and FASB-plus, G4+1). Until the succession of the IASC, 
by the IASB, the SEC and FASB view of the superiority of their organization was 
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probably warranted (Volcker, 2001). FASB control of political forces has almost 
certainly contributed to the advancement of the IASB (Street, 2007). The central 
intuition behind the proposed theory of accounting is that, from both a practical 
and conceptual perspective, the more we can narrow the definition of GPFR users, 
and the more we can filter out the influence of political forces on standards 
development, the greater the basis for confidence in developing a general theory 
of accounting (Miller, 1999; Dalessio, et al, 1999). We can eliminate numerous 
confounding influences. I also make the case that standards’ setters have 
discretely, incrementally been guided by this intuition and that they have been 
remarkably successful in implementing an understated, conceptually coherent 
conceptual framework and standards, against a challenging political environment. 
 
 The preceding discussion serves a number of basic functions in relation to 
the proposed theory. It establishes the factors preventing the formation of a 
coherent theory of GPFR to this point. In some sense this qualifies the improbable 
presumption of a viable theory of accounting that has been unattainable to this 
point. Beyond this, the elements that a coherent theory of GPFR must contain are 
inferred from an examination of historical developments. Specifically, the central 
importance of accounting as a constraint on market breakdown is inferred as the 
fundamental societal interest in GPFR is inferred from the reactivity of 
accounting regulation. This supports the view of accounting reports aimed at 
informing investor decisions. Secondly, from Moonitz (1961; 1962), Sprouse 
(1962) and Hendriksen (1982), I extract the central intuition for specification of 
the descriptive characteristics of the socio-economic environment. These factors 
provide a frame for the development of my theory. 
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Chapter Three 
A general theory of accounting 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 This chapter relates contemporary accounting theory to its historical 
development, explaining why it has failed to achieve coherence. From this base, I 
argue for the establishment of a theory of GPFR, drawn from identified 
postulates. The objective is an internally consistent, externally optimal theory that 
establishes a framework for the development of GPFR standards. 
 
3.1 The current state of accounting theory 
 Accounting to this point has been characterized by the underdevelopment 
of a referent theory (Hendriksen, 1982; Higson, 1983, Staubus, 1999; Inanga and 
Schneider, 2005; Zeff, 1971; Loftus, 2003). In the ‘positivist era’ this has led to 
sub-optimal theorizing that relies on sophisticated methodologies but delivers 
insubstantial conclusions (Inanga and Schneider, 2005; Stamp, 1984). Against 
this, normative theories involve risk in the assumptions they must make 
(postulates) about the desired state (Inanga and Schneider, 2005). Part of the 
reason a coherent theory of accounting has failed to evolve is that heterogeneous 
user definitions entail accommodating irreconcilable imperatives of different 
users (Beaver and Demski, 1974; Benston, et al, 2006). It has been suggested 
suppressing user heterogeneity would aid coherent accounting theory 
development (Beaver and Demski, 1974). The FASB have acknowledged the 
barrier to a coherent conceptual framework, describing “much of the detail and 
complexity in accounting as demand-driven” (FASB, 2002, pp. 2-3). Further, 
relaxing the assumption of the self-containment of individual financial reports 
would reduce the dichotomous, conflicting relationship between stewardship and 
decision-usefulness (Gerboth, 1973; Beaver and Demski, 1974; Crowther, 2002). 
Coherence has also eluded accounting theory due to the influence of culture on 
accounting (Belkoaui, 1981; 1989; Riahi-Belkoaui, 1995; 2002; Iqbal, et al, 
1997). These factors have, in aggregate, frustrated coherent accounting theory. 
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 The identified problem with the existing state of accounting theory is that 
it has fairly consistently been a product of consensus by compromise. As cited in 
the introduction, Higson (2003) locates this as the central reason for the failure to 
achieve accounting theory progress. Where I have specifically identified this 
approach within the period to 1950, it has been more pervasive than this. Existing 
concepts such as decision-usefulness are defined around observed practice and 
investor behavior (Inanga and Schneider, 2005).  Arguably, accounting is still in a 
pre-science phase of its development (Henderson and Pierson, 1983). The period 
of high-sounding stakeholder theory has frustrated accounting theory 
development (Henderson and Pierson, 1983). 
 
 Accounting theory development has also been frustrated by a multiplicity 
of theories that have been about different things (Higson, 2003). Included in this 
array of theories are concepts of stewardship, the agency relationship, accounting 
as a study of accountants, and ranging interpretations of objective functions of 
accounting. Dichotomies drawn in absolute and mutually exclusive terms have 
contributed to this problem (Fields, Lys, and Vincent, 2001). It is purposive of 
general accounting theory development to recognize that positive theories are also 
necessarily normative in part, and that no normative theory is meaningful of 
anything more than opinion without positive elements (Higson, 2003; 
Whittington, 1987; Tinker, Merino and Neimark, 1982). This is acknowledged in 
the theory proposed by Sterling (1970). In essence a normative theory must lever 
itself from a sensible view of the world (Demski, 1973). In this sense we can infer 
to the false dichotomy between positive and normative theories. This discussion 
will also discuss another important yet false dichotomy; that asserted between 
decision-usefulness or relevance and accountability. 
 
 The aggregation of these forces confounding theory is causally significant 
but it does not address the central problem for accounting theory. Accounting is 
very closely proximate to its practical implications. It is this closeness, that of the 
endogenous nature of the influence of accounting and its domain, that conditions 
progress towards a coherent conceptual framework and, even more so, financial 
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reporting standards. High-level abstraction is less available in accounting than in 
many other fields of enquiry because of the immediacy and nature of accounting’s 
practical implications. This makes accounting generally more inherently political 
than, for example, finance or economics. This is a function of accounting as, at 
one level, an applied technology and, at another, the entailment of compulsion in 
accounting regulation. Normative accounting theory analytically entails 
prescription (what should be). In a regulatory context, it is close to what is (in 
regulation). Conversely, in finance, disagreements consist between different 
descriptive accounts of reality. Any, or none, may be correct, but their substantial 
character more clearly references against discrete, particular predictive successes 
and failures. For accounting, to this point, there is not even consensus over what 
would constitute success or failure. This, at least partially, may explain the 
differential progress between conceptual frameworks and the standards generated 
from them (Weinstein, 1987). 
 
3.2 Foundations for a general theory of accounting 
 An important contribution to the development of accounting theory was 
made by Ijiri .The described essential elements of a theory of accounting include 
(Ijiri ,1971; 1975; 1983): 
 
1. Novelty: The theory must tell us something new and interesting 
(substantial) about the world. 
2. Defensible: The theory must be defensible either in logical or empirical 
terms, or, more probably both. It must be supported by evidence. 
3. Availability through dissemination: A theory of accounting must be 
presented in the ‘public’ sphere. This relates importantly to people 
operating within the discipline and would entail such things as conference 
presentations or publication in books or journals. 
 
 These criteria reflect the need for a theory to have some (possible) influence and 
to be subject to review and critique by experts (Inanga and Schneider, 2005). 
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These criteria are generally uncontentious and, prima facie, offer no reason for 
challenge. 
 
A further contribution to the development of accounting theory is that of 
Hendriksen (1982). He made the case that all testable theories require deductive 
and inductive elements. Following from this, we must stipulate testability as a 
criterion for sound theory development. Deduction requires the following 
theoretical elements: 
 
1. The formulation of general or specific objectives of financial 
reporting. 
2. A statement of postulates of the social, economic, political 
environment in which accounting operates (I reverse the order of 
these, holding 2 as the basis for 1). 
3. A set of constraints to guide reasoning. 
4. A structure to express the theory. 
5. The development of a set of definitions. 
6. The formulation of the principles of policy derived from logic. 
7. The application of principles to specific situations and the 
development of procedural rules (Hendriksen, 1982). 
 
By taking the practical consequences of 7, derived from 3, 4, 5, and 6, in relation 
to the described environment (2) and objectives (1), the basis to inductively test a 
theory arises.23 This requirement to test a normative theory is also supported by 
Henderson and Pierson (1983). 
 
                                                 
23
 The described environment informs the assumptions of the theory as a set relation to that 
environment. Testing the theory, a priori of application of a proposed theory, must consist in 
counterfactualism. This involves redrawing accounts on the assumption of principles derived from 
the stated theory, and examining the results’ relationship with subsequent market movements. This 
is similar to capital asset market research (in some instances) in relation to fair value, where 
researcher estimates have been applied as the basis to compare the respective value relevance of 
fair value measurement against historical cost or mixed attribute models. 
 76 
 More recently Walker (2003) has summarized the essential elements of a 
theory of an accounting conceptual framework. He states that the theory’s 
assumptions must be consistent with external user behaviors and practices, it must 
be expressed clearly, demonstrate an internal consistency and provide a 
comprehensive guide to financial reporting practice (Walker, 2003). This entails a 
conceptual framework must hold a clear view of the objective function of 
financial reporting from which logical, coherent standards can be developed. He 
makes the case that ideally a conceptual framework would cover all sectors but 
the diversity of users this would entail provides support for separate profit-
orientated financial reporting, [consistent with the views expressed by Sprouse 
and Moonitz (1962)]. The descriptive characteristics of the theory allow the use of 
induction (Walker, 2003; Miller and Redding, 1988). The theory must also be of a 
general nature and enable prediction (Kam, 1986). 
 
3.2.1 The socio-economic environment 
 An examination of the broad social, economic, and political environment 
will form the source of the postulates for the proposed theory of accounting. 
Nothing about this approach requires that the contemporary environment is a 
necessary or ideal state. This discussion is not centrally concerned with the 
philosophical question of determinism versus voluntarism. Equally, I am 
unconcerned to espouse a moral positivism of the critical accounting theorist kind. 
In simple terms then, the position taken here relies on the assumption of the key 
elements of extant society as a relation to accounting as a technology operating 
within that/those societal systems (Hawkins, 1973). Key descriptive 
characteristics forming the postulates for the proposed theory include the 
existence of society, capitalism in the generic sense of the mixed economy, the 
rise of the corporation, free labour, the centrality of the market as a determinant of 
distribution and price, and globalization and its implications. 
 
 Before addressing finer points of the prevailing socio-economic 
environment it is useful to consider existing social organization in terms of its 
most general qualities. This is not a sufficient basis for the specification of 
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accounting postulates but it is a precondition for establishing those postulates. 
Existing social organization is structured as (largely) democratic societies. The 
accent I would place here is on society. This involves the implicit agreement to 
collective protection against reduced individual freedoms (Cudd, 2007). In terms 
of democracy, this only qualifies the particular focus of society’s elements. It 
informs the view of Hobbes’ society as the sovereign to sovereign as the populace 
in general (Cudd, 2007). It is difficult to see how a legal fiction, the corporation 
could exist, outside of such an arrangement (that is, society) (Marcoux, 2008). 
This point is one I return to shortly. 
 
 The broad environment in which contemporary accounting operates was 
described by Moonitz (1961) and Sprouse and Moonitz (1962). They describe an 
economic system in which most productive assets are owned privately, in which 
labour is free, that is non-slave labour, and in which the market is the primary 
mechanism for the distribution of goods, services and equities determining the 
prices for these. The growth in the corporation as a central component of 
capitalism is observed by Most (1982). The corporation grew rapidly as an 
institution over the nineteenth century in the United Kingdom and concomitantly, 
and subsequently, in the US and the rest of the world (Giroux, 1999). The 
industrial revolution was the force propelling this rise. From 1760 Britain began 
to transform from an agrarian, cottage industry-based economy into the large-
scale factory production-based economy of the industrialization (Alexander and 
Britton, 2004). The increased scale of business increased individual business 
capital requirements (Most, 1982; Alexander, Britton, and Jorissen, 2007). This, 
in turn, created the need to aggregate individual investor capitals. From this, 
society’s interest in the capitalization of business was reflected in the legally 
enshrined corporation and its liability limitation to investors contributed 
capitals.24  The separation of management from financing established the need for 
the provision of financial information by management to investors. 
 
                                                 
24
 The limitation of liability actually applied to paid and promised capital, the total sum reflected 
in the par value of shares. This is not important for the present purposes but it entails that where 
shares were not fully paid (to par), further investor liability to that amount existed. 
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3.2.2 Globalization 
 Globalization has been a more general condition in the development of 
modern economies than the term’s most recent coinage would suggest. In the 
period to the First World War the world economy demonstrated a linear trend 
towards integration with expanding trade and investment flows. The inter-war 
period, and until the 1970s, reversed this trend with national economies inclined 
towards regulated markets and fixed exchange rates (Padoa-Schioppa and 
Saccomi, 1994). This period was characterized by insularity and autarkical 
national economies, operating on substantially mercantilist lines. The period of 
isolationism seems best explained by abduction, to the combined influences of 
two world wars and the Great Depression causing a period of trend reversal, 
rather than a Pareto Optimal alternative. International trade did, however, begin to 
expand in the immediate post-war period, creating pressure on the Bretton Woods 
agreement (Padoa-Schioppa and Saccomi, 1994).  Progressively, from the late 
1970s, national currencies have been floated, facilitating international trade and 
investment flows (Wray, 2007). From this basis I stipulate globalization as a long-
term, persistent trend and fundamental feature of modern economics (IASB, 
2007). Globalization has been central to the progressive impetus towards 
convergence (Jermanowicz, Prather-Kinsey and Wulf 2007). Global capital flows 
have created increasing pressure for international GPFR comparability (Hughes, 
et al, 2007). 
 
 The trend towards globalization has heralded an era coined the “Great 
Moderation”. This is a term for a period of historically low inflation and GDP 
volatility across the developed world, within a period, dating to the early 1980s, 
of sustained economic growth (Bernanke, 2004; Stock and Watson, 2003; Willis, 
2003).  To this date no precise specification of the causes of this idyllic state has 
been forthcoming. A variety of reasons are posited, including: An improvement in 
macro-economic management,25 the operations of central banks, the absence of 
                                                 
25
 Bernanke, 2004; A similar confidence in monetary policy was felt shortly after it was first 
introduced in the late 1920s (Degen, 1987). The quality of central bank stewardship of the 
economy (US) is questioned by Schwartz (2008), and Friedman (1999). 
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negative supply shocks26, and structural changes in the economy supportive of 
stability. These include increased labour market flexibility (Willis, 2003) and the 
emerging predominance of less volatile service industries (Bernanke, 2004). A 
concomitant (trade-off?) of the ‘Great Moderation’ were elevated exchange rate 
and asset market volatility, which has increased markedly since the early 1980s 
(Issing, 2003; Wray, 2007; Yamaguchi, 2003; Dymski and Pollin, 1992; 
Campbell, 2005; Crockett, 2003). Another potential explanation, one that relates 
to the recent economic malaise, for these developments is that of financial market 
liberalization from the early 1980s (Friedman, 1999; Wray, 1992; Padoa-
Schioppa and Saccomi, 1994; Kregel, 1992; Kindleberger, 1992; Dynan, 
Elmendorf and Sichel, 2005; Checcetti, Flore-Leganes and Krause, 2005). 
Allowing that the progressive increase in (typically) developed, Anglophone 
country national and household debt is related to finance industry liberalization, 
we have reason to infer the ‘wrinkles’ have been, until recently, inflated away by 
the availability of credit through above trend endogenous money supply growth.27 
Given prior stipulation of globalization, increased global asset market volatility is 
anticipated as a central structural development in the current economic era 
(Bordo, Mizach, and Schwartz, 1995; Brousseau and Dretkin, 2001; Fergusson, 
2003; Borio, English and Filardo, 2003; Mussa, 2003).28 
 
 The significance of globalization in relation to accounting has been in the 
progressive trend towards global standards to facilitate global investment flows 
(Iqbal, Melcher, and Elmallah, 1997; Hopwood, 1989; Rutteman, 1989). The 
ascendancy of international accounting standards and their need for a uniform 
measurement base has occurred parallel to growing challenges to historical cost 
accounting measurement (Bromwich and Hopwood, 1983). It is possible to infer 
                                                 
26
 Nakov and Pescatori, 2007; Summers, 2005, provides a contrasting perspective. 
 
27
 Dynan, et al, 2005; Debelle, 2004; Dynan and Kohn, 2007; Lansing, 2005; Greenspan and 
Kennedy, 2007; Faulkner-MacDonagh and Muhleisen, 2004; Dynan, Johnson and Pence, 2003; 
and Friedman, 1992. 
 
28
 The value attended to this issue is in the basis it provides to challenge objections to fair value on 
the basis that fair value reflects increased volatility. Inference: Fair value affords the impression of 
greater volatility. Volatility has increased, thus, fair value better reflects reality. Stated this way, 
this objection seems fairly weak. 
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the case for fair value has been advanced by the pursuit of global standards. 
Independent of its inherent qualities, reason exists at the pragmatic level of its 
established traction, that there is reason to prefer Fair value. This is a significant 
counter to pure theoretical proposals such as that entertained by van Zijl and 
Whittington (2006), in favour of deprival value. 
 
3.2.3 Summary 
 Against the backdrop of the current environment and developments in 
accounting theory and regulation, the proposed theory will be advanced, informed 
by the central intuitions of Ijiri (1971; 1975), Higson (2003), and Hendriksen 
(1982). Their approach follows in the mould of accounting theory development of 
the normative era, relating postulates as rational inferences from the existing 
environment. The current state of regulation, particularly at the level of 
conceptual frameworks, reflects a general trend towards the coherence promoted 
in the normative era. This discussion will outline an explicit theoretical basis to 
the theory of accounting implied by standards setters. I interpret a tiered ability to 
propound pure accounting theory. Due to the essentially political nature of 
accounting, coherent theory will be most contentious in relation to standards, and 
then in varying degrees to particular standards (Rutteman, 1989). Conceptual 
framework development, with less immediate or obvious implications will be less 
difficult to achieve and, beyond this, academic theoretical development will be 
the least contentious arena due to its distance from application. It follows that 
academic accounting is circumstantially situated (and indicated) as best-placed to 
assert and expound otherwise implicit theoretical developments in accounting. 
Academic accounting is also best positioned to elaborate normative accounting 
theory, independent of conceptual framework developments. This is the central 
motivation of this discussion. 
 
3.3 GPFR user defined 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 The discussion to this point has presaged identifying the investor as the 
sole GPFR user. This conforms with the central intuition expressed by Beaver and 
 81 
Demski (1974) and Jensen (2001), who argue that if the objectives of accounting 
(and corporations) are posited as being very broad, their function, will be too 
complex to be achievable. Where Jensen (2001) focuses on the corporate function 
the present thesis concerns itself more directly with the relation of that function to 
GPFR information provision. These parameters bypass the need for an 
independent assessment of the institutional legitimacy of the corporation. Instead, 
the corporation is held here as an objective entity and accounting, as a fixed 
relation to the objective function of the corporation. This view is informed by 
Sprouse and Moonitz (1962) and draws on the prevailing socio-economic 
environment, describing the central elements of the environment as the basis for 
postulates underpinning GPFR. No stipulation or case for the necessary or optimal 
nature of that environment is made. 
 
 The preceding discussion of stakeholder theory importantly impacts views 
of GPFR users. As noted, this theory has led standards setters and academics to 
infer to an extensive array of users (stakeholders). Stakeholdership has 
historically been identified with use. I have made the case that use does not 
warrant the right to use. Further to this point, as a relation to a societal view of 
stakeholdership, and stakeholder theory as a derivative of social contractarianism, 
the case is made that the investor as sole GPFR user can be reconciled with 
society’s best interests. In part, this issue will be considered by addressing the 
question of who is not a stakeholder and the reasons for this.  
 
 Specific foundations for assessing the user status of GPFR will be 
outlined. This discussion includes objective functions of GPFR and the respective 
groups’ ability to access their reasonable information requirements (Most, 1982). 
I will consider the current versus potential investor debate, making the case that 
they are type identical and that by specifying one, the other is necessarily implied. 
This issue relates to the reconciliation of stewardship with decision-usefulness as 
subsets of accountability and relevance. The guiding motivation for this approach 
is the development of a logically-derived, coherent accounting theory that, 
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accommodating pragmatic considerations, aims at narrowing the determinative 
variables that form the theory’s postulates and principles. 
 
3.3.2 The Determinative Characteristics of a GPFR User 
 With the grant of the previously described socio-economic environment, 
certain characteristics mark out the legitimacy of a user of GPFR in their financial 
report use. Their relation to the company’s financial metrics must be an essential 
one and the general user’s need cannot be satisfied by the ability to require the 
information (Staubus, 1999). The essence of the company is that it is a legal 
fiction designed to facilitate the aggregation of investors’ capital. The aggregation 
of capital to facilitate business scale in pursuit of profit maximization at any given 
level of risk is the corporation’s objective function (Jensen, 2001). The essential 
relationship between capital and the company is that capital has an indefinite 
lifespan and that, in its absence, there is no corporation. It is not governed by 
specific contracts, with fixed and pre-determined terms, it cannot directly compel 
satisfaction of its information demands, and it is always a residual interest, after 
the satisfaction of all liabilities (FASB, 2007a). This point is one Staubus (1959; 
1999) has expounded, identifying equity investors as having the greatest 
information needs, being subject to harm from excess information, existing in a 
uniquely non-contractual relationship to the company, and requiring the greatest 
degree of attention to isolate the residual or equity value of a company (Liam, 
u.d.; FASB, 2007a). 
 
 These factors place investors in a position of unique risk in the 
capitalist/mixed economic system (Staubus, 1991; 1959). It has been argued 
(Jensen, 2001) that the satisfaction of the information requirements of investors 
will satisfy the needs of all other GPFR users. This view is one that major 
standards setters have adopted (Trueblood, 1973; FASB, 1978). It is not an 
uncontentious position but it is consistent with the generic utility function of the 
corporation; to aggregate capitals to maximize profit. It can improve this function 
of profit maximization where the information demands of investors are satisfied, 
without consideration of other user information needs, by enhancing the 
 83 
efficiency of the market in capital allocation through the reduction of information 
asymmetries between management and investors (Jensen, 2001). This proposition 
is an argument for utility maximization through efficiency and concomitant 
economic growth (Lev, 1988). As previously, this is qualified by silence 
regarding wealth redistribution. If this is an important question, and it may even 
be stipulated that it is, it is not one with relevance to GPFR (Bromwich, 1992). To 
adulterate GPFR would create a lottery for information claims based on the 
relative power of the claimants. This, presumably, would entail more conservative 
general outcomes than are anticipated by the stakeholder/critical theorist 
proposition of diverse GPFR users. 
 
 In contrast to Lev (1988), minimizing information asymmetry between 
naïve and sophisticated investors presupposes inherently complex information can 
be presented simply. This is rejected in view of the risk that simplification would 
entail an unjustifiable reductionism. For this reason the sophisticated user, the 
analyst, is a suitable proxy for (the investor) accounting regulation to target. This 
view challenges Cunningham’s (2004) position that fair value accounting 
threatens her membership’s (FEI) competitive advantage, yet, secures support 
from that position. Cunningham is implicitly arguing that fair value takes the 
investor too close to the knowledge her membership sells those investors. 
Logically, information simplification entails selection risk and ‘leaps of faith’ on 
the investor’s part. This presumption that direct targeting of the naïve investor is 
the objective of GPFR appears impractical and functionally unattainable. 
Logically, the sophisticated investor would re-establish their competitive 
advantage, and utilize the time not spent analyzing financial reports, augmenting 
this information elsewhere, assuming that the simplified GPFR satisfied their 
information needs in the same manner that analysis of current GPFR does. 
 
 
3.3.3 Investors as GPFR users: Current and Potential? 
 The recent focus of disagreement and debate surrounding international 
accounting standards has evolved now that the GPFR user primacy of the investor 
 84 
has been established in the stance taken by the IASB and FASB (2007; 2007a; 
2007b). Tentatively, the IASB have advanced the idea of potential investors as 
GPFR users since 2005 (IASB, 2005). The debate now concerns whether the 
focus should be on current or potential investors (Lee, 2006). This has been used 
by historical cost advocates as a means to re-energize the distinction between 
stewardship and decision-usefulness and the debate surrounding it, linking the 
interests of current investors with stewardship and stewardship, somewhat 
questionably, with historical cost.29 There are reasons to hold current and 
potential investors as type-identical, both as a continuous set and with 
homogeneous information needs. Investors, however long-term, are subject to 
dynamic personal circumstances that may dictate the realization of investments at 
any given point. Beyond predictable changes including buying a house and 
retirement, unpredictable circumstantial changes, such as illness or injury, may 
alter the investor’s propensity to hold investments. Similarly, outside of a 
dogmatic commitment to portfolio theory, company-specific and macro-economic 
or socio-economic changes may unseat the original reasons for investing in a 
particular company. Regardless of the intention to buy and hold, dynamic 
personal and environmental circumstances entail that long-term investors do 
review their portfolio, with changes to it in prospect. For these reasons the current 
investor is, at least conceptually, always the potential investor, whether in their 
decision to buy, hold or sell. Following from this the potential investor must have 
company financial information as the counterparty to the buy or sell choices 
available to the current investor. Even in the hold choice, the potential investor 
has a need for GPFR to establish the basis for bidding the company’s securities in 
order to influence the current investor’s decision (or to refrain from doing so). 
The current investor’s interest lies in a well-formed, well-informed market that 
delivers the company’s fair value, such that portfolio review decisions involve 
only investor-specific variables. This entails that GPFR is targeted at current and 
potential investors. 
 
                                                 
29
 This issue is addressed later in this chapter in the reconciliation of the two objective functions of 
GPFR. 
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 This interpretation has been rejected by Bush (2005) who argues that, in 
contrast to the US, accounting in the United Kingdom has developed to prioritize 
stewardship. He argues that this is appropriate as the shift away from a central 
concern for stewardship is focused on the interests of the trader (Bush, 2005). It is 
doubtful whether traders would generally trade on fundamental information. It is 
more likely they would trade the market price action following the release of such 
information. The case is made that US standards address the issue of secondary 
market pricing rather than long-term investors (Bush, 2005). This argument is 
disingenuous to the extent that it implies investment is impossible via the 
secondary market. It would only be with considerable reservation that we could 
characterize equities bought on the secondary market, held for twenty years, as a 
trading operation. Bush’s view necessarily presupposes that all necessary 
information is contained within a single report and that decision-
usefulness/relevance implies any current or potential investor will only ever need 
forecasts without reference to a substantive basis for confidence in those 
forecasts. It seems the demarcation is drawn too starkly between stewardship and 
decision-usefulness in the current debate. The self-containment implication of 
single period GPFR is unreasonable. Decision-usefulness does not obviate the 
need to include some historical information. It also allows that multiple GPFRs 
over a period are a single text and that the information contained in any single 
report only acquires its full context by being read in conjunction with previous 
reports (Crowther, 2002). Moreover, the assumption that financial accounting is 
the only source of company-specific financial information seems to establish a far 
too stylized situation to be meaningful as a referent basis for the key objectives of 
GPFR. If GPFR was the sole source of such information its value would be 
manifold its current value and, thus, provided only that its value was paid for by 
all of those to whom it was valuable, extensive attention to stewardship and 
decision-usefulness would fall within the cost-benefit constraint.  
 
 More fundamentally, Bush’s (2005) view relies on an apparent logical 
contradiction. The position that investors buy and hold indefinitely assumes 
portfolio theory which, in turn, presupposes market efficiency. This is derived 
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from the basis to portfolio theory that, just so long as an investor is sufficiently 
diversified, they can simply hold their portfolio, assuming a predetermined level 
of risk, without any subsequent adjustments. This necessarily assumes efficient 
pricing at the original transaction date, and that all risks, over an indefinite period 
could be known at the purchase date, yet Bush wants to tell us that successive 
accounting fair values, also assumed objective variables as a derivation from 
market efficiency, have no incremental value to the investor in supporting or 
challenging the generative basis of the investment decision. Curiously, Bush does 
not argue against relevance and fair value on grounds that such information is 
already implied in current share prices. His concern is that decision-useful, 
relevant, fair value information-focused GPFR undermines stewardship. The 
discussion returns to this point shortly. 
 
 The case has been made that GPFR usefulness to investors is determined 
by whether investors use it or not (Lee and Tweedie, 1990; Bartlett and Chandler, 
1997; Epstein and Pava, 1993; Anderson and Epstein, 1996; Wilton and Tabb, 
1978). Their empirical research supports the view that investors make limited use 
of financial accounting information and that the extent to which it is used is 
positively correlated to the sophistication of investors. There are unstated 
assumptions with the inference from general use to usefulness. The hypothesis 
assumes systematic market inefficiency such that sufficient rewards do not accrue 
to sophisticated investors over time by exploiting the information contained in 
GPFR, sufficient for those investors to fully exploit their advantage, eliminating 
economic profits. If such rewards did accrue the assumed market inefficiency 
would be eliminated by the operations of sophisticated investors. In such case, by 
whatever means the naïve investor selected their portfolio, whether by the 
movements of the planets or by consulting chicken entrails, they would be paying 
a price that reflects the information contained within financial reports. Thus, in a 
certain sense, naïve investors secure a free-rider advantage from GPFR that is 
effectively an implicit use of that information. 
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 The only alternative hypothesis that suggests itself is that private investors 
do not use GPFR because it has no possible utility to them.  This is an argument 
against financial reporting simpliciter. We would not even be able to allow Watts’ 
(1977) value ascription to voluntary financial reporting. Simply, financial reports, 
if they have any value at all, only have value to the limits of the fees preparers 
earn producing them. This would seem to be a curious manifestation of welfarism. 
Instead, we might take the view that where GPFR has little individual utility, its 
value as part of the broader financial information set, consists in its production 
and dissemination and does not require its general use. In the absence of this, 
GPFR information would be immensely valuable to the individual investor but 
given publication, its value is implied. 
 
 A final consideration favouring the investor as GPFR user arises with the 
variable reporting requirements imposed on various business entities based on 
their ownership structure. By isolating the distinguishing characteristics of 
publicly listed, profit-orientated entities from businesses with lesser or no general 
purpose financial reporting requirements, the basis for those requirements on 
publicly listed entities must, presumably lie in their difference or some essential 
aspect of it. Sole traders, partnerships and private companies have no general 
purpose reporting requirements imposed on them. Given this, we must reject 
limited liability as a foundation for the more extensive reporting requirements 
imposed on publicly listed companies (Marcoux, 2008). It may be argued that 
public companies are often larger than other business structures and that this 
relates importantly to their ability to influence wider society. This, in general, is 
true but it does nothing to unseat the societal interest in GPFR as a function of 
financial reports’ service value to investors. Moreover, satisfaction of magnitude 
differences is presumably by tax rates and the proportional need for legitimization 
that attends scale in a reputational sense. Any contrary argument is likely to be 
nothing more than a ‘Trojan horse’ conduit to an attack on socialized capital in its 
most overt form -the publicly held corporation. This, arguably, supports the 
efficient operation of markets in securities’ pricing as supportive of the greatest 
long-term general social benefit. The essential element distinguishing publicly 
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listed entities is that ownership of these entities is by the investing public. It 
follows logically that the reason and optimal achievement available to GPFR is 
satisfaction of investors’, separated from management, information demands, 
enabling informed capital allocation (Lev, 1988). 
 
3.3.4 Who is not a stakeholder in GPFR? 
 Stakeholder theory tells us that GPFR should accommodate any group that 
uses external financial reports. Early views of stakeholdership typically suggested 
contemplation of GPFR users as management, investors and creditors (Smnett and 
Grasino, 2008), or managers, owners and social control agencies (Vatter, 1964). 
The important commonality is that management generally featured in earlier 
views of legitimate GPFR users. Stakeholders are those who, “can affect or are 
affected by the achievement of a firm’s goals” (Freeman, 1984). They are also 
defined as, “those who depend on a company for the realization of their goals and 
on whom the company is dependent” (Steadman and Green, 1997). This typically 
includes, but is not limited to: regulators, investors, management, government, 
creditors, customers, suppliers, employees, unions, and public interest groups 
(Renman, 1968). To these groups Vergoosen (1994) adds analysts and competing 
companies. Stakeholder theory envisages and supports a diverse range of GPFR 
users, with wide-ranging information needs. Accommodating this perspective is 
functionally preclusive of a coherent accounting theory. The influence of 
stakeholder theory on the academy and regulators has been previously noted.30 
 
 Stakeholder theory has developed from its original base to include greater 
specification of the stakeholders in contemplation and the means of establishing 
their priority. One development of the theory is the substantially descriptivist 
view of Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997). It asserts the achieved priority of 
stakeholders who possess legitimacy, power and urgency. Where stakeholders 
possess two or more of these qualities, their stakeholdership has force. The 
problem here is that the model does nothing to specify what it is that constitutes 
                                                 
30
 For a formal discussion of the philosophical bases to diverse GPFR users versus investor-only-
as-user, see Gaa (1986), supplemented by Deschamps and Gevers (1978). Also, Stanton (1997) 
offers a brief discussion of the ‘moral basis to a ‘right’ to GPFR by different users. 
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legitimacy in substantive terms. The descriptivism of stakeholder theory must 
inevitably rest on an at least covert normativity. What ‘positive’ stakeholder 
theory indicates is that activist, noisy (urgent) parties with (coercive) power have 
influence over the company. What versions of normative stakeholder theory want 
to say is that they also have legitimacy. I explicitly reject this proposition. Not 
only does it make a distinct element in the model a necessary entailment of other 
elements but it implicitly relies on the view that the “good currency” (Schon, 
1971) of stakeholder theory is a reason to accept it. Popularity (convention) as a 
robust predication basis for an academic theory is doubtful, without abandoning 
logic. This argument of Schon’s is incoherent as it is inherently deterministic and, 
therefore, it conceptually contra-indicates any operative role for normativity. That 
is, if theories that are popular (that have ‘good currency’) are self-evident facts in 
the world that should not be challenged, yet we should use these theories, the use 
of which is not negotiable, it is unclear what the operative role of the normative 
injunction to action means. Alternatively, it is consistent but objectionable, 
warranting anything with popular appeal. The position supplicates before current 
academic convention without independently establishing a case for the veracity of 
positions taken by the academy. 
 
 There are a number of fundamental flaws in stakeholder theory. Possibly 
the most basic is that it is a non-sequitur of its generative theory, social 
contractarianism. Hobbes’s position was that, in exchange for the protection of 
society against untrammeled trespasses on any individual by any other (except the 
Sovereign), each individual (at least implicitly) ceded their full autonomy to the 
Sovereign. Assuming democracy, without requiring it, the abrogation of 
autonomy is to society in toto, in exchange for a collective guarantee. Nothing 
about this theory entails stakeholder theory as a sub-societal extension of 
interested groups’ claims to GPFR user status. The generative theory supports 
only a whole-of-society interest. Moreover, stakeholder theory is poorly 
specified.31 No answers are given to questions about how much or what 
                                                 
31
 It is observable that attempts to give stakeholder theory a more determinative, substantive 
character, such as Roberts and Mahoney (2004), offer only tentative proposals. This is informed 
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information any particular group should be given. Allowing the cost-benefit 
constraint there must be limits to the satisfaction of the diverse information 
demands supported by the theory. Beyond this pragmatic constraint there may be 
conflict between stakeholders. This would entail that for information required by 
one group, another group require it be withheld (Staubus, 1999). For these reasons 
stakeholder theory, in its standard forms, must be rejected as definitive of the 
composition of GPFR users. From this base, particular groups’ claims to GPFR 
user status must be assessed on their individual merits. 
 
 Although standard interpretations of stakeholder theory are rejected, the 
view that society has an interest in the corporation is justifiable. Just as society 
regulates the interactions of individuals, at least to the extent of ensuring certain 
standard forms of interaction, so it must also regulate business entities’ 
interactions, between each other and between individuals, and in their interaction 
with the wider physical and socio-economic environment. The social contract 
would collapse if incorporation licensed ultra-societality. Nothing of this 
proposition, however, indicates important implications for information provided 
by way of GPFR. It may indicate taxation and governmental demands for 
financial information may be required within the regulatory and legislative 
context but the power to compel the provision of information removes such 
information from the general purpose. Special purpose financial reporting is 
already required for taxation purposes and any concession to other legislation as 
requiring accommodation within GPFR would entail the illogicality that GPFR 
must satisfy yet to be enacted laws as well as existing legislation. An entailment 
of this is that it is uncertain how broad societal interest can be advanced by 
expanding the definition of GPFR user beyond investors. This position may be 
argued for independently by the societal utility that obtains from the optimal 
allocation of resources within society, achieved by well-informed securities 
markets operating efficiently to eliminate unexploited economic profit 
opportunities (Jensen, 2001). This supports the investor as sole GPFR user in 
                                                                                                                                     
by allusions to morality, fairness and the normative proposal to apply ill-defined understandings of 
these concepts to accounting. 
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furtherance of society’s interest. Notably, this ‘national interest’ argument was 
prominent in the Corporate Report (1975). 
 
 The ‘national interest’ conduit to society’s interest finds support in the 
inferred motivations behind financial reporting regulation. The Securities Markets 
Act (1933) and subsequent amendment (1934) were motivated by the social 
dislocation caused by the Great Depression (May and Sundem, 1976). 
Deductively, it follows that society’s principal interest in financial reporting is to 
avoid market breakdowns and concomitant economic and social turmoil. This 
view supports the investor as sole GPFR user and investors’ information needs as 
paramount. To the extent that financial reporting can obviate the adverse 
implications of economic and asset market cycles, it can logically only be in the 
provision of the best possible information to investors and potential investors to 
inform economic (investment) decisions that take account of the economic 
substance of companies. No consideration occluding such information provision 
could more than occasionally achieve superior outcomes, and then only by 
random happenstance. 
 
 The discussion now moves to establish the respective bases for rejecting 
all other (non-investor) claims on GPFR. Focus is given to the more important 
and recurrent claims of (ostensible) users. These have been argued for in 
academic literature (Gray, Owen, and Maunders, 1987; 1991; Laughlin, 1977; 
1987; Tinker, 1980) and in official reports, including those of major standards 
setters (IASB, 1989; FASB, 1978), the AAA (1966) and AICPA (1973). Although 
the general trend since 1973 is towards narrowing the user definition, in part by 
prioritizing investors (and creditors), through the use of the primary or principal 
user device, many users have been specified over time. I focus on those user 
groups who have had the greatest significance (and official acknowledgement) as 
‘constituents’ of the standards’ setting process. This term seems to have been 
applied casually to anybody who deems themselves a user of GPFR, without 
assessing the merits of their claims. 
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3.3.4.1 Labour/Unions 
 Labour and unions have been identified historically as separate GPFR 
users (OECD, 1986). This is rejected on the grounds that the union claim is purely 
derivative of its representation of labour. In this sense, as with the analyst-investor 
user relationship, a case for focusing the financial reporting information required 
arises. Here, I relate the labour/union distinction to the naïve/sophisticated 
investor distinction. The strongest claim appears intuitively to lie with the greatest 
disadvantage; that is with naïve labour. This must be qualified to the extent that 
financial reporting is a technology; it is a practical application. It is observed that 
individual investors make limited use of GPFR (Lee and Tweedie, 1990). 
Similarly, and almost certainly more so, individual workers have limited 
resources or inclination to understand financial reports or, assuming their 
understanding, to make meaningful decisions on the basis of that understanding. 
For this reason, although the legitimacy of the unions’ claim to GPFR 
stakeholdership is derivative of its representation of labour, that representation 
along with the resources and sophistication that unions are able to bring as the 
users of GPFR, supports the equality of their claim to rights with those of labour 
(Dan-Cohen, 1986). For ease this might be styled ‘sophisticated labour’. 
  
The case for labour’s use of GPFR consists in its right to assess the 
financial strength of a company as a relation to job security and in developing pay 
demands (Alexander and Britton, 2004; Lee, 2006; Macve, 1981). In the first case 
it is uncertain what use labour makes of GPFR in assessing job security. Further, 
it is not obvious in the most important situation of high general levels of 
unemployment, what particular use commodity labour (and this is largely the type 
of labour we have in contemplation here) could make of company financial 
information where their choice is substantially negatively defined between 
insecure employment and unemployment. Moreover, any conclusion about 
security of employment predicated on the financial metrics of a company is 
overdetermined. All that a company’s financial strength will assure is that this 
single cause will not threaten employment. As a company’s financial strength 
pertains to meeting claims to unpaid wages, this risk is short-term, generally 
 93 
minor in nature, and information sufficient to identify this risk is already available 
in GPFR. There is no case made, nor any evident case to be made, that financial 
information suitable for the needs of risk capital providers is insufficient for the 
purposes of labour given statutory and contractual protections. Finally, the service 
potential of generic labour is unimpaired by particular job loss concomitant with 
redundancy due to company liquidation. 
 
The second basis for labour’s GPFR usage is that it informs wage claims 
(Alexander and Britton, 2004). This argument assumes that productivity and 
profitability establish a foundation for wage claims. The case is made that three 
bases exist for general wage level increase (Foley and Maunders, 1977). These are 
cost of living adjustments, pay parity with workers doing the same work outside 
of the company, and productivity increases (Foley and Maunders, 1977). In the 
case of the inflation-adjustment and pay parity, these bases are satisfied readily 
without firm-specific financial information, establishing no independent basis for 
labour GPFR user status. In relation to productivity increases the assumption must 
be that this is a function of labour intensification to support the inference from 
productivity increases to pay claims. Where increased profitability and 
productivity are functions of increased physical capital or improved operations 
management or technology and process it is unclear how such productivity 
increases importantly relate to a claim of labour on the company. Moreover, if 
such arguments for labour GPFR use are allowed it may have perverse 
implications for capital investment, given a reduced incentive to management and 
capital. Thus, the productivity argument for labour’s GPFR use is rejected. 
 
Labour’s GPFR use has been addressed as an important if erroneous 
argument, in part pragmatically; because it is likely to impose the greatest 
incremental demands on GPFR information provision over that meeting investor 
needs (Macve, 1981; OECD, 1986). This is reflected in the level of 
disaggregation unions, in particular, would prefer (Macve, 1981). Curiously, the 
purpose of disaggregation is primarily to support segmentally or divisionally-
predicated, profitability/productivity-based wage claims. The interesting anomaly 
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contained in this argument is that standard arguments, and even the conception of 
unionization, presupposes a generic ‘labour’s worth’ proposition. It must be 
assumed, on this basis, absent general productivity or profitability growth, that 
superior specific divisional performance, while supporting wage increases for the 
pertinent division, must ceteris paribus undermine other segment or division 
wage claims or, possibly, indicate wage reductions elsewhere in the company. It 
is not certain that unions would be comfortable with this conclusion. Taken as a 
whole, labour’s claim to GPFR user status has no objective basis. Moreover, the 
case has been made that labour’s needs are best met by the fair value information 
I argue is optimal for investors (Clarke and Craig, 1991). 
 
There will be numerous situations in which profitability is regulated by 
factors extraneous to labour productivity. This would entail the logical 
implication that where profitability is the operative basis for pay claims, assuming 
constant labour productivity and input price increases for a company whose end-
product is price-constrained by market competition, that independent of labour’s 
role in declining profitability, a pay decrease is indicated. If we allow that the 
company’s input cost increases are indicative of general ‘cost-push’ inflation, the 
case may be made that profitability supports worker pay decreases in a period of 
elevated inflation. This would approximate the present situation in New Zealand 
retailing. The issue here is that the pay claim bases clash with each other. This 
does not logically reduce to invalidating all labour claims. Labour valued at a 
given amount at any date is a real variable, thus, inflation adjustment might be 
indicated such that its real value is preserved nominally. This has no implications 
for GPFR. 
 
3.3.4.2 Auditor, Management, Preparer interests in GPFR 
 I have taken issuers’, management, and auditors’ use of GPFR as a single 
class of claim due to their derivative user status. In each case the claim to 
stakeholdership has no substance independent of the (ostensible) user’s agency 
relationship with the investor. This does not entail that the operationalisation of 
GPFR through technical input into the development of accounting standards by 
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these groups is contra-indicated. It is not obvious where better sources of such 
advisory contributions might be found. What is more certain is that, as a set 
relation to the previously described world, nothing about optimal capital market 
efficiency indicates a concern for the vested interests of non-investors, 
independent of these parties service to investors. In particular, managers’ claim to 
GPFR user status as a function of their compensation calculation is disingenuous. 
This is a simple matter of contract and it is available to specify contractual terms 
for the calculation of compensation upon achieving certain objectives, based on 
financial reporting standards prevailing at the time of the contract.  
 
 The discussion of derivative GPFR users is important as these groups 
have, in large part, informed the development of accounting regulation. To some 
extent management and preparers have been removed from the equation by 
aggravating the aesthetic challenge of the acronym GPFR to its more precise 
specification GPEAFR or general purpose external accounting and financial 
reporting. The preference of preparers for reliability (Johnson, 2005), to reduce 
their risk, can give rise to increased management discretion, through reduced 
recognition in financial statements predicated on the basis of reliability concerns 
(Booth, 2003). It is not clear why regulation would consider the requirements of 
managers regarding the information they provide themselves when they have 
access to any information they deem necessary (Storey and Storey, 1998). Beyond 
this, in relation to preparers, the case can be made that their independent concern 
to mitigate litigation risk lacks credible motivation. Where prioritizing 
stewardship and conservatism supports this ‘interest’ it does so in an ad hoc 
manner. Elevation of litigation risk can be priced into audit services and/or 
insured against. Moreover, the mitigation of litigation risk stands in conflict with 
the role of GPFR in supporting market efficiency. For these reasons the GPFR 
user status of derivative users must be rejected. 
 
3.3.4.3 Lenders   
 Lenders have maintained a tenacious claim to GPFR user status. 
Furthermore, the acceptance of lenders as GPFR users has possibly been one of 
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the most significant constraints to the development of coherent accounting 
standards. The following factors dictate that this claim should be independently 
assessed. Lenders claim to have an interest in GPFR in determining the credit risk 
involved in extending particular companies access to debt. This argument seems 
difficult to justify as debt is supported by contract through which debt providers 
may specify the information they require to assess their preparedness to enter such 
a contract and to determine the applicable interest rate. That is, the debt provider 
is positioned to require a special purpose financial report (SPFR). Secondly, it is 
unclear how information sufficient to meet the needs of residual interest holders 
(equity investors) is not also sufficient to meet the needs of debt providers, with 
their priority claim on the company’s resources. 
 
 A significant claim of lenders is that the demarcation between debt and 
equity is not as distinct as is implicit in the case I make for rejecting creditor 
GPFR user status. Not only do hybrid instruments, such as preference shares, 
exhibit some of the characteristics of both debt and equity, but debt contracting 
risks obtain. The latter point relates to altering company risk profile (post-debt 
assumption) where management incentives obtain from increased leverage. This 
argument is sound in the limited sense that management can, in effect, notionally 
transfer equity risk to debt providers without paying a premium (in interest rates) 
for this. Giving weight to the context in which such opportunism would occur, 
allowing that the lender is situated to contractually specify debt to equity ratios, 
where such specifications can be circumvented it is uncertain what advantage 
would accrue to the debt provider by having their user status in contemplation 
when formulating GPFR. Moreover, information satisfying to the investor would, 
necessarily, identify this management strategy. To suggest otherwise is to suggest 
that investors are unmoved by the level of debt, and concomitant cash-flow 
implications, that a company has. 
 
 There is an independent practical reason to reject the GPFR user status of 
lenders. The banking industry has pressed their claim to this status to argue, for 
the most part, for their interests as issuers and managers. In connection to their 
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resistance to fair value the key case that is argued for is that banks’ loan books 
have firm-specific value that is greater than their fair value. I address this issue 
later, in the case for fair value (chapter four).  Beyond this, the banking industry 
argues that fair value increases volatility which has negative implications for 
Banks’ cost of capital and their satisfaction of regulators’ prudential requirements. 
This seems to be an argument for industry privilege rather than an objective, 
unbiased input into accounting regulation. Banks are, in effect, arguing for a less 
than efficient risk-adjusted cost of capital than the market would otherwise deliver 
and for the ability to, in substance, be unrestrained by reserve asset requirements. 
Against these non-creditor related arguments banks argue that historical cost and 
conservatism provide a greater margin for safety in GPFRs when determining 
debt provision. These arguments and their flaws have been previously detailed. I 
recapitulate them here purely to demonstrate the convolution of creditors’ 
(lenders) arguments for GPFR user status. Lenders want to smooth their incomes 
by selective realization to convey the impression of lower risk (or volatility) than 
reflects economic substance, in support of the lowest possible cost of capital. This 
is one reason to reject the user status of lenders. 
 
3.3.4.4 Lobbyists/Government/Regulators 
 Lobby groups’ interest in financial reports is less obvious than the 
previous groups. Regardless of the particular concern the lobbyist has with the 
operation of a company it is, at best, only indirectly linked to a company’s 
financial reports. Even if the concern is, for example, a company’s generation of 
excess profits this is information that will necessarily be made available to the 
investor. That is: industry type, revenue, EBITDA, net profit (NPAT), tax paid 
and owners’ equity. In the case of other lobbying, the relation between the 
lobbyists’ agendas and GPFR is likely to be less direct. Where there is no 
question that lobby groups are external, and they use GPFR, with no power to 
compel information from the company, it is not obvious what basis their claim 
would consist in. Investor-focused GPFR, augmented by the organs of democratic 
process, appear sufficient to satisfy any possible legitimate claim lobbyists may 
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have to company-specific information. The lobbyist use of GPFR, as a claim to 
particular specifications of GPFR information content seems tenuous. 
 
 Further to the rejection of lobbyists as an important GPFR user, it is 
available to argue such interests are met by government’s ability to compel 
financial or other information from a company. The lobbyist concern is satisfied 
indirectly through government. This governmental ability is observable in the 
divide between tax accounting and financial accounting. From this view the target 
of GPFR, external users who lack the ability to command the information they 
require [who have a legitimate, purposeful foundation to seek the information 
they do], describes the investor only. 
 
This specification does not entail an obstinate rejection of the inclusion of 
any information, supplemental to that required by investors directly, just because 
it does not address investors’ direct interests. Where it is cost effective to provide 
information that will otherwise be compelled, or that, in the absence of such 
information, will give rise to political or reputational costs greater than the cost of 
the provision of such information in GPFR, it is in the investor’s interest that such 
information be provided as GPFR. The investor’s interest is (or may be) wider 
than GPFR information necessary to make a rational decision to buy, sell, or hold 
shares in an entity. Again, any decision on the inclusion or exclusion of such 
information in or from GPFR will turn on the interests of the investor. This 
applies to any secondary claimant to financial accounting information and would 
certainly extend to providers of debt financing. The ability of such other users to 
require special purpose financial reports aligns the investor’s interest with certain 
interests of other potential users. It does not, however, a priori establish the claim 
of those users to exert an influence on GPFR. 
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3.3.4.5 Summary 
 The case has been made for current and potential investors as the sole 
legitimate users of GPFR (Staubus, 1961; 1999). This case looks at the central 
function of financial accounting and reporting in its environment, relating that 
environment to the objective function of GPFR. This view reconciles the 
investor’s particular utility with the utility of society and is therefore unreliant on 
sui generis axioms more demanding than the reification society (Bierman, 1979). 
Rival GPFR user claimants are demonstrated to hold no legitimate claim to 
consideration (user status) in relation to external company financial reporting that 
expressly targets groups without the ability to specify or command that 
information. Proffered reasons include: the ability to require specified company 
financial information, no legitimate purpose for that information, the sufficiency 
of investor-targeted information, and, in terms of their preclusion from user status, 
the tension between investor and other interests. To this we might add that, as the 
owners of the reporting entity, investors pay for the provision of information 
(GPFR), establishing a default assumption of limitation of such information to 
investors unless reasons to conclude otherwise exist. 
 
3.4 Stewardship versus Decision-usefulness: A false dichotomy? 
 Standards setters have been progressively moving towards a preference for 
decision-usefulness since the late 1960s-early 1970s (Stanton, 1997). Despite this, 
the debate over which objective accounting should aim at has persisted, with 
significant resistance to the ascendancy of decision-usefulness and relevance as, 
respectively, the primary objective function and qualitative characteristic of 
financial reporting. Opponents to developing trends in accounting conceptual 
frameworks and standards typically prefer the traditional approaches to 
accounting, including historical cost measurement, stewardship, conservatism, 
and matching. This general position rejects fair value and the subsumption of 
stewardship into decision-usefulness, believing that it should be a separate 
accounting objective, at the minimum, equal to decision-usefulness. The position 
of standards’ setters is that there is no obvious mutual exclusivity between 
stewardship and decision-usefulness (IASB, 2006a; IASB, 2007). The broad line 
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taken in this discussion supports the position of the IASB, augmented by the 
stewardship function of multiple period reports and other sources of company-
specific information and macro-economic data, taken as a single text (Crowther, 
2002). 
 
 An important component characterizing the debate between stewardship 
and decision-usefulness is its relation to the debate between the precise 
specifications of accounting information users. The primacy of investor-users is 
largely an achieved assumption. This has reduced the field of possible arguments 
for particular accounting objective functions, qualitative characteristics and 
concomitant arguments for measurement bases and specification of standards, on 
the basis of diverse users/stakeholders. In this context the present/potential 
investor bifurcation appears to be a device to re-form the battle lines between the 
trend in conceptual frameworks and regulation towards decision-useful, relevant, 
fair value accounting and traditional historical cost, stewardship-focused, 
conservative accounting. The dichotomy between present and potential investors 
has been addressed. It is not clear that there is any substantive basis to the 
distinction beyond its potential utility to an axiomatic presumption for, as a de 
minimus, the equality of traditional accounting approaches. The dichotomy is 
rejected here as artificial as is the non-sequitur often generated from it; a 
conclusion in favour of the primacy of stewardship. 
 
3.4.1 What is Stewardship? 
 The IASB conceptual framework describes stewardship as information 
showing: 
 
 “… the results of stewardship of management, or the accountability of 
management for resources entrusted to it. Those users who wish to assess the 
stewardship or accountability of management do so in order that they make 
economic decisions [including] whether to hold or sell their investment…or…to 
reappoint or replace the management.” 
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     (IASB Conceptual Framework, 1989, 
paragraph 14) 
 
Stewardship-postulated conceptual frameworks tend to represent a conventional 
view of the agency relationship in which the risk of interests’ divergence between 
managers as agents and their principals, the shareholders, arises (Stittle, 2003; 
Watkins, 2007; Benita, 2003). The stewardship function of accounting is intended 
to control for this risk. This feature is reflected in the IASB’s Preliminary Views 
on an Improved Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: The Objective 
of Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics of Decision-Useful 
Financial Reporting Information (2007). This concern is expressed in terms of 
stewardship as requiring information about management’s safe custody of assets 
and compliance with regulations (OB 27). It requires information about the 
probity and competence of management (Lennard, 2007). 
 
 The stewardship concern recognizes the separation of management from 
investment and other financing (Watkins, 2007). The suggestion made by 
stewardship advocates is that a dynamic economic environment requires a 
dialogical interaction between management and investors and that stewardship as 
an objective function of GPFR establishes the basis for this dialogue. Such 
advocacy relates stewardship as a fundamental element in modern corporate 
governance (Lennard, 2007). Another general aspect of the stewardship focus is a 
tendency to emphasise past transactions and events. 
 
 The arguments for stewardship as the primary (or at least distinct) 
objective of GPFR tend to reference this function back to historical cost, 
matching, conservatism and control of agency risk. It is available to argue that 
this general line of argument describes an excessively stylized view of the world. 
To allow this view it is necessary to accept that all the information we require (or 
that may be required) is contained within financial reports and that no other 
source exists, even in the form of previous annual reports. To prioritise 
stewardship, except as an incidental accomplishment of the historical information 
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contained within GPFR, seems to devalue other sources of information (Crowther, 
2002). Less than a reliance on alternative information sources, the subsumption of 
stewardship by decision-usefulness, presupposes that historical information within 
particular financial reports will directly satisfy the retrospective component of 
accountability while including prospective information with predictive and 
confirmatory value. 
 
 Independent of the previous point there is no obvious sense in which 
management’s stewardship can or needs to be described by anything other than 
the sequence of share price movements, adjusted for any bonus issues, combined 
with the timing and amounts of any dividends paid. This would provide all the 
requisite information to assess the stewardship of the company in terms of a view 
of market efficiency implicitly granted by Bush (2005). Arguably, historical 
information’s primary purpose is to establish the context for interpreting futuristic 
information. The investor needs to be able to assess the substance of 
management’s forecasts on the basis of the documented accuracy of historical 
forecasts. Outside of this, little obvious value attends to stewardship as a basis for 
action outside of special cases, including proving directors’ liability for losses. 
This is all the more so where significant shareholders are able to command 
information and have at least de facto power to influence the composition of 
boards. Under such conditions the individual or aggregated influence of 
significant shareholders, in combination with proxy voting and individual 
shareholder indifference obviate the utility assumed of stewardship as an 
objective of GPFR.  
 
 The decision-useful/stewardship debate was importantly informed by the 
1983 contribution of Ijiri. This was essentially an argument for the independence 
of stewardship and the rehabilitation of historical cost in the face of growing 
initiatives of standards’ setters and some academics towards variants of current 
value accounting and decision-usefulness. The argument broadly consists in 
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demonstrating that stewardship or accountability32 is “not entirely encompassed in 
the decision-usefulness concept” (Coy, et al, 2001). This proposition was further 
expounded by Gjesdal (1981), who demonstrated the differential rankings of 
qualities and objectives obtaining from an incentive objective (stewardship) and a 
decision-objective. It is not very clear what substantive objection to decision-
usefulness is being raised. The clearest argument is that the decision-usefulness 
conceptual framework does not explicitly consider questions of fairness, except as 
an (implicit) relation of neutrality and freedom from bias (Gjesdal, 1981). 
Conversely, stewardship explicitly judges fairness in relation to agreement. 
Fairness is indeterminable without an agreed metric against which to measure it 
(Coy, et al, 2001). Wading through the opacity of that ostensible definition we are 
not given substantial cause to challenge decision-usefulness. In one sense the 
explicit fairness asserted of a stewardship-informed conceptual framework offers 
no meaningful specification, in another, we are asked to infer unfairness of 
market-determined distribution decisions without independent argument. 
Moreover, no reason is given to suppose fairness issues hinge on GPFR and 
cannot be developed after the preparation and presentation of GPFR, at a societal 
level, accommodating social contractarianism, contextualized by the machinery of 
democratic representation. 
 
 Beyond the ‘fairness’ objection to decision-useful conceptual frameworks 
other implications of the choice between decision-usefulness and stewardship are 
identified. These are, in general, poorly specified and functionally meaningless. 
Stewardship is said to acknowledge the endogenous relationship between the 
supplier of accounting information and its users.  Conversely, decision-usefulness 
focuses purely on the user (Coy, et al, 2001). It is not very clear why this is 
objectionable. Perhaps more clearly, the case is made that stewardship focuses on 
objectivity, verifiability, and stability (Gjesdal, 1981), whereas decision-
usefulness conceptual frameworks accent relevance and reliability. This is 
instructive of the nature of the distinctions Gjesdal (1981) draws more generally, 
                                                 
32
 Following from Wheat (1971) I question the synomity assumed by certain academics of 
stewardship and accountability. Arguably, the former is a subset of the latter. 
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in that they are not clearly specified. More simply, stewardship accents reliability 
as direct verifiability by reference to a transaction price and decision-usefulness is 
concerned with relevance and prospective information. It is nothing more than an 
elaborate, convoluted conduit to the relevance/reliability debate. 
 
 Consistent with the position taken by the majority of the IASB (2006) 
(Preliminary Views) the case for stewardship as an aspect of decision-usefulness 
seems logically justified. Moreover, the focus lent to GPFR development by a 
single objective provides independent practical support for the proposal. 
Distinguishing stewardship as a discrete, parallel objective to that of decision-
usefulness is unlikely to entail any incremental advantages over its implication 
from decision-usefulness (IASB, Preliminary Views, 2008, BC 1.35). This is 
amplified where historical cost is assumed (without necessary warrant) as a 
derivation from stewardship. It is not clear how the account function is served by 
non-comparable, temporally heterogeneous valuations, instantiated as objective 
variables about nothing more tangible than a transaction basis. There is some 
suggestion that stewardship-accented accounts would emphasise detailed 
accounting for related-party transactions. It is again not certain that such 
information would be unimportant in a decision-useful context. Where it is 
generally agreed that stewardship and decision-usefulness are not mutually 
exclusive, stewardship advocacy turns on distinctions in terms of emphases 
(Lennard, 2007; Williams, 2007; FASB, 2006). 
 
3.4.2 Decision-Usefulness 
 Decision-usefulness first emerged in the normative accounting era, either 
as the implicit or explicit underpinnings of theories that gained fleeting currency 
in that period. As previously discussed, where the currency of such theories of 
accounting receded in the academy with the rise of positive accounting theory, 
regulation, as an inherently normative accounting theory, has been more 
significantly and persistently influenced by the central intuitions informing this 
period. Decision-usefulness, despite traces dating to the depression-era (Bush, 
2005), probably dates in its explicit articulation to Chambers CoCoA. However, it 
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is from 1966-1973 that it established itself officially and, only in 1970, in APB 
Statement No. 4, that it appeared as important conceptual framework information 
(Henderson, et al, 2004; Coy, et al, 2001; Storey and Storey, 1998). Since this 
time it has progressively challenged the incumbent objective function, 
stewardship (Rayman, 2006; Roberts, Weetman, and Gordon, 2005).  
 
 Proponents of stewardship argue that the subsumption of stewardship by 
decision-usefulness deflates the account function of GPFR (IASB, 2005; Laughlin 
and Puxty, 1981; Anson and Lamourex, 2006). Resistance to the primacy of 
decision-usefulness has been noticeably substantially British. This may reflect the 
embedding of stewardship in the British accounting tradition, against the 
decision-usefulness focus of US accounting regulation (Bush, 2005; Grixti, 2005). 
This proposition is reflected in the affirmation of the central importance of 
stewardship by the Association of British Insurers (ABI, 2006), the International 
Corporate Governance Network (2006), arguments raised in  the paper produced 
for ICAEW by Bush (2005). The view also finds support in the alternative views 
to the IASB’s general preference for decision-usefulness, reflected in IASB 
Chairman, David Tweedie’s advocacy of the distinct, parallel treatment of 
stewardship as an objective separate from decision-usefulness. We seem to see 
here the importance of tradition and culture on the views of accounting theory 
promulgation. In relation to the descriptive characteristics I have established, 
acculturation should optimally be subjugated by accounting’s primary objective 
function. 
 
 The question of what decisions are important should be raised here. The 
investor needs to know whether they should buy, sell, or hold. In this context it is 
undemanding to a priori posit the assertion that the information investors require 
relates to the current value of a company, the company’s prospects, and a 
contextual basis to assess prospective information. The current value of assets and 
liabilities is required. In addition, information about management’s expectations 
of future cash-flows will form an important input into investors’ assessment of the 
value of the company. The context for this information is provided by information 
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about past performance and forecast reliability. It is further supported by details 
of the assumptions underpinning management forecasts. The case made here for 
fair value is that where valuations are not available at levels one and two, or 
where any part of levels one and two valuations reference illiquid markets, level 
three valuations are indicated. These level three valuations should offset the risk 
of management discretion by supplying quantitative information about the 
assumptions made in relation to primitive variables (Ryan, 2008). This enhanced 
information provision is proposed as an augmentation of existing applications of 
fair value. It is also a key reason for advancing the sophisticated investor as a 
suitable proxy for the investor simpliciter. 
 
 A secondary observation here is the point drawn from the discussion of 
investor use of GPFR in the research by Lee and Tweedie (1990). Although they 
find investor use of GPFR is a positive correlate of investor sophistication, the 
implication of the inaccessibility of (then) current GPFR in regard to naïve 
investors as an indication of deficient usefulness to such investors does not obtain. 
This was previously discussed as the free-rider advantage to naïve investors of the 
operation of sophisticated investors eliminating unexploited profit opportunities. 
To this I add the competitive market for the supply of information that, assuming 
no systematized friction in the market for the supply of such information, should 
operate to minimize inefficiencies in the market. If we reject this assumption, I 
would make the case that this is an argument for the regulation of that market 
rather than presenting an argument for GPFR simplification. The central point 
here is that no reliance is placed on investors’ widespread use of GPFR to 
establish its general usefulness to investors. 
 
 Consistent with the view maintained by the IASB (and FASB) the position 
taken here is that decision-usefulness embodies stewardship as well as forecast 
information. This position has been subject to challenge on empirical grounds 
(Gassen, 2008). Gassen’s study of US companies established the mutual 
exclusivity of the rival GPFR objectives. Certain limitations are acknowledged in 
relation to validity issues of this study. Most fundamental amongst these is the 
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uncertainty between the articulated accounting objectives and the reflection of 
these in operational terms in the studied companies. At the least, the study is no 
more than equivocal evidence against the view argued for here of the 
compatibility of the respective objectives. It is uncertain what function 
stewardship would have where it could not influence a decision, except where its 
provision obviated the need to make a decision. We might allow this limited 
concession to stewardship as a manifestation of agency risk mitigation, ultra-
decision-usefulness. Even this concession exists by warrant of imputed decision-
usefulness, approximate to the free-rider advantage previously described of the 
naïve investor who does not directly use GPFR. 
 
3.4.3 Summary of the debate 
Against the position adopted by standards’ setters and by many advocates 
of the separate, equal (or primary) role for stewardship in standards’ 
promulgation, the view taken here is that stewardship and accountability are not 
synonymous. Instead, accountability is composed of stewardship and decision-
usefulness. Moreover, stewardship is historically decision-useful information. All 
such information is relevant. There is no clear reason why the account function 
cannot be extended to forecasts. This follows the Wheat Committee Report (1972) 
in which stewardship was taken as a subset of accountability. On this reading, 
accountability is a supra-category, approximately describing the same temporal 
parameters that relevance does. 
 
 Prospective information-accountability must be less stringent than the 
historical account function. Necessarily, the general environment might change to 
such a degree that the basis for the forecasts is undermined. Accountability 
requires the realism contained in the assumptions supporting forecasts, the degree 
of foreseeability of extra-company economic environment changes from those 
serving as postulates for the forecast, and the role of company-specific (that is, 
controllable) factors contributing to the in/accuracy of forecast information. 
Nonetheless, it is conceptually plausible that the decision-useful focus extends the 
accountability of management to investors. No sound reason presents to assume 
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that accountability conflicts with relevant, decision-useful information from this 
perspective. 
 
 The view outlined is that accountability involves no conflict with 
prospective information. Further, there is no obvious loss of value to accounting 
conceptual frameworks by decision-usefulness’ subsumption of stewardship. The 
purpose of the incidental nature of stewardship, essentially delimited to its 
decision-usefulness, is to focus the objective of GPFR in the move towards its 
coherent conceptualization. The distinction lies in emphasis. In a sense 
prospective information is a decision-useful increment, with the grant that the 
cost/benefit constraint may potentially reduce historical information contained 
within GPFR. This issue will turn on the extent to which historical information 
aids decisions. Accountability approximately complements relevance in the sense 
that they interact and they both have (at the least) similar temporal parameters in 
relation to the life of the company.33 By hypothesis, neither quality, relevance or 
accountability could be assured absent each operating in an endogenous relation 
to the other. This entails that the stewardship/decision-usefulness debate 
persistently observes a sub-optimal trajectory, concerned as the traditional view 
is, purely to frustrate the move to useful, current value, relevant financial reports 
in favour of temporally remote and heterogeneous values, that systematically 
extends the capacity for opportunistic behavior. The reconciliation of ostensibly 
conflicting qualitative characteristics and objective functions drives off of the 
narrow user basis previously argued for. The focusing of accounting postulates 
proposed by major standards’ setters observes the fundamental intuition 
informing the theory proposed here. General accounting theory will be most 
expeditiously achieved by a coherence derived from the simplicity inhering in the 
theory’s underlying postulates. These preconditions create a circumstance 
conducive to theory coherence. Where the discussion to this point has not made 
this explicit, some loss of detail would be an acceptable price to pay for the 
economy of generality. 
                                                 
33
 Abductively, accountability is fractionally briefer in that relevance predates IPOs, whereas 
accountability can only reasonably apply subsequent to public issue. 
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Chapter Four 
Fair value: An Implication of the Proposed Theory? 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
 To this point the discussion has considered accounting as a financial 
information technology with an identifiable objective; to provide information 
useful in enabling investors to make economic decisions. Specifically, GPFR 
should aim at providing a unique source of company-specific information that is 
useful for informing the market generally whether to buy, sell or hold a 
company’s equity securities. This basic conclusion is examined in relation to fair 
value as a potential entailment of the theory. The reason for selecting the 
accounting measurement basis debate as an area of focus is that it has generally 
been one of the most vexed issues in financial accounting (Whittington, 2007a). 
For this reason it is likely to be a suitable testing ground for the proposed theory. 
It is also, arguably, not an entailment of the theory. The distinction that I would 
draw here is that although fair value is not a necessary, mechanistic entailment of 
the proposed theory, some sense of current value accounting is. Furthermore, the 
momentum behind fair value gives sufficient cause to infer from the proposed 
theory to fair value. This qualification accommodates the operative role of 
accounting as a company financial event recording technology. To argue for 
valuation method perfectionism would be to remove the theory from serious 
prospects for its influence. In this sense it would be nothing more than a 
counterfactual hypothesis, such as Chambers’ CoCoA. Moreover, by stepping 
back from fair value as operationalised, instead preferring fair value coherence as 
a measurement system based on economic substance, many of the conceptual 
objections to fair value are addressed. 
 
 Contemporary debate over accounting valuation methodology centers on 
fair value versus historical cost (Herz and MacDonald, 2008). Traditional 
historical cost accounting has become increasingly challenged by standards 
setters’ trend towards a fair valuation basis for accounting (Chorafas, 2006; King, 
2006; Hitz, 2007; Whittington, 2008; Bradbury, 2008; Deegan, 2004).  The debate 
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picks out the preferred qualitative characteristics for the respective positions, as 
articulated in standards setters’ concepts statements. Fair value advocacy 
prioritizes relevance whereas the position of historical cost proponents is that 
reliability is the paramount qualitative characteristic of GPFR (IASB, 2006b). The 
debate develops to lay claim to the implication of reliability in relevance and 
relevance in reliability. This debate tends to be drawn in polemical, rhetorical 
terms in which mutual exclusivity is implied yet the possibility of either 
characteristic presupposes at least a minimal possession of the other. This debate 
poses questions of the kind, ‘how can unreliable information be relevant’ and ‘in 
what sense is information reliable if, having no relevance to current values, 
nobody would make a decision based on it’ (Toppe-Shortridge, et al, 2006). The 
central contention of this discussion is that the debate has a logical conclusion and 
that, on balance, subject to some specification issues, this favours fair value. 
 
4.1 Historical cost 
 Historical cost is the traditional method of accounting valuation. It is 
formally defined by the IASB conceptual framework (1989) as: 
 
“assets are recorded at the amount of cash or cash equivalents paid for or the 
fair value of consideration given to acquire them at the time of acquisition. 
Liabilities are recorded at the amount or proceeds received in exchange for the 
obligation, or in some circumstances (for example, income taxes), at amounts of 
cash or cash equivalents expected to be paid to satisfy the liability in the normal 
course of business.” 
    (Quoted in Stolowy and Lebas, 2006, p. 158) 
 
Historical cost involves recording financial statement items at their cost to the 
company at the transaction date. That is, historical cost expressly reports 
something that has happened.34 This allows verification of the recorded values, 
against invoices and receipts. Further, changes in recorded values (of fixed assets) 
                                                 
34
 This contrasts with fair value, which posits a counter-factual value in the event that a transaction 
that did not occur, had occurred. 
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are regulated by the depreciation schedule selected by the company up to the 
point of asset realization or liability settlement. Depreciation is calculated on the 
original value, with a range of methods available. This choice of method and the 
rate of depreciation provides some scope for managerial discretion and error. 
Tests for impairment may also be applied to measurement under historical cost 
accounting, although where impairment is applied the basis for historical cost’s 
superior objective characteristic, that is its reliability, is obviated. The central 
foundation for historical cost advocacy is that it is more reliable than fair value, 
depending on a lesser degree of subjectivity (Stolowy and Lebas, 2006). 
Furthermore, impairment under historical cost exhibits a systematically negative 
bias as only impairment that reduces an asset’s value below the depreciation 
schedule are allowed. 
 
4.1.1 The case for historical cost 
 The case for historical cost has generally been advanced on the basis that 
it has greater reliability than fair value. Historical cost numbers consist in actual 
prices paid by an entity or value received at the transaction date. They do not 
require assumptions, estimates or other subjective assessment (at the point of 
original recognition). This view favours the original interpretation of verifiability, 
as an analytic entailment of a past transaction price, as the central condition of 
reliability. A central concern raised by historical cost advocates is that many fair 
value measurements do not involve an arms-length (or, in fact, any) transaction 
(Toppe-Shortridge, et al, 2006). By eliminating appraisals and valuation 
techniques historical cost proponents contend that the scope for manipulation is 
reduced (Toppe-Shortridge, et al, 2006). 
 
 The principal concerns of historical cost advocates surround the absence 
of an arms-length transaction and the introduction of subjectivity to accounting 
valuations where no market price exists. This concern relates to levels two and 
three of prescribed fair valuation methods (discussed in further detail under “fair 
value”). From this objection it is possible to infer an implied historical cost view 
of historical transaction prices at fair value, at the time of the transaction, 
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consistent with the definition articulated by the IASB (1989). In this context, 
some grounds to allow the objective character of transaction-basis accounting 
measurement exist, but only at the point of asset acquisition or liability 
assumption. It is not nearly so obvious that the economic substance of financial 
accounts would be supported in relation to realization as a precondition of 
recognition. This point relates to certainty, obtaining from realization, 
acknowledging that until realization of an asset or discharge of a liability occurs, 
it is inappropriate to recognize income under historical cost. 
 
Historical cost advocates point out that historical cost does not rely on the 
subjectivity inherent in fair values derived from model-based valuations. Where a 
market price is not available for a similar asset, adjusted for differences, or there 
is no market-based price at all, fair value specifies mark-to-model. The model is 
to use as much market-based information as possible. Historical cost proponents 
argue that such valuations are highly subjective, potentially embodying 
management bias. A wide range of model valuations is permitted. This risk is 
obviated by historical cost which records such assets at acquisition cost, less 
accumulated depreciation. Once the basis for depreciation is established no 
opportunity for management’s manipulation of the recorded values exists other 
than impairment. 
 
 In terms of initial recognition historical cost broadly relies on the 
assumption that the parties to the transaction acted rationally. That is, historical 
cost in such case, eliminates subjectivity without loss of relevance (IASB, 2006b). 
Limited circumstances challenge this notion where the transaction (acquisition) 
was the result of a bad decision, where costs exceed the recoverable amount, such 
as costs of construction of a building adversely impacted by delays, or where the 
acquisition was a bargain. Outside of such special cases, initial recognition at 
historical cost seems to capture reliability and relevance. Notably, such historical 
costs are generally functionally fair values (IASB, 2006b). 
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4.1.2 Structural advantages of historical cost 
 An advantage of historical cost claimed by its proponents is that it is 
symmetrical in its treatment of both sides of the balance sheet. Where fair values 
are widely employed for assets, liabilities are valued at their nominal value 
(Chorafas, 2006). A mismatch occurs where assets are marked-to-market and 
liabilities are recorded on an accruals basis of cost amortized to impairment 
(Chorafas, 2006). This view of the balance sheet symmetry of historical cost 
versus the asymmetry of fair value is not an essential property of fair value so 
much as an objection to mixed attribute accounting. In this sense the issue does 
not describe a qualitative feature of either system so much as it identifies 
problems with implementation, complicated by entrenched, diverse interests that 
operate to confound the comprehensive use of fair value. 
 
A related advantage claimed of historical cost is that it is a simple basis for 
accounting valuation. This case is made by one of historical cost’s more vocal 
proponents, Flegm (2004; 2005), that the growing complexity of accounting 
standards and guidance is due to fair value measurement. Arguably, Flegm (2004) 
is conflating the complexity of contemporary accounting standards with the rise 
of the influence of fair value measurement (Squires, Smith, McDougall, and 
Yeack, 2003). FASB guidelines have grown to over 100,000 pages of rules 
(Squires, et al, 2003). This significantly complicates interpretation and 
application. The case for principles over rules (Flegm, 2004; 2005), whether 
independently valid or not, does not address the historical cost/fair value debate. 
As Levitt (2007) and Schuetze (2004) have argued, although fair value is 
somewhat more complex than historical cost, it is substantially in compromises, 
largely generated out of resistance to a coherent fair valuation system, that 
standards have proliferated and their volume swollen (FASB, 2002). This is more 
instructive of a problem attending mixed attribute accounting, as a consequence of 
resistance to fair value, than it is of fair value per se. 
 
 Historical cost is favoured by the banking industry for the lower level of 
volatility it entails in financial statements. This concern is more extensive, 
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although to a lesser degree, being raised by industries reliant on hedges, or 
speculative use of derivatives. The case is made in relation to non-hedge 
instruments, in particular, that the information value of fair value adjustments 
(particularly to long-term financial instruments) is uncertain where the loss or 
gain may never be realized. There are concerns that the increased volatility of fair 
value may increase the cost of capital for certain industries. It is not clear that 
these arguments reflect a virtue of historical cost so much as a flaw. The case may 
be made that increased volatility reflected in the financial statements is better 
reflective of the underlying volatility in the market and, thus, economic reality 
and as a base for the assessment of managerial performance. This argument for 
historical cost seems to be an argument motivated by the desire to obscure the 
economic substance of certain events. It is a management/issuer GPFR user based 
argument and therefore, in the context of the current theory, able to be rejected. 
 
4.1.3 Bases to question historical cost 
 Given the lengthy tenure of historical cost as a preferred valuation method 
it is unsurprising that it has encountered periods of resistance and threats. What is 
possibly more remarkable is the tenacity with which it has repelled such threats, 
oftentimes with little beyond its incumbency to recommend it. The external 
catalysts for threats to historical cost include the elevated inflation of the 1970s 
and early 1980s which served to cast doubts about the currency of historical cost 
accounting until the mid-1980s. This pressure abated as inflation was brought 
under control by the early-mid 1980s. Subsequently, market crises of the late 
1980s revealed the opportunism that historical cost allowed due to the realization 
basis for recognition it entailed. Where such an approach was a central element of 
prudence or conservatism by intent, it allowed managers to cherry-pick 
performing assets for realization, while retaining poorly performing assets at their 
cost price. During the Savings and Loan crisis, spanning the mid-1980s and into 
the early 1990s, this behavior exacerbated the market slump when markets 
rebalanced. The cumulative influence of external forces has led to the rise of 
current cost accounting variants, against the incumbent, historical cost. This 
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section considers arguments against historical cost as an accounting measurement 
base. 
 
 The general problem associated with historical cost accounting 
measurement is its lack of currency (Herz and MacDonald, 2008). This, it may be 
argued, compromises its decision and value relevance. This problem is 
compounded by a general lack of comparability between entities and between 
particular assets of an entity (Kirkman, 1985). The transaction date basis for 
valuation inherent in historical cost discounts the heterogeneity of transaction 
points. If we grant that, given historical cost measurement presupposes a 
transaction between willing parties, what historical cost represents in accounts is a 
range of transaction point fair values. This measurement base is, then, 
systematically mixed-attribute, due to temporality. This issue is further 
complicated by depreciation schedules applied to fixed assets on the basis of 
management selection based on expected useful life. As discussed, historical cost 
accounting representational faithfulness is negatively correlated with inflation. 
Possibly more importantly, as previous crises have revealed, managerial 
manipulation of their results is possible under historical cost’s transaction basis 
for recognition. This is of particular significance because it presents incentives for 
managers to behave dysfunctionally in an organizational sense, realizing better 
performing assets and investments while retaining lesser quality investments that 
have performed poorly, so as to avoid the transaction (sale) that would trigger 
recognition in the company’s accounts. These are the substantive problems with 
historical cost. 
 
 A central concern with historical cost is that accounting is performed in 
nominal units (national currencies) and that these complicate international and 
inter-temporal comparability. This may have been less problematic historically 
where pre-debasement currencies were the nominal unit of account but the rise of 
fractional reserve banking and the decline of the gold standard have complicated 
comparison. Wherever broad money supply grows in excess of GDP growth, a 
variable inflationary affect is imparted to asset markets. More obviously, the 
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general price level adjustment bases to accounting measurement were proposed in 
relation to consumer price levels in the 1970s and 1980s (Whittington, 2007; 
Tweedie and Whittington, 1997; Kirkman, 1985). Certain counterintuitive results 
obtained from such proposals, including positive balance sheet implications for 
heavily (monetary) indebted companies with countervailing real assets (Clayton 
and Blake, 1984; Lucas, 1981). The effect of these difficulties, combined with re-
established control over inflation globally, led to the dissipation of impetus for 
such proposals although current value accounting had gained some traction by the 
mid-1980s (Kirkman, 1985). 
 
 A number of periods through recent history have demonstrated the ability 
of management to postpone presenting the substantive economic nature of 
companies underlying businesses due to transaction-based accounting (Landsman, 
2006). This occurred during the Savings and Loan crisis of the late 1980s and 
subsequently, in the lack of recognition of declining values in the US auto 
industry due to structural overcapacity (Schuetze, 2006; Toppe-Shortridge, et al, 
2006). Where historical cost accounting provides for impairment of assets this 
disconnects it from its purported reliability, which consists solely of an historical 
transaction price as an objective reality. Both the auto-industry and post 
September 11 aircraft and airline industries have avoided write downs that would 
have attended a fair value accounting of the relevant company’s assets due to 
industry overcapacity. Instead, value decrements are dictated by depreciation 
schedules which, on a ‘useful life’ of asset basis, will not account for expectations 
of actual use or changes in these. This is not substantially obviated where some 
part of the depreciation calculus relates to actual use as the fixed asset is 
implicitly permanently impaired on an embedded value basis. 
 
 There are circumstances where, in times of market or industry decline, 
historical cost offers too-favourable an impression of certain companies but it is 
also potentially unrepresentatively pessimistic. In relation to contemporary times 
historical cost understates the value of the oil industry, natural gas and, more 
generally, the value of intangible assets (Schuetze, 2006; IASB, 2006b). The case 
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may be made that where historical cost systematically undervalues internally 
generated intangibles, partial recognition under fair value in its present form could 
be improved with the addition of conceptually coherent modifications to fair 
valuations of such assets. Nowhere is this proposal inconsistent with fair value, 
reflecting the embedded value of intangibles. 
 
 Historical cost can actually inflate values relative to current value (fair 
value as one variant) during periods of economic decline or turmoil (Churchill, 
1977; McNeal, 1977). This would be true of relatively new companies and 
companies that have acquired significant assets in the period directly preceding 
general market decline. This could establish GPFR values for a company that 
support the security of debt funding where the underlying economic reality is that 
the debt is inadequately secured (Churchill, 1977). This risk is greatest during 
recessions, disrupting bankers’ arguments that historical cost provides a ‘margin 
of safety’. The margin of safety inferred is unreliable, potentially non-existent 
and, in any circumstance, no basis to make a rational lending decision. 
 
 The magnitude of lobbying for historical cost provides an indication of its 
objectivity-challenged nature. By inference to opportunism inherent in the voluble 
support historical cost garners from some quarters we have reason to question the 
substance of the positive claims made in its support. Previously discussed 
instances include Colleen Cunningham’s (former CEO of FEI) argument that fair 
value is fundamentally flawed by its reliance on subjective, model-based 
valuations (Toppe-Shortridge, et al, 2006). This is revealed as the disingenuous 
pursuit of sectoral interest that it is by her subsequent argument that investment 
analysts would prefer to retain the competitive advantage they have in converting 
historical cost accounting information into fair value-based accounts (Fink, 2006). 
Although unstated, Cunningham may attend some value to the disinterest of 
external model-based valuations but essentially the argument is motivated by 
analyst advocacy. I have outlined the case that analysts are not independent GPFR 
users, their use is derivative. It follows that anything that complicates investor 
 118 
information accessibility, such as accounts that establish a need for information 
processing intermediaries, is a deficiency in GPFR. 
 
4.1.4 Summary 
 Historical cost has a long tradition in accounting valuation. Over time 
traditional accounting has come under threat due to widespread dissatisfaction 
with its relevance to investors. Periods of elevated inflation, the Savings and Loan 
crisis of the late 1980s, and the progressively growing gap between book values 
and market values, have all raised doubts about the relevance of historical cost 
accounting. This development has been reflected in a trend towards fair values by 
major accounting standards setters. Against this trend, historical cost has 
considerable trenchant support from diverse interests. The position is substantially 
encapsulated in the relevance/reliability debate. This debate has observed a sub-
optimal trajectory as the defence of historical cost valuation obstinately promotes 
an interpretation of reliability as a truistic entailment of verifiability as a function 
of records of an historical transaction. Drawn in these terms the argument is that 
fair value is not reliable because it is not historical cost. Reasons exist to resist 
such circularity where the reliability assumed of historical cost has no currency. 
All that such reliability warrants is the value derived from an historic transaction 
is factual of the historic event. Nothing essentially about this kind of reliability 
tells us anything a rational decision maker would rely on. 
 
4.2.1 Fair Value 
What is Fair Value Accounting? 
 Fair value is a current value-basis for accounting measurement. It has been 
gaining influence in accounting standards since the 1990s, against the (then) 
incumbent, historical cost. Fair value accounting measurement is defined by the 
FASB as: 
 
“The price that would be received for an asset, or paid to discharge a liability, in 
a current transaction between marketplace participants in the reference market 
for an asset or liability”  
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   (FASB, cited in King, 2006, p. 47) 
 
The definition applies conditions of willingness on the parties to transactions, 
their knowledgeability, and that the transaction price is not due to liquidation 
(AIMR, 2007; Landsman, 2006; FASB, 2006b). Fair value is composed of three 
basic levels (Elad, 2004): 
1 Market quotes for identical assets or liabilities. 
2 Estimates from a market for similar or related assets or liabilities, adjusted 
for differences. 
3 Model valuations with as many market inputs as possible. (Landsman, 
2006; FASB, 2006b; Hague, et al, 2006; IASB, 2006b). 
 
Although fair value favours prices in deep and liquid markets, it is not expressly a 
market value or an exit value (Elad, 2004; Cairns, 2006).35 It recognizes 
unrealized changes in the market price of assets and liabilities, distinguishing it 
from the transaction (realization) basis for recognition under historical cost (Bies, 
2005). Regulators specify a preference for level one valuations (Hitz, 2007). 
Where these are not available, level two is preferred and, finally, where model 
valuations are the only available option, these are to be used, employing as much 
market-derived input as possible (Herz and MacDonald, 2008). The case is made 
by Ryan (2008) that level two values are justifiable where they are, as described 
in standards, estimates from (active) markets for similar assets, adjusted for 
differences. However, a second allowable class at level two is prices delivered by 
inactive markets (Ryan, 2008).36 
 
 Fair values are progressively more important in the development of 
international accounting standards (Rutteman, 1989; FASB, 2006; IASB, 2007c; 
                                                 
35
 Although, as noted by Hitz (2007), accounting standards do not distinguish the level of depth or 
liquidity of the referent market when allowing the objective value of any market-informed fair 
value. 
 
36
 This is more of an ill-defined area of fair value. No firm basis for assessing the liquidity or 
depth of a market is provided and, at least until recent times, any market value has been preferred 
to a non-market alternative, without reference to the quality of the referent market’s formation. 
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2007d). The intention of standard setters is that fair values will produce 
accounting standards and information that will enable users to: “identify what 
cash flows are possible or realistic” (King, 2006; IASB, 2006b). Fair value 
accounting is implicitly predicated on the view that markets are substantially 
efficient although, in contrast to certain arguments positing a conceptual 
challenge to fair value, value-relevance, I extend the predication of fair value to 
allow that fair value accounting can exist in the context of somewhat inefficient 
markets. Fair value may be advanced as a normative proposition; enhancing the 
efficiency of markets (Miller, 1999).37 The principal argument for fair value is its 
decision-usefulness/relevance (Bies, 2004; IASB, 2006b). Standard empirical 
analyses of accounting valuation relevance are based on an assumption of 
securities prices as reflections of value. This general circumstance would suggest 
the fair value case for its own relevance is similarly circular to the case for 
historical cost and its reliability, described previously. Contra-Zimmerman and 
Watts (1986), fair value advocacy does not presuppose its own descriptive 
characteristic. In this sense, fair value can allow a general level of efficiency that 
can be enhanced by fair value accounting, supporting fair value as a normative 
proposition, whilst allowing that, at a conceptual level, it has incremental value in 
an informational role (Miller, 1999). 
 
4.2.2 The case for Fair Value accounting 
 The principal case for fair value accounting is that it has greater relevance 
for accounting information users (IASB, 2006b). A significant volume of 
empirical evidence has amassed, establishing, for the most part, that fair value 
financial accounts more accurately correspond with market prices of equities than 
historical cost does. Such research supporting fair value includes, inter alia, 
Caroll, et al (2002) and Venkatachalam (1996). The evidence is not universally 
supportive of fair value relevance but, intuitively, it is not difficult to infer the 
greater relevance of fair values (current values) compared with historical, 
transaction-date values. It is possible to make the qualification to the case for fair 
                                                 
37
 This is a point I return to later in this chapter on the discussion of Hitz’ (2007) challenge to the 
conceptual foundations of fair value. 
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value that where it fails in reflecting market values there may be a case for certain 
elements of re-specification. One such case might include a more extensive 
internally generated intangible asset recognition than is available under current 
accounting rules (Aboody and Lev, 1988). Recognition of revalued, formerly 
impaired intangibles, up to the maximum level of the pre-impairment level, 
captures minimal recognition of internally generated intangibles. The only in-
principle reason to object to such recognition lies in the putative lack of reliable 
measurement of internally generated intangibles. This reliability objection is 
inherently an historical cost conception as it is the cost, and the ability to separate 
expensed cost from capitalized cost that cannot be measured reliably where such a 
distinction would not impact a fair valuation of intangibles. As with many 
reliability arguments, the default position from uncertainty of measurement seems 
to be non-recognition. Inferentially, the strong opposition that has arisen in 
response to the ascendancy of fair value supports its relevance (Edwards, 1989). 
 
 The FASB has expressed the desire that the principles underlying financial 
accounting should be identified and emphasized (FASB, 2005). It is held by the 
standards’ setter that comparability feeds into relevance and reliability. Prima 
facie comparability favours fair value over historical cost in a systemic sense, 
where historical cost operates with temporally heterogeneous values against the 
temporal homogeneity (current value) of fair value. Threats to fair value 
comparability pertain principally to the specification of its subjective operation 
on, especially, level three model valuations. The FASB (2007a) concepts 
statement No. 2 Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information, specifies 
comparability of accounting information, allowing investors to identify 
similarities and differences between two sets of economic events. 
 
 The FASB (2005) identify relevance as consisting in predictive value, 
feedback value (accountability) and timeliness. Reliability entails verifiability, 
neutrality and representational faithfulness.38 Financial accounting information 
                                                 
38
 Reliablity has now been subsumed by representational faithfulness, with reliability relegated to 
a secondary, or enhancing, characteristic. 
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should be useful to decision-makers in assessing cash flows and it should provide 
information on resources and claims on these (FASB, 2005). The FASB (2006; 
2006b) concluded that, in general agreement with accounting information users, 
the fair value option provides relevant information. This would seem to 
significantly undermine the argument of historical cost, conservatism proponents, 
such as Holthausen and Watts (2001), that information on equity valuation is a 
minor concern for standard setters. 
 
Fair value finds general support amongst the major standards’ setters, the 
IASB and FASB (Chorafas, 2006). Part of the ascendance of fair value is in the 
need to find a standard global accounting measurement base (Camfferman and 
Zeff, 2007). If this has not established an independent impetus for fair value it has 
created equality between it and the incumbent, historical cost (European 
Parliament, 2007). Evidence of the growing support in standards for fair value is 
based largely on its closer proximity to economic reality, even allowing for 
model-valuation errors, than the fiction of amortised cost (Woods, 2004). 
 
4.2.3 The purposive approach 
 The case has been made that there are limited implications for the value-
relevance accounting literature unless standards setters infer such relevance 
(Holthausen and Watts, 2001). This argument is a ‘back-door’ challenge to the 
central basis to empirical research involving correlation analysis, that is, stock 
price regressions on fair values, compared with historical costs, as evidence for 
fair value relevance. The real target here is fair valuation. The argument is made 
that such analyses assume the priority of the investor as GPFR user (Holthausen 
and Watts, 2001). The relevance of value-relevance research is contrasted with 
the FASB SFAC No. 1, paragraph 41, which states that the direct valuation of 
equity is not the only purpose of financial accounting. Developments in FASB 
(and IASB) standards, Discussion Papers, and observer notes generally do not 
support the view of Holthausen and Watts (2001).39 The inferred irrelevance of 
value-relevance to standards’ setters is not a secure conclusion. The FASB 
                                                 
39
 This issue has been discussed at greater length previously. 
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position may be more accurately interpreted as (written), “equity valuation is not 
the exclusive relevance criterion for accounting information.” 
 
 The argument that the value-relevance research provides no independent 
support for fair valuations as an influence on standards setters, strives to 
undermine the central argument for fair value, its value-relevance, but it fails to 
do this in two key regards. The case has been made that the primacy of the 
investor as GPFR user is an intentional objective that major standards setters have 
been gravitating towards since the early 1970s. Where Holthausen and Watts 
(2001) argue that this assumption is unsubstantiated, the weight of evidence 
supports it. Secondly, as Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (2001) demonstrate in a 
reply to the Holthausen and Watts (2001) view, value-relevance has been the 
guiding intuition of US accounting standards since the creation of the 1933 
Securities Act. The heredity of US accounting regulation is briefly described by 
Barth, et al (2001), revealing its development as a direct response to the turmoil 
pursuant to the 1929 stock market crash. Inference is drawn to the standards 
setters’ priority of objective equity market pricing. They also note the number of 
FASB research supplements that are adaptations of the value-relevance literature, 
supporting the relevance of this literature. Further, they observe that SFAC No. 5 
states that value relevance is distinct from decision relevance. This operates to 
qualify the targeted information required by standards setters. Value 
relevance/decision relevance is now, arguably, the paramount focus of both the 
IASB and the FASB, with their progressive trend towards fair value accounting 
standards. To use one brief qualification to the importance of value-relevance, 
dating to 1978, as definitive evidence for the nullity of the enormous body of 
empirical value-relevance research seems a desperate ploy of academics who 
simply do not like its fair value implication. 
 
4.2.4 Industry support for fair value 
 A number of industry groups argue that fair value accounting information 
is useful to accounting information users. Association of Investment Management 
and Research (AIMR, 2004) believe that investors need to know the current price 
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of an asset, not its acquisition price. They argue another advantage of fair value 
accounting is that it better reflects the growing volatility of markets. I have 
previously made the case that this increased volatility is a structural feature of 
modern (post-1980) financial markets, and thus, a long-term effect (Wray, 2007). 
It is further argued that fair value entails enhanced comparability over historical 
cost (AIMR, 2004). This point is illustrated by the case of two companies, owning 
similar pieces of land, with similar current market values, acquired at different 
times. Under historical cost, provided only that their respective acquisition dates 
entail a significant differential transaction price, these will be recorded at 
substantially different prices (Shortridge, et al, 2006). Against this, fair value 
opponents contend managerial valuation may reflect such similarly valuable 
assets, valued materially differently on the basis of ostensible differences. It is not 
clear that this objection describes an inherent feature of fair value. In general then, 
the issue of cross sectional comparability favours fair value. Fair value imposes a 
need to misrepresent objective reality, establishing a basis for liability, whereas a 
similar result can obtain under faithful historical cost accounting. That is, 
allowing that model-valuation assumptions are disclosed, the reporting entity 
must make an overt misstatement whereas historical cost permits that same entity 
to simply not execute the transaction that would deliver the undesired outcome. 
Rather, it seems to relate a caution regarding external valuation and valuation 
liability. 
 
 The pro-fair value view is iterated by the Certified Financial Analysts 
Institute (CFA, 2007). They argue that fair value is the only useful information for 
decision-making. They cite their on-line survey of two thousand investors which 
found 79% of respondents preferred fair value accounts as the basis for decision-
making (Herz and MacDonald, 2008). CFA rejects the value of historical cost 
valuations, stating that they do not reflect the economic effects of a company’s 
operations. Furthermore, arbitrary depreciation schedules inherent to historical 
cost accounting do not reliably describe reality (CFA, 2007). Assets may continue 
to generate cash flows long after having been written-down, such that managerial 
compensation is calculated in the write-down period on excessively expensed 
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accounting records and, upon full write-down, on understatements of cost 
pertinent to those periods. Through both periods key financial ratios, such as 
return on investment will be corrupted by the capricious depreciation schedules 
used. This does not require managerial manipulation although it may; it merely 
requires an error in judgment where useful life, particularly of unique assets, can 
only be estimated. This will be especially pertinent where realized depreciation is 
substantially a function of use. It is argued that all financial decisions are based on 
fair values and that this establishes their objective worth as the accounting 
measurement base (CFA, 2007). 
 
 Official support for fair value is reflected in the previously described 
positions of the IASB and FASB and also, with some qualification, by the US 
Federal Reserve (Federal Reserve, 2005). They grant that fair value accounting 
information is relevant to users in the valuation of assets and liabilities. However, 
the Federal Reserve has articulated reservations about the recognition of 
unrealized changes in the fair value of all financial assets and liabilities. This 
issue has been addressed previously with the qualification to the singular 
comprehensive bottom line. Federal Reserve research shows variability in the fair 
value of bank loans and questions the reliability of subjective inputs into valuation 
models. It notes that small changes in pricing model assumptions can have 
significant implications for fair valuations. I address this problem later, following 
Stephen Ryan’s (2008) position, indicating greater disclosure of these model-
valuation subjective inputs. 
 
4.2.5 Academic/empirical support for fair value 
 A significant body of value-relevance literature and research has been 
developed in support of fair value relevance. Earlier the discussion addressed 
whether value-relevance was a central concern of standards setters. Here the 
discussion turns to consider the evidence for the value-relevance of fair value 
accounting. Although there is contrary evidence, the preponderance of evidence 
supports fair value relevance to investors. Much of the value-relevance research 
focuses on proofs of the correspondence of fair values with market prices. The 
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preponderance of this research is US based and focuses on the financial sector 
and, more particularly, financial assets. This is a logistical constraint, imposed by 
the current application of fair value standards and the level of development of the 
accounting academy in the US relative to other jurisdictions. 
 
 The evidence for fair value relevance, although generally supportive of the 
proposition, is mixed. The 1995 study by Petroni and Wahlen supports the value 
relevance of fair values for listed securities but where market prices are 
unavailable, fair values are too unreliable to be relevant. SFAS No. 107 has been 
the subject of extensive research. Findings typically follow Petroni’s and 
Wahlen’s (1995) conclusion, that fair values for securities with market prices are 
value-relevant but for non-market securities the correlation between share prices 
and fair values is less clear (Nelson, 1996; Eccher, Ramesh and Thiagarajan, 
1996; Barth, et al, 1996). This evidence is, in turn, equivocal. Arguably, it 
indicates a positive value to detailing the valuation basis employed in arriving at a 
fair value for non-market assets and liabilities (Wahlen, Boatsman, and Herz, 
2000).40 Alternatively, the case has been made that firm-specificity of value is not 
reflected in fair value (Eccher, et al, 1996). Given an assumption of the inclusion 
of the basis of fair value calculation in the accounts, this interpretation is 
abductively inferior to that proposed by Wahlen, Boatsman and Herz (2000).  
This position is supported by Cotter and Richardson (2002), who find greater fair 
value/security price correlation with external appraisals of non-market assets. The 
generally greater relevance of fair values is further supported by Barth and Clinch 
(1998), who find that fair value revaluations of financial, tangible and intangible 
assets are reflected in stock prices. 
 
This issue makes the research conducted by Aboody, Barth and Kasnik 
(2001) of particular interest to the valuation relevance debate. It is additive in 
substantive terms where much of the value-relevance literature generated in the 
US is, at best, a modest empirical increment to existing knowledge. It is 
                                                 
40
 This is similar to Ryan’s (2008) proposal and is not as fair value is currently specified in 
standards. 
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distinguished by its contemplation of the implications of fair valuations in terms 
of relevance and decision-usefulness as they affect fixed assets. Secondly, it 
supports the predictive value of fair value revaluations of those fixed assets. A 
significant positive relation between revaluations of fixed assets and future 
changes in cash-flows and operating incomes is noted in a study of UK firms by 
Aboody, et al (2001).  They control for variation in stock prices that is unrelated 
to fixed asset revaluation by regressing stock prices on the revaluation balance, 
earnings and book value. Three years’ data from revaluation are used to assess the 
impact of revaluations. This research and its conclusions are supportive of the 
predictive value of fair valuations, making this amongst the most significant of 
the value relevance research. 
 
The findings of Aboody, et al (2001) have been challenged on the grounds 
of research execution issues by Sloan (2001). He argues that the research 
methodology was flawed as it had to rely on observable current values without 
controlling for management errors and biases. Further, the case is made that the 
Aoody, et al (2001) conclusion is overdetermined as operating performance is 
influenced by many factors. Amongst the research design flaws Sloan (2001) 
observes is the use of only three years’ of cash flows and operating income data 
from the revaluation date. The impact of increased debt assumption on the basis 
of asset revaluations, [maintaining a constant debt-to-equity ratio], is not 
considered. 
 
The objections raised by Sloan (2001) are largely insubstantial. It is not 
obvious that three years’ cash flow and operating profit data, post-fixed asset 
revaluation is inadequate as Sloan contends. This relates to his observation that 
many factors impact on operating performance and the ability to control for these 
diminishes progressively with time from the operative event. It is unlikely that 
Aboody, et al (2001) would advance the case that a revaluation of fixed assets 
functionally guarantees the company’s outperformance in terms of its operating 
and financial metric throughout its indefinite lifespan. If we accept this challenge 
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of Sloan’s we have to allow that nothing else may affect company performance, 
however far such extraneous events are from the revaluation date. 
 
 The second substantive claim Sloan makes is that revaluations allow the 
company to assume more debt and thus facilitate increased cash flows and 
operating earnings. In the first instance, this argument assumes that all debt will 
yield net positive returns. Clearly Sloan’s argument assumes that investors in 
fixed interest instruments are systematically foregoing risk-adjusted returns. 
Setting this concern aside, some incremental information value may exist in net 
profit as one of the tested metrics but it is doubtful this speculative proposition of 
Sloan’s is, in any event, well-conceived. The argument turns on the lack of an 
explicit control for total debt over the study period. An implicit assumption 
underlying this observation is that the banking industry lends on the basis of 
accounting numbers and that a loan would not be extended against an asset worth 
a given amount if its historical cost was much less. This seems to assume the 
banking industry systematically eschews risk-adjusted profit opportunities. This is 
unlikely. 
 
Another issue Sloan (2001) raises is that the Aboody, et al (2001) study 
relies on observable current values, without controlling for management errors in 
these. This indicates some value to repeating the study, in expanding the sample, 
and, possibly, in assessing the veracity of management-estimate history in relation 
to the sample companies. The latter suggestion is, at best, theoretical and, for 
practical purposes, logistically too demanding and too uncertain of delivering a 
sound conclusion. In any event, extending and repeating the research would seem 
to offer a reasonable control against systematic sample bias in the revaluing 
companies. It is not clear that Sloan is arguing for more here than that Aboody, et 
al’s (2001) probabilistic conclusion, is not certain. If this is his argument it is 
reasonable to grant his concern, without sharing the view of its substantive nature. 
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4.2.6 A response to the manipulation risks of fair value 
 Managerial manipulation is raised as an inherent risk of fair value 
measurement, principally due to third level fair valuation methods (Beatty and 
Weber, 2006; Flegm, 2004). The case is made that marking-to-model involves too 
great a level of subjective judgment on the part of managers. There is no doubt 
that this has been a problem in the past. Against this risk Chorafas (2006) argues 
that volitional manipulation of this kind may be controlled by increased 
managerial accountability. He cites the risk of imprisonment, describing the case 
of Daewoo Group in South Korea, owing more than $80 billion. The result of this 
situation was a prison sentence for the former head of Daewoo, Kim Woo-choong 
(Chorafas, 2006). Further, Enron directors agreed to pay $13 million personally to 
settle claims against them involving accounting manipulation. Enron’s insurers 
paid out $155 million in relation to this matter (Chorafas, 2006). The implication 
is that such personal accountability of management and boards may mitigate 
valuation manipulation risk. Arguably, increased penalties specified under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act will further enhance this risk control. What might be 
suggested here is that the sufficiency of the management risk is determinative of 
the risk mitigation achieved. This argues for the removal of arbitrary maximum 
financial penalties and prison sentences, making them functions of the magnitude 
of the manipulation and the losses caused. Incremental to this posited risk control, 
the disintegration of Arthur Andersen might reasonably be expected to 
reconfigure the agency risk/reward equation. 
 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Reform Act, passed by President Bush in 2002, 
adjusted the risk-reward ratio for CEOs and CFOs. The CEO or CFO became 
liable to certify filed financials and where these are later found to be non-
compliant, a requirement was imposed that the certifying officer refund any bonus 
or equity-based compensation received in the year following the non-compliant 
document (Squires, et al, 2003). Maximum penalties included fines of up to $5 
million and up to twenty years imprisonment for volitional non-compliance 
(Squires, et al, 2003). The effectiveness of these measures has been constrained 
by practical difficulties establishing the “willing and knowing” in non-
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compliance, as a pre-condition for punitive measures. Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley 
has had its efficacy in managerial manipulation constrained as it relates to 
publicly traded companies that are registered in the US. A number of recent high-
profile corporate collapses were of companies registered off-shore, including 
World com, Qwest, and Global Crossing (Squires, et al, 2003; Schuetze, 2006). 
 
 It is not clear that the issues raised in recent high-profile corporate 
collapses relate principally to fair value accounting manipulation. The 
opportunism inherent in unethical behavior may be more generally linked to the 
speculative excesses generated by advanced phases of an economic boom 
(Minsky, 1986; Ryan, 2008). More particularly, in the recent context, competitive 
pressures for returns in a low interest rate environment may have aggravated the 
incentive affect of opportunistic behavior (Schwartz, 2008). Deregulation of the 
telecommunications industry is argued for as a significant influence in the 
aforementioned collapses (Stiglitz, 2003; Merino, 2007). Tax cuts are also held as 
aggravating speculation (Stiglitz, 2003). Where Flegm (2004; 2005) ascribes 
Enron’s collapse to fair value subjectivity, Schuetze (2006) observes that the SEC 
erred in failing to specify external appraisals for model-based valuations. This, 
then, looks more like an implementation issue rather than an inherent failing of 
fair value. In addition, Flegm’s (2005) complaint of declining ethics cannot 
reasonably support the inference to causation by fair value. Independently, the 
suggestion of a decline in business ethics over the past thirty years, if accepted, at 
least partially exculpates fair value of causality in recent corporate collapses. This 
suggestion must be qualified by skepticism about Flegm’s evidence of declining 
business ethics. He cites the increased priority afforded investors as the target of 
GPFR by students after one year’s study as evidence of an ethical collapse. This 
position is incoherent as declining ethics, resulting in business collapses, harms 
residual interests (equity holders). 
 
 Against Flegm’s (2004) view that fair value was responsible for the 
collapse of Enron, Veron, Atret, and Galichon (2006) argue that fair value 
accounting has reduced the tools available to manage earnings. Arthur Andersen, 
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Enron’s auditors, were able to take the word of Enron’s audit committee 
regarding model valuations due to rules prevailing at the time (Scheutze, 2006). 
These rules were not particular to fair value. Notably FAS No. 98 Sale and 
Leaseback (1988) aroused significant managerial resistance due to the reduced 
ability to use off balance sheet accounting treatments (Veron, et al, 2006). The 
fact that the staff of Enron erupted into cheers (Flegm, 2005) upon revelation that 
they could use fair values may be more instructive of the potential for 
opportunism that inhered in its (then) too loose specification and insufficient audit 
practice. The case has been made that tighter specification of audit procedures has 
a more central role in agency risk control than measurement bases do (Ronen, 
2008; Turley, 2008). 
 
4.26 The misspecification of reliability: Accounting for intangibles 
 The historical cost presumption of reliability through verifiability by 
reference to a past transaction seems to mis-specify objective conditions for 
reliability. This issue is brought into focus by Aboody and Lev (1998) in their 
consideration of the growing gap between accounting values and market values. 
This, they argue, is due to the failure of existing accounting to measure the value 
of intangible assets. They make the case that SFAS No. 86 introduced the option 
of capitalizing research and development expenditure and that, of a study of 163 
firms taking this option from 1987 to 1995, stock returns were positively 
associated with intangible capitalization.41 Reliability concerns establish the basis 
for an essentially historical cost basis to resist capitalizing intangibles. Arguably, 
fair value has the mechanism available for such measurement, in the form of 
embedded value; the present value of discounted future cash flows. Conversely, 
historical cost inherently fails to acknowledge a value attributable to internally 
generated intangibles. The central quality of reliability claimed by historical cost 
proponents seems to depend on removing the risk of making uncertain positive 
statements by maintaining silences. In this sense the argument is less obviously 
                                                 
41
 It is not clear whether the capitalization option encouraged these firms to invest in R&D, and if 
this is the reason for their relative outperformance, however, assuming it did not result in non-
accounting variable changes, this serves as independent evidence of the informational value of fair 
value accounting for intangibles. 
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for the reliability of accounting information than for its irrelevance. This looks 
more like ensuring accounts say nothing wrong by saying little worthwhile at all 
(Booth, 2003). 
 
4.2.7 Problems for fair value accounting 
 The general basis to objections to fair value is that it is unreliable (Hitz, 
2007; Wahlen, et al, 2000). This consists in regard to the previously described 
three levels of fair value specified in the standards of the FASB and IASB. In 
relation to level one, market values for identical assets, the concern is that the 
reference market is treated as delivering objective values regardless of its depth 
and liquidity. This issue affects level two valuations as well, aggravated by the 
lack of any strictly relevant referent market and the subjectivity inherent in 
adjusting for differences between the particular asset or liability and its ‘similar’ 
referent. The final level, level three model valuations, creates the greatest concern 
(Hitz, 2007). Model valuations are highly sensitive to minor differences in 
assumptions, including asset utilization rates, concomitant cash flows, and the 
discount rate (Bies, 2005). Each assumption is integrally dependent on the 
accuracy of the others. The reliability risks outlined are valid and they do indicate 
the need for careful standards’ specification (Wahlen, et al, 2000). Arguably, fair 
valuations could be improved with more explicit legal and contractual sanctions 
than presently exist. Such liability would optimally extend to managers, directors, 
valuers, preparers, and auditors. What is not indicated is that historical cost’s 
paucity of useful information offers a superior alternative. 
 
 A related area of concern is that of conservatism inherent in the realization 
basis of historical cost accounting measurement (Landsman, 2006). Where, in 
traditional accounting, recognition only occurred after realization, in the case of 
fair value recognition occurs in relation to unrealized changes in the (market) 
value of assets. The absence of an arms-length transaction is held to undermine 
the reliability of fair values. These issues interrelate. The essential issue is that we 
do not have certain knowledge that the values recorded under fair value will be 
achieved. These concerns have some, if variable merit. What they do tend to do is 
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reify the transaction point. There are reasons to resist this implication of historical 
cost accounting. 
 
 The evidence supporting fair value relevance has been challenged on the 
basis that the fair value/securities’ price correlation does not provide evidence of 
the causal relation. To the extent that fair value merely reports market prices its 
decision-usefulness is nullified. This proposition is raised by Landsman (2006), 
although more tentatively than by Hitz (2007) (Discussed later). What we can say 
here is that evidence of market inefficiencies provides support for improved 
market efficiency accruing to certain modes of presentation, disrupting the pure 
information perspective. Such evidence is provided (inter alia) by Coronado, 
Mitchell, Sharpe, and Nesbitt (2008). They find incremental value relevance of 
recognition over disclosures of pension liabilities. The argument here is for a 
normative pursuit of market efficiency, thus the contradiction Hitz apprehends 
does not arise. This contradiction is between positive market efficiency theory and 
fair value. Axiomatically, a theory concerning the particulars of regulation 
presupposes some qualification to the efficient market hypothesis. Hitz (2007) 
argues that, to the extent that fair value does potentially include incremental 
information, at levels two and three of fair value, it conceptually violates its own 
foundations and is compromised by the unreliability of such information 
(Landsman, 2006). This position too narrowly defines conceptual fair value as 
market-consensus value, discounting fair value’s conceptual extension to values 
that the market would grant but for insufficient information. 
 
 In relation to fair values derived against prices of securities in deep and 
liquid markets there does not appear to be any substantive basis to the concern. 
The absence of an arms-length transaction can be proxied by similar transactions 
in the referent market between willing, unrelated parties. What opponents of fair 
value (and more pointedly, banks) want to say here is that firm-specific valuation 
is discounted by fair value. This is, assuming perfect managerial rationality, 
possibly marginally true. The price delivered by the market is one the firm does 
not accept, admitting a managerial valuation of the asset that is not less than the 
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market price.42 In this sense fair value provides a minimum value of assets and 
liabilities to the firm. If this is problematic for its excessive conservatism it is not 
clear how historical cost improves the situation. Presumably, transaction prices 
are not less than (for purchases) or not greater than (for sales) the valuation 
management places on an asset or liability at the transaction date. 
 
 In terms of illiquid markets and second level fair valuation, adjustments 
are possible and they are regularly made. The case that these are uniquely 
problematic overstates the difficulties involved. If we allow that employee stock 
options, subject to escrow of the securities underlying those options or a 
bonding/vesting period for the underlying securities, a strong-case of instruments 
distinct from those traded on any potential referent market is established, and we 
deduce that these are valued at issue, then no case arises to frustrate valuation. 
These derivatives are necessarily ascribed a value. They form part of 
compensation. To argue that they are impossible to value by both issuer and 
employee reductio ad absurdum is to say the company is offering employees 
some money and other stuff that is good. This is strained. Both parties hold a firm 
view of the value of the consideration. 
 
 In the case of illiquid markets, it is unclear why a range of value proxies 
would not suffice, founded on disclosed assumptions underlying discount cash 
flow valuations. Any suggestion that this is problematic presupposes a disruption 
of the company’s going-concern basis. It essentially asserts a liquidation basis to 
accounting values similar to that proposed by Chambers, without first justifying 
this liquidation assumption. The intuition here is that representational faithfulness 
is compromised where reliability is an assumed function of ‘worst case scenario’ 
anticipation. That is, the assumption that at any given point, we need to know the 
current value an (illiquid) market will offer is not secure. The problem is that the 
                                                 
42
 Assuming the firm continues to hold an asset or liability, against a given market price, the firm 
can be assumed to value the asset or liability at an amount not less than (or greater than) the 
referent market price. It prefers to hold the asset with information about this price known to it. It 
may be that the market price, as opposed to the asset or liability, produces indifference on the part 
of the holder, but this describes only the lowest firm-specific valuation of an asset, that it might 
continues to hold at higher prices, or a liability that it might only discharge at lower values. 
 135 
marginality of the illiquid market referent is exacerbated to the point where its 
referent value relates only to forced sales. 
 
 The level three model-based valuations of fair value are understandably 
the most contentious of fair value bases. The subjectivity of appraisal and 
estimates in model valuations is argued by historical cost proponents to create the 
basis for valuation manipulation. The model must use as much market-based 
information as possible. A range of alternative methods are allowed in mark-to-
model fair valuations. Minor changes in assumptions underpinning models may 
have significant valuation implications. This concern is legitimate but it is 
principally an issue of fair value operationalisation and specification. The 
problems at this level are not insuperable and their solution links with the 
extended disclosure and accountability function anticipated in relation to 
prospective information. Fair valuations of the mark-to-model kind inherently 
contain prospective information. At each future period from the modeled 
valuation, that valuation will gain substantive support or stand in need of revision. 
If this, in tandem with bolstered liability for culpable misstatement is insufficient 
as a basis to assert the incremental information value of modeling value of firm-
specific, non-vendibles it is, at the minimum, unclear how amortised cost could 
secure superior information for investors, especially in light of fuller disclosure 
surrounding model assumptions and a proposal to quantify primitive variables 
(Ryan, 2008). The objection to fair value of the subjectivity of model-based 
valuations loses its force provided that primitive variable quantification is 
disclosed. This provision reduces preparer ability to make unwarranted 
assumptions, enabling scrutiny of those assumptions, augmented by comparison 
between entities’ assumptions. 
 
 Another concern about (SFAS 159) is the relevance of fair value consists 
in the referent values (that is, market values) used in testing the valuation basis 
(Wahlen, et al, 2000). This argument is essentially a challenge to market 
efficiency (Kothari, 2001; Lee, 2001). This turns around the idea that fair value 
relevance assumes the objective character of market values. The position takes the 
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form that where fair values are stronger positive correlates of market values, it is 
not certain that market values are descriptive of an underlying objective value. 
This argument is approximately that if market values are just ‘fictions’ decision-
usefulness will not obtain from an accounting measurement base that merely apes 
(or even contributes to the formation of) those market prices. Fair value financial 
reporting will do no more than tell the user what is already known to the market 
and what is ‘known’ is uncertain as an objective identity. 
 
 Fair value referents have been further challenged as being relevant only to 
traders, not (buy-and-hold) investors (Bush, 2005). This issue is one I have 
discussed in the preceding chapter, in the consideration given to the question of 
whether GPFR should focus on current or potential shareholders. In a slightly 
different sense to the one advanced by Bush it is possible to infer grounds for 
some doubt about the relevance of fair values. As discussed, Bush’s argument is 
tenuous. Fair value may, however, be flawed in extrapolating from the marginal 
investor, including traders, to investors in general. This is an implication drawn 
from the potentially small fraction of a company’s equity securities that are 
regularly traded. In contrast to Bush I would not want to advance so tenuous an 
argument as the view that fair values prioritise traders as the target of GPFR. 
However, the referent value objectivity of marginal investors may be doubtful as 
an input into investors’ decisions, at least to the degree of precision implied by 
market values. Against this, it is unclear how historical cost obviates this 
‘precision excess’ where it relies on values that are definitionally marginalist in 
that they are derived from completed transactions. 
 
The related concern of no arms-length transaction in recognition without 
realization seems to only exist as a problem where there is reason to doubt 
realizability. Possibly the issue that best illustrates this concern is the fair 
valuation of liabilities impaired on the basis of the reporting entity’s increased 
firm-specific risk, that is, risk of firm non-performance or default risk. As fair 
value currently stands, an objection is raised to the asymmetric treatment it entails 
in asset and liability valuation (Chorafas, 2006). Where fair values are used for 
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assets, cost amortised to impairment is used for liabilities. The asymmetry by-
passes the counter-intuitive balance sheet improvement that obtains from, for 
example, the reduced fair valuation of an entity’s outstanding liabilities, due to the 
market’s estimation of the entity’s increased risk of default. 
 
 This ostensible asymmetry is less obviously problematic for fair value 
than critics would suggest. The reason we might resist problematization of this 
issue, and still reject reporting financial statement improvements on the basis of 
increased company default risk, is that the company has an ultimate liability to 
repay the face value of its bonds. It can only avoid paying full value by its 
bankruptcy or repurchase of its outstanding bonds. Assuming the company was 
situated to do the latter we would not expect the discount to be substantial and, 
even if it was, it would reduce significantly in the event that the company bid for 
its outstanding bonds. There appears to be a need to realize any benefit recorded 
in the limited case where the company’s ultimate liability is to the full nominal 
value of its debt instruments. Conceptually, fair value as a measure of economic 
substance survives this challenge. 
 
 On the asset side of the balance sheet blockage has some parallels with the 
corporate bond (liability) situation, although standard setters specify that blockage 
is not to be discounted. The distinction, and reason to hold the two situations 
distinct, is that where a company must fundamentally alter the supply/demand 
equilibrium to realize a gain on its non-performance risk-increased, discounted 
debt instruments, unless the going-concern assumption is disrupted, no such 
necessity arises in relation to its assets. It only needs to realize block holdings in 
other companies, under normal conditions at a discount, where its own viability is 
doubtful. Conversely, realizing balance sheet gains on its own discounted debt, 
that are not due to a shift in the market interest rate, without supporting 
realization, would lead to the inference that the company believes in the 
possibility/probability of its own bankruptcy and relief from the obligation. 
Rather than improving the balance sheet this would assure little or no residual 
(equity) value whatsoever. For these reasons the ostensible asymmetry opponents 
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of fair value protest of can be obviated by the specification of minimum 
conditions of realizability. In the described circumstance the discount for 
company-risk impaired debt or the value decrement concomitant with the 
realization of block holdings in other companies both indicate realization as a 
precondition for recognition of a price differential form, in the first case, nominal 
(issue price) value, and in the second, market value. As fair value targets 
underlying economic reality, and that reality is redefined where realization would 
alter the supply/demand dynamics of the market, nothing incoherent obtains from 
the ostensible asymmetrical treatment of assets and liabilities that cannot be 
reconciled by reference to the generative axioms of fair value. 
 
 The major standard setters have by-passed this issue by imposing the 
pragmatic constraint on subjectivity implicit in specifying such instruments 
(ESOs) be recorded at the value they would have when they vest (IASB, 2006e). 
Simply, this eliminates any calculus for difference. Similarly, with blockage, no 
calculation is allowed to discount the holding as a relation to its size. IASB IAS-
39, paragraphs 48A, AG71, and AG 75 explicitly state the fair value is of a single 
instrument (IASB, 2006e). Where the standard setters fair value position on 
blockage does nothing more demanding than assert the going concern assumption, 
the standard setters’ position on, for example, ESOs, is less clearly consistent with 
economic substance. Plainly, the market would not deliver the same price for 
conditional and unconditional instruments. This indicates that fair value 
coherence as a reflection of the substantive economic character of the event (ESO 
issue), supports accounting accrual of the ultimate instruments value, sensibly as a 
probablistic inference to the instrument’s realization, and thus cost to the issuing 
entity. 
 
4.2.8 Empirical evidence rejecting fair value relevance: bubbles and the 
comprehensive income implication of fair value’s balance sheet approach to 
income 
 Although the preponderance of value relevance research supports the view 
that fair value is value-relevant, the evidence is not unequivocal. Comprehensive 
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income, specified under SFAS 130, shows no stronger correlation with returns 
than net income (Dhaliwal, Subramyanyam, and Trezvant, 1999). In general net 
income is a better indicator of market value and cash flows. The only incremental 
information value relates to the changing value of the marketable securities 
component of accounting reports. This evidence is supported by the findings of 
Cahan, Courtenay, Gronewoller, and Upton (2000). In regressions of firms’ equity 
values on reported fair values Landsman found that correlation results were mixed 
(O’Brien, 2005). The case has been made that the link between fixed asset 
revaluations and future firm performance is overdetermined (Sloan, 2001). Fair 
value relates to comprehensive income in that it substantially extends the focus 
on, and priority of, the balance sheet. The evidence of Wang, Buijink and Eken 
(2006) is more equivocal, finding some incremental relevance to asset 
revaluations and currency translations. Arguably, Aboody, et al’s (2001) research, 
positively correlating fixed asset revaluations to subsequent performance, further 
supports the value relevance of comprehensive income. 
 
  Intuitively, comprehensive income could be expected to have a variable 
relation to value due to the variable qualitative characteristics of components of it. 
Nonetheless, elements of comprehensive income can be assessed for their quality, 
importantly tied to recurrence, potentially elevating the value relevance of the 
total information provided by comprehensive income GPFR. What empirical 
research of this issue generally does is take net profit and comprehensive income, 
as presented, against each other. This reflects a preoccupation with individual 
numbers, the bottom line, where, the assumption of modest levels of aggregate 
investor rationality offers conceptual support for the view that investors will 
distinguish between elements of a company’s performance they expect to be 
repeated versus those which are one-off. For this reason, the repeated empirical 
research findings of less, the same or variable incremental relevance of 
comprehensive income over net income, yields unremarkable results. The ‘noise’ 
of non-recurrent items will not have a standard influence. What may be indicated 
here is empirical research based on an adjustment made to comprehensive 
income, for the recurrence of its components. Under any circumstances 
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comprehensive income affords more information for analysis. This value-
relevance challenge to fair value presupposes investor (and analyst) analysis 
based on bottom-line numbers. If such an assumption is safe this is a decisive 
argument against fair value. In such a case GPFR regulation becomes a nullity. 
Company management may just as well offer their opinion about the company’s 
fortunes as the singular content of financial reporting, possibly augmented with a 
number (bottom line, out of 100, for example) for timorous souls who take 
confidence from numerical representations of opinions.  
 
The evidence of Dhaliwal, et al (1999) is of particular relevance to the fair 
value issue because it bases its value relevance assessment on comprehensive 
income on available-for-sale securities (AFS), net losses associated with 
minimum pension liability adjustments, and foreign currency translation 
adjustments. What this research does is reveal limitations to comprehensive 
income more than fair value (Cooper, 2007). Pension liabilities and foreign 
currency translation need not importantly inform the market of a company’s 
operating performance. The solution proposed to this by the project manager 
responsible for developing IAS 39, Paul Pacter, was that there should be three 
bottom lines: net income, income including abnormals, and comprehensive 
income (Wood, 2004). It is important that the qualities of contributions to 
reported accounting numbers (operating performance) be known by their source. 
Nothing inherent to fair value precludes multiple bottom lines. 
 
             Against the view of the pro-cyclicality of fair value comprehensive 
income the case has been made for multiple bottom lines, to describe the 
qualitative nature of particular components of a company’s economic 
performance (Pacter, cited in Wood, 2004). This allows that earnings quality as a 
function of recurrence can be isolated and is important to investors. This response 
addresses the concerns expressed by Mulford (2007). This issue for fair value is 
also tacitly challenged by the research conclusions of Dhaliwal, et al (1999). If we 
accept their finding, that comprehensive income has less relevance than net 
income, we must also accept that fair value does not create pro-cyclical 
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aggravation of inflated or depressed market prices. On a separate point Enria, 
Cappiello, Dierick, Grittini, Haralambous, Maddaloni and Molitor (2004) make 
the case that fair value provides earlier signals of financial fragility, countering its 
affect of increasing market volatility and its pro-cyclicality. This latter point is 
one we need to qualify by the context provided by Dhaliwal, et al’s (1999) 
research findings. We cannot have this one both ways. If fair value 
comprehensive income has no, or only muted, pro-cyclical implications, then its 
stabilization of the cycle (countercyclical) implications must be similarly limited 
(Jameson, 2005; Jameson, 2005b). 
 
            The view, then, that comprehensive income under fair value is not relevant 
in the sense of corresponding more closely with market values, may be allowed 
without unseating the utility of fair value comprehensive income (Skinner, 1999). 
He makes the case that comprehensive income performs a role in terms of 
assessing contracting issues. 
 
  Where Dhaliwal, et al (1999) argue that net surpluses provide better 
indications of future cash flows and income, Skinner (1999) holds that this result 
is expected (or at least unremarkable). He queries why it might be expected that 
unrealized gains and losses on the measured variables might be expected to have 
implications for stock prices. We can sharpen Skinner’s point by expanding the 
function of comprehensive income to stewardship in toto. It is worth noting that 
nothing of this localized debate offers a challenge to the use of fair values over 
historical cost so much as it challenges the ubiquitous utility of the balance sheet 
view of income that has been a concomitant of fair value. As Pacter has argued, 
the problem comes in the obsession with a single bottom line (Wood, 2004). 
There is nothing inherent to fair value accounting to preclude the three bottom 
lines proposed by Pacter (Wood, 2004). 
 
 The issue of fair value as a balance sheet approach to income has raised 
concerns that it supports market bubbles (Penman, 2006; Boyer, 2007; Bondi, 
2005). This view holds that mixing present profit with unrealized gains and losses 
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obscures the value creation process. In doing this it adds an accounting 
accelerator to an existing, pro-cyclical financial accelerator, aggravating market 
cyclicality (Boyer, 2007). Moreover, fair value creates the impression that a firm 
is an aggregation of substitutable assets. This conflicts with modern theories of 
the firm and its value creation which shows that managers activities and the 
strategic complementarities between firm-specific assets are the key to value 
creation (Bondi, 2005). It has been argued that conceptually fair value improves 
service to investors but that implementation risks exist. Moreover, market values 
can be derived from historical cost accounts (Penman, 2006). 
 
 A more rigorous investigation of procyclicality and volatility than the 
tentative, more general discussion of Boyer (2007), is that of Plantin, Sapra and 
Shin (1997). They find evidence that, in relation to long-term, senior, illiquid 
assets, such as comprise an important part of bank assets, marking-to-market (fair 
value) increases inefficiencies. The market for bank loans is small relative to total 
loan books and is susceptible to supply shocks, such that prices fall sharply in 
response to increased supply and only recover gradually (JWGBA, 1999). The 
case is made that such volatility is artificial.43 Banks generally hold loans to 
maturity and price fluctuations over the holding period are more indicative of 
supply dynamics than risk pricing. Similarly, banks are better situated to extract 
cash flows from assets, thus the market systematically undervalues such assets 
relative to their entity-specific value. Naturally, in the context of the current 
debate, challenges to fair value’s ability to capture economic substance must be 
established on the basis of historical cost’s superiority. It is not sufficient to prove 
fair value’s imperfection. Managers’ incentives indicate the sale of long-term loan 
assets to avoid recognition of short-term fair value losses. The authors argue that 
this creates endogenously elevated volatility as short-horizon managers sell pre-
                                                 
43
 Against the view of increased volatility in financial reports Alkon (2006) finds little evidence 
that fair value increases financial report volatility, due to countervalence (hedges). In terms of 
realized (market price) volatility, the evidence does not support reported volatility’s translation in 
market values. This view that fair value’s propensity to aggravate volatility is exaggerated is 
supported by Serafeim (2007). The view of Hodder, Hopkins and Wahlen (2006) is that increased 
volatility is indicative of real volatility. 
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emptorarily. The fair value assumption of frictionless markets is unsafe (ECB, 
2004). A response to this concern is provided in the following discussion. 
 
4.2.9 The Decision-Usefulness of Fair Value Accounting: The challenge of 
Hitz and response to this challenge 
 This thesis attempts to establish a conceptual basis to financial accounting. 
The central importance of accounting valuation, along with the difficulty 
standards setters have had in the inference from their identified concepts to 
measurement specification, supports the intuition that this is the optimal testing 
ground for a general theory of accounting. The discussion will approach its 
treatment of this issue by means of a reply to Hitz (2007). This is a clear and 
comprehensive exposition of the counter-thesis. In simple terms, Hitz (2007) 
makes the case that the proposition of fair value accounting is conceptually 
challenged. I present the view that this conclusion is unsafe and that Hitz relies on 
extremist interpretations of fair value accounting as a concomitant of market 
efficiency. If we only relax our assumptions about market efficiency, as any 
normative theory of accounting inherently does, his arguments are nullities. 
 
 Fair value accounting measurement has gained increasing acceptance 
amongst regulators to the point where it is now the conceptual preference of the 
SEC, the FASB, and the IASB (Hitz, 2007). The move to fair value has been 
progressive since the mid-1980s. This transition entails a shift from historical cost 
accounting based on transactions to event-based fair valuation (Hitz, 2007). The 
conceptual foundation for fair value accounting is its decision-usefulness and 
relevance, inferred from an assumption of the efficient market hypothesis. 
Importantly, the majority of empirical research, which is supportive of the 
conceptual confidence in fair value, relates to highly liquid markets, with a focus 
on the financial sector (Hitz, 2007).44 The motivation for fair value rests on 
decision-usefulness as opposed to stewardship and contracting objectives (Hitz, 
2007). 
                                                 
44
 This is the reason why Aboody, Barth, and Kasnik (2001) used UK companies to assess the 
implications of fair value revaluations of fixed assets. The standards and samples using such an 
approach were unavailable in the US. 
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“Fair value was introduced to provide information to investors to assess amounts 
and timing of future cash flows from an investment in a firm’s shares and debt 
securities.” 
         (Hitz, 2007) 
 
This position, as a basis to infer the utility of fair value, generalizes the 
assumption of market efficiency to all levels of fair value (Hitz, 2007). Fair value 
has secured growing prominence in international accounting standards, with the 
fair value option available for all securities, subsequent to the 2003 revision of 
IAS 39. IAS 16 introduced full fair value for actively traded intangibles (Hitz, 
2007). 
 
 The case is made that the position taken by standard setters “cannot be 
unequivocally supported by theoretical reasoning” (Hitz, 2007, p.325). [It is not 
obvious that any practical application could be operationalised so as to avoid at 
least some conceptually purist reservations]. One concern raised by Hitz is that 
fair value assumes an exit price in idealized market conditions of voluntary action 
of rational agents, operating with identical, complete information. Entity-specific 
competitive advantages, including private skills and value-in-use, are excluded 
(SFAS 157, paragraph C32; SFAC No. 7, paragraph 24; JWG, 2000, paragraph 
4.5; IASB (2006), paragraphs 42-45; Hitz, 2007). The three-level valuation 
hierarchy, with preference for level one (market values in deep and liquid 
markets), provides last resort recourse (level three) to model-valuations. These are 
internally assessed on a present value approach (SFAC No. 7; SFAS 157: IAS 36; 
Hitz, 2007). Hitz argues the range of available methods and models that may be 
used under the fair value standards precludes the coherence of fair value. 
 
The measurement perspective holds that “accounting should measure and 
report the…value of a firm…decision-useful information is information on the 
contribution of assets and liabilities to enterprise value [indicating value-in-use]” 
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(Hitz, 2007).  In practice, value and income are not well-defined and so they are 
proxied by information aiding the determination of the present value of future 
cash flows. The information perspective supports accounting information that 
improves decisions. It views accounting information as one source in a broader 
information set. The form of presentation does not influence its ability to 
influence decisions, supporting a view of perfected market efficiency. 
Conceptually, the newness of information capable of altering investors’ 
expectations regarding the value of the firm is important or, less demandingly, 
cost effective information aggregation establishes a basis to assert satisfaction of 
the information perspective (Hitz, 2007). Absent the information newness factor 
the aggregation conduit assumes either, a), market efficiency imperfection or b), 
that aggregation is not individual-investor cost effective. 
 
Financial reporting is an institution created by the deficiencies of real-
world markets, including asymmetric information and transaction costs (Hitz, 
2007). The present value of future cash flows, fair value basis, assumes investor 
indifference to the timing of those cash flows. Value-in-use is the benchmark 
measurement attribute yet fair value will, generally, not correspond with value-in-
use (Hitz, 2007). Fair value ignores management skill, or firm-specific human 
capital thus fair value systematically undervalues the firm.45 Hitz’s (2007) 
presumption appears to be that all firms possess superior management. By 
definition (of superior), this is impossible. From an information perspective, fair 
value only aggregates market (publicly available information) so it cannot revise 
the expectations of market participants. It, therefore, has no incremental 
information content or value. Conceptually, this observation applies to synthetic, 
model-based valuations as well (Hitz, 2007).  
 
It is noted that model valuations fail in terms of reliability yet they may 
contain incremental information, but only so far as they stand outside of the 
conceptual basis for fair value (Hitz, 2007). By implication, internally modeled 
                                                 
45
 Fair value also ignores the sub-optimal utilization of assets by the firm, where those assets have 
uncertain external referents. This, at the least, raises a question about the systematic 
undervaluation inherent in fair value. 
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valuations cannot be market-consensus expectations. For this reason investors 
need to assess the trade-off between increased relevance of private information 
impounded into model valuations against the increased risk of intentional bias in 
those valuations. This disrupts the fair value paradigmatic information 
aggregation assumption, impairing the decision-usefulness of model-based fair 
values (Hitz, 2007). 
 
In assessing financial statement fair value applications against decision-
usefulness from the information and measurement perspectives, Hitz finds limited 
support for fair value. The information perspective of fair value balance sheets 
isolates aggregation, discounting the mode of presentation. Fair value does 
eliminate hidden reserves, moving fair value closer to market value than does 
historical cost. It fails to account for internally generated goodwill. Fair value 
income increases volatility, although volatility may not necessarily increase due 
to off-setting changes on aggregation. It may also be argued that increased 
volatility is actual and thus, should be reflected in financial statements. From the 
measurement perspective, empirical evidence supports the closer proximity of fair 
value income to economic income (versus historical cost) and its greater 
predictive value, although Hitz describes economic income as ambiguous, stating 
that over time fair value income will equal historical cost income. 
 
In general terms Hitz (2007) finds the conceptual basis for fair value 
tenuous. He raises concerns that the income concept needs to be clarified. The 
reliability of fair values is doubtful as it relies on idealized market conditions yet 
proxies such assumptions under real-world conditions, with sub-optimal market 
values, where they are the applicable reference for an asset or liability. He allows 
that liquid market information is decision-useful but that model valuations are less 
strong. Conversely, the incremental information value possible in model 
valuations depends on violating the conceptual basis to fair value, by impounding 
private information (VIU) into these models. 
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4.3.0 The counter-argument: the conceptual case for fair value 
Before considering fair value it is useful to consider whether the case for 
current value as an assumption or stipulation is warranted. The assumption of 
current values over historic values consists in two central elements. One is that 
current value accounting reflects the most recent information on aggregated 
market participant assumptions and expectations. Any accounting measurement 
system that does not form around a current valuation basis excludes the full range 
of possible information. The case that current valuation excludes historical 
information appears to presuppose the investor, otherwise isolated from financial 
information, makes investment decisions on the basis of single annual reports. 
This assumption discounts the competitive market for company-specific financial 
information that poses an imminent threat to accounting. Accounting as a 
discipline cannot pretend the absence of such competition. Moreover, the ‘self-
containment’ proposition discounts previous annual reports. As this information 
augmentation exists, these assumptions implicit in the case for historical cost are 
rejected. 
 
 The second reason we might prefer current values is that they are 
(analytically) temporally homogeneous where historical cost values are 
temporally determined by the time of their transaction. Beyond relevance to 
current decisions, it is reasonable to assume this feature supports comparability. 
Against this position, historical cost proponents argue that such values can be 
extracted from historical cost accounting information.  In this sense it is redundant 
to argue for current value superiority in terms of relevance or comparability as 
these qualities are implicitly granted of current value by historical cost 
proponents. What we do need to do is secure a current valuation base against 
claims that it unduly compromises reliability.  The historical cost position is only 
slightly better than an argument for a more abstruse accounting information 
presentation such as arguing that this information should be written in code or that 
hardcopies should only be produced in small, faded print. The argument appears 
to tacitly accept that fair value is relevant but that agency risk entails that 
management subjectivity outweighs management information accessibility. 
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Subject to certain specifications, I make the case for fair value formulated to 
address this concern. The objective is to combine management’s superior 
information access with constraints on management bias.  
 
 The arguments Hitz (2007) raises contesting fair value decision-usefulness 
from measurement and information perspectives depends on a certain 
questionable characterization of fair value. His challenge attends no decision-
usefulness increment in aggregation or confirmation of preceding market and 
model valuations; an account function. He also challenges fair value assumptions 
of idealized market conditions, irrespective of the referent market valuation base, 
while assuming market efficiency as a constraint on the incremental information 
value of fair value of level one valuations. It is open to stipulate (on the basis of 
sufficient empirical evidence) a degree of market inefficiency as an operating 
assumption of normative accounting theory (financial reporting regulation), as 
Hitz does, that may be mitigated by instantiating fair value standards. All we need 
to do to validate this proposition is to establish the relative closeness of fair value 
to economic concepts of income and value when juxtaposed with historical cost. 
The completion of this proposition is to establish an implied process-view of 
accounting standards’ perfection, that is, fair value’s momentum justifies its 
instantiation as an improvement on extant accounting practice. Finally, Hitz 
argues that value-in-use is explicitly conceptually precluded from fair value. In 
contrast I argue that value-in-use is implicit in fair value’s present value-basis 
assessment of non-generic (where generic is level one) assets and liabilities, and 
that it is in these lower level items that firm specificity can be located. That is, by 
deduction, where the firm’s present and future cash flows support a differential 
valuation to the aggregate value of level one items the difference must be firm-
specific and a particular relation between model-valued assets and other economic 
income generating factors controlled by the entity. If human capital forms some 
part of the future cash flow assumption then it must either be controlled or 
constructively controlled by the company, due to the human agent’s rational self-
interest. Any deficits in this proposition may be addressed by Crowther’s (1992) 
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view that single financial reports are not discrete datum in the real-world context, 
but are better viewed as individual chapters in a larger text. 
 
 The case that market values are to be preferred, without reference to the 
quality of the market formation appears to create some disjuncture between 
conceptual fair value and fair value-as-implemented. The motivational force 
behind fair value, its conceptual claim to relevance, enabling informed, rational 
decisions, is predicated on its reflection of economic substance. The pragmatic 
motivation of standard setters that I infer from the inconsistency of their 
treatments is that they are reluctant to step back from any kind of market price, 
regardless of such a price’s separation from one that would be delivered in a deep 
and liquid market, between willing and knowledgeable economic agents. The 
inferred reason for this is that market depth and liquidity become areas requiring 
some quantification, that is, an absolute cut-off point is needed. This concern 
importantly impacts the issues raised by Boyer (2007) and Plantin, et al (1997). 
Economic substance is not going to be reflected in market values driven by short-
term supply dynamics in an illiquid market for preponderantly hold-to-maturity 
entities (Plantin, et al, 1997; JWGBA, 1999). What we can say here is that market 
values of long-term assets, held long-term, with demonstrable marginality and 
minority of the (securitization) market, do not necessarily describe the economic 
(fair) value of the assets to the term holder. 
 
 It is not clear that this is problematic for fair value conceptually. The 
valuation here that seems best indicated is level three. This only requires that we 
qualify markets as fair value referents, relative to some predeterminate level of 
depth and liquidity. This position is supported by Ryan (2008) arguing that level 
three valuations may be preferable to level two, where the level two valuations are 
derived from illiquid markets. The greater disclosure of model valuation 
assumptions may improve its information value to investors (Ryan, 2008).46 
                                                 
46
 Ryan (2008) also notes that neither SFAS-157 nor SOP 94-6 Disclosure of Certain Risks and 
Uncertainties requires quantitative information about the primitive variables involved in modeling 
calculus. In relation to the subprime crisis that is the focus of Ryan’s discussion, such variables 
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Where the market itself so far departs from the depth and liquidity preferred of 
level one fair valuations, its referent value is voided. Loans have a nominal or 
capital value and a (generally) specified intervening cash flow. The only relevant 
variables incremental to these known factors are changes in the debtors risk 
profile. Absent a suitable market referent, level three fair valuation is indicated. 
Because changing market values confound an assessment of this risk with short-
term supply dynamics, model valuations may be superior. 
 
 Notwithstanding this tentative solution, many of the objections to market 
values are specious. The suggestion of Plantin, et al (1997) that short-horizon 
sellers, motivated by contracting concerns, would pre-emptively sell, argues only 
for appropriate control of agency risks, potentially indicating compensation 
aligned with cash flows. It offers no independent insight into optimal accounting 
measurement. Their argument, that fair value may be endogenously volatility-
enhancing, presupposes fair value is ‘helicopter dropped’ on an environment 
otherwise held constant. Plainly if, as Plantin, et al (1997) suggest, strategic 
concerns would be elevated over fundamental (long-term value creation) 
concerns, recalibating incentives would be indicated. This does not constitute a 
basis to reject fair value. Moreover, where short-termism indicated certain agents’ 
opportunistic ‘short-selling’, term benefits would accrue to rational capital 
through discounted loan asset acquisition, supported by long-term agent 
incentivisation. The ‘pernicious’ action of fair value would then, if anything at all, 
make ‘stupid’ money, small money. This would ultimately chase it out of the 
market, thereby enhancing efficiency. 
 
 Arguably, the youth of credit-derivative markets is the principal 
determinant of market liquidity and concomitant inefficiency (JWGBA, 1999). 
The assumption of frictionless markets under such conditions is unsafe (ECB, 
2004). We can allow that such circumstances may introduce artificial volatility 
into long-term, illiquid assets. Conversely, market discipline may be conducive to 
                                                                                                                                     
include assumptions about house price depreciation, discount rates, expected future interest rates, 
and mortgagor refinancing capability and timing. 
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more rapid corrective action in relation to valuation revisions under adverse 
circumstances. The Savings and Loan crisis was exacerbated by historical cost 
treatments that muted the deteriorating fundamentals of companies (ECB, 2004). 
The Savings and Loan Companies, as with banks in general, borrowed (then, as 
now), short-term and provided fixed long-term loans. This resulted in ongoing net 
losses when interest rates rose from 7% to 11%, above the level of loan interest 
rates. Under historical cost, the losses showed only in the income statement going 
forward, whereas fair value would have reflected the loan impairment in the 
balance sheet. Nothing about this undermines level three valuations for such 
assets but the case may be made that, even if we grant the market’s imperfection, 
it is not an argument for historical cost. If the concerns raised by opponents of fair 
value tell us anything substantial at all, they seem to make a case in favour of the 
“willingness” of parties to a transaction, in the IASB definition of fair value and 
the “normal business conditions” of the FASB definition (Blanchard, 2007; Ryan, 
2008). The problematisation of fair value  by Hitz (2007), Boyer (2007) and 
Platin, et al (1997), relates to an assumption of a fair value preference for any 
market, irrespective of how well formed it is, as though illiquid markets were the 
next best proxy for deep and liquid markets, of the underlying economic value of 
assets and liabilities. Where the FASB (IASB, 2007e) describe fair value as: 
 
“an estimate of the price an entity would have realized if it had sold an asset or 
paid if it had been relieved of a liability on the reporting date in an arm-length 
exchange motivated by normal business considerations.” 
 
The IASB (2007e) describes fair value as: 
 
“the amount for which an asset could be exchanged or a liability settled between 
knowledgeable, willing parties in an arms-length transaction” (Blanchard, 2000). 
 
What is not indicated is a carte blanc rejection of fair value. Conceptually fair 
value maintains its robustness against the special cases fashioned as charges 
against it. Such arguments point to necessary considerations underlying the 
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progressive operationalisation of fair value measurement. The case may be made 
that standards need to specify depth and liquidity sufficient to apply level one fair 
values. 
 
 The distinction that is able to be drawn is between market values and fair 
values. Where this has been the source of much of the contention surrounding fair 
value, it operates to secure fair value against the allegations that it fails to reflect 
the underlying economic substance of events. This point is made clear by the 
testimony of Dorchester to the FASB (2004), in which, while lauding initiatives 
towards current values, he stated a preference for market values over fair value 
(FASB, 2004). Dorchester complained of the ambiguity of fair value and the 
uncertainty as to whom it was fair (FASB, 2004). This creates no particular 
difficulties for the proposed theory. The owner (shareholder) is the party in 
singular contemplation here. 
 
 This brings us to the next explicit concern raised by Hitz (2007), that fair 
value assumes market efficiency. The conceptual commitment to a purest view of 
market efficiency is not inherent to fair value. It is in evidence in the view 
expressed by Dorchester, outlined above. What fair value implies is a reasonable 
basis to infer we cannot systematically improve the objective character of a 
market-based valuation basis in relation to values derived from deep and liquid 
markets. This is a significantly more modest claim on the efficiency of markets 
than Hitz (2007) supposes. What he seems to object to are particular 
specifications prevalent in accounting standards that are (pragmatically) reluctant 
to step back from any market values. His basic assertion that market efficiency is 
generalized to markets per se, from deep and liquid markets, although somewhat 
true, provides no conceptual challenge to fair value. Only so long as the 
implementation of fair value is consistent with the underlying economic reality it 
describes, preferring market referents where the reference market satisfies 
minimum liquidity conditions, then it is conceptually coherent. For this reason, 
this conceptual challenge by Hitz (2007) is rejected. 
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 The view described above challenges Hitz’ objection to fair value on the 
grounds that it assumes idealized market conditions, irrespective of market 
formation. It also undermines Hitz’s assumption that no incremental information 
obtains from fair value financial reporting. We might point to cost-effective 
information aggregation and confirmatory value of fair value information. 
Notably, this fits well with the described view of decision-useful accounting 
information, in which stewardship is an element, principally useful for assessing 
the veracity of prospective information. Ultimately, the stewardship function is 
not an essentially punitive operation. The ability to seek redress is almost 
invariably a minority component of the account function. It is in the continued 
employment of individual agents and an attendant concern for a company’s 
prospectivity that accountability is importantly implicated. 
 
 It is not as certain as Hitz (2007) would have us believe that fair value 
functionally eliminates any recognition of value-in-use. This, Hitz (2007) argues, 
systematically undervalues the firm. This objection to fair value is an interesting 
contrast to Plantin, et al (1997) and Boyer’s (2007) concern that during expansive 
economic conditions, fair value is procyclical. Unfortunately, having rejected this 
concern, it is not available to enlist it as a counter-weight to Hitz’s systematic 
undervaluation problematisation of fair value. Such an approach would, in any 
event make the reliability and relevance of fair value something of a lottery. Firm-
specific value is reflected in elements of fair value, satisfying the information 
perspective. It is only Hitz’s assertion of a market consensus valuation as 
conceptual fair value that precludes such firm-specific valuations under fair value. 
This is the ideal fair value, not an axiomatic property of it. The net present value 
of future cash flows necessarily incorporates elements of firm-specific value. For 
this reason it is only the sufficiently generic, marketable assets and liabilities that 
conceptually presuppose market values as fair values. In this case the value-added 
of fair value GPFR is cost-effective aggregation and (ex post) confirmation of 
values, including model valuations. 
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 Other objections Hitz raises to fair value accounting measurement include: 
the fact that internal modeling cannot be market-consensus expectations, it is 
therefore unreliable, that, although it does eliminate hidden reserves, it fails to 
account for internally generated goodwill. In relation to reliability, as has been 
drawn out in the preceding discussion, this is not the prioritized qualitative 
characteristic of fair value. Fair value aims at relevance, targeting decision-
usefulness, subject to minimum satisfaction of reliability. This does presuppose 
certain minimum conditions of reliability and, more than the abnegation of 
reliability as a qualitative characteristic, advances a different set of mechanisms 
for its achievement. Previously, the view was presented that market-consensus 
expectations are not a necessary condition of fair value must be qualified. In 
relation to level one fair valuations, reliability is definitionally inherent in the 
consensus of the market. For levels two and three, reliability is aimed at by 
disclosure of model valuation bases, by confirmation (and/or revision and bases 
for this) in subsequent reports, supported by a textural view of the broader 
information set that views a company financial report as a datum, as a rational 
investor necessarily must. It is envisaged that rational capital will realign 
managers’ incentives to longer, multiple-period horizons. 
 
 The failure of fair value to account for internally generated goodwill under 
IFRS 3 does not constitute a fundamental conceptual challenge to it as an 
accounting measurement base. One of the objections to fair value is that the 
impairment basis operating under it captures some value attributable to internally 
generated goodwill. Simply, goodwill impairments may be reversed up to the full 
pre-impairment value of the goodwill, reflecting some of the value of internally 
generated goodwill. In contrast, under historical cost, goodwill is amortized on a 
scheduler basis of (typically) up to twenty years, without the option of reversal. 
This is not, however, the central issue. More importantly, the expensing of 
internally generated goodwill is predicated on reliability grounds. Conceptually, 
fair value is not inconsistent with the recognition of internally generated goodwill. 
To the extent that this goodwill is reflected in enhanced cash flows, the 
underlying economic reality of the goodwill, its fair value, may be recognized as 
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an asset in proportion to the value increment it entails. Fair value has the 
mechanism to measure goodwill, the present value of expected cash flows. It is 
only the narrow, somewhat empirically established interpretation of fair value, 
which precludes such valuation. Contra-Hitz, I would make the case that this 
reflects the extent to which fair value deviates from its conceptual basis, rather 
than a basis to reject it conceptually. 
 
4.3.1 Summary 
 The case made by Hitz (2007) for the conceptual incoherence of fair value 
takes an excessively narrow view of the assumptions underlying fair value. 
Market efficiency is not centrally implicated in fair value as an accounting 
measurement base. Level one fair valuations grant that current market prices are 
‘best guess’ proxies for value but historical cost entails the reification of realized, 
historic, temporally heterogeneous fair values. Equally, fair valuation does not 
preclude entity-specific valuations. Such values are inherent in the present value 
assumptions in lower level fair valuations. Hitz (2007) takes fair value’s 
articulation in standards as a complete, conceptually committed expression of the 
measurement basis. I make the case that standard setters have been concerned to 
overgeneralise market pricing for pragmatic reasons, including the appearance of 
a consistent, coherent and unqualified confidence in the objective character of 
markets. If we allow that conceptually, fair value is wholly about reflecting the 
underlying economic value of an entity and its income generating capacity, the 
substantive concerns of Hitz (2007), Plantin, et al (1997), and Boyer (2007), are 
addressed and nullified. Where aggregate fair values do not reflect the full 
economic value of an entity’s cash flows nothing about exclusion from the 
balance sheet of the entity indicates other than that the entity does not control the 
excess value-generating capacity.  
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Chapter Five 
5.0 Discussion and Conclusion 
 The preceding discussion has examined developments in and on 
accounting theory as a basis for the consideration of the development of a 
coherent theory of accounting. I have considered the contribution of the academy 
to accounting theory development. This has consisted, in broad terms, in three 
distinct periods. Until the mid-1950s accounting was essentially an empirically-
based description of existing practice. Subsequent to this, from the mid-1950s 
until approximately 1970, normative accounting theory rose to the fore in the 
accounting academy. From 1970 positive accounting theory has predominated. 
This has been in substantial part, defined by an implicitly ethnographic, 
prediction-predicated study of accountants and management choices. Only in the 
intermediate period was the academy centrally concerned with the development of 
a normative theory of accounting. 
 
 The generally limited (or negative) contribution of the academy to a 
conceptual framework has been aggravated since the 1960s (and 1970s) by the 
fairly persistent flirtation of academia with stakeholder theory, and latterly, 
critical theory. These sub-paradigms have demanded recognition, particularly in 
relation to stakeholder theory, that has confounded the ability or inclination of the 
academy to advance a general theory of accounting. This has occurred over the 
period of positivism’s incumbency. The predominant paradigm definitionally 
precludes its own engagement with the development of a normative theory of 
accounting. These factors have generally precluded a positive contribution by the 
academy to a general theory of accounting and its operationalisation. 
 
 Although not immune to trends in academic accounting, regulators have 
made substantial progress in the development of a conceptual framework. Work 
on this project began in the depression era of the 1930s as a direct response to the 
social and economic turmoil aggravated by the collapse of asset markets. The 
progress was at best sporadic between 1933 and 1966, with substantial progress in 
evidence only from 1966. This enervated, more strident development in 
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accounting regulation predicates was reflected in a number of reports culminating 
in the Wheat and Trueblood Committee reports. Wheat established the FASB and 
Trueblood identified the principles that were to form the basis for the FASB’s 
conceptual framework. From this period, accounting Conceptual Frameworks and 
regulation have developed in what I have described as a ‘quiet’ move towards 
coherence. 
 
 The nature of development of the conceptual framework to the current 
period has centred around its progressive focus on the investor. Decision-useful 
information, relevant to investors in their allocation of risk capital is the general 
achievement of major standard setters’ conceptual frameworks. To this end 
current value variant, fair value, has surfaced as the principal measurement base 
challenge to historical cost. 
 
 In developing a framework for a general theory of accounting, chapter 
three makes the case that current conceptual frameworks are (a somewhat 
qualified) success. The innovations proposed in this discussion include the 
elimination of equivocation over the centrality of investor as GPFR user. In 
particular, creditors are no more than marginal claimants, otherwise protected by 
contract and their priority over equity holders, securing the intuition articulated by 
standard setters that information sufficient for risk capital providers will satisfy 
creditor needs. Similar arguments apply to debt capital providers, with the 
incidental advantage that this eliminates coherent theory-frustrating arguments 
from debt providers, motivated by their plural imperatives as issuers and 
managers. Defining the user is fundamental to a coherent normative theory of 
accounting. 
 
 The determination of investor-as-user is generated from an examination of 
the elements of the broad socio-economic environment. I consider the 
development of the corporation in the (prevailing) mixed economic system. 
Beyond this I describe the broader evolution of society. It is in the context of the 
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existing elements of contemporary society that I make the case for the singularity 
of investor as user. 
 
 The theory operates from the achieved conclusion of the investor as user 
to identify the optimal mix of objective functions and qualitative characteristics 
required to satisfy investor needs. The analysis supports the view that standard 
setters have acted correctly in preferring decision-usefulness and in the 
subsumption of stewardship by it. A further element of standard setters’ 
achievement of conceptual framework coherence is the deflation of reliability as a 
definitional entailment of transactions-based accounting measurement. This is 
reflected in the substitution of representational faithfulness as a primary 
qualitative characteristic, of which reliability is an element. Comparability has 
also gained greater prominence. These conceptual elements aggregate to favour a 
current valuation basis to accounting measurement. 
 
 Auxiliary to the conceptual propositions, it is envisaged that fair value 
implementation requires certain conditions to secure it from reliability risks. This 
implicates fair value in a systematic elevation of risk of opportunistic agent 
behavior. This does not undermine fair value on the basis of execution risks. The 
increased prospect of opportunistic behavior inheres in fair value’s greater 
prospectivity for relevance. Simply, historical cost accounting can be faithfully 
applied, without satisfying representational faithfulness, obviating the 
manifestation of preparer opportunism. This issue turns on the perverse 
implications historical cost’s recognition-basis has. Simply by holding poorly-
performing assets, preparers avoid the need to present significant value 
destruction or increase up to the point of sale of the relevant assets. The position 
adopted here is that certain phases of economic cycles establish predispositional 
conditions for opportunism and, given the argued for rejection of fair value’s 
procyclicality, nothing inherent in fair value will do anything more than describe 
the modes of opportunism. Incremental to historical cost, positive misstatements 
are required under fair value to achieve the obfuscation readily available under 
historical cost. The central concern is that agent liability and accountability lack 
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sufficient motivational force. This is the basis for proposing fair value which is 
supported by augmented liability and penalties, extending to valuers/appraisers, 
preparers, auditors and managers (including directors). 
 
 The theory assesses the current accounting valuation debate against the 
implications of the proposed general theory of accounting. I find the case for fair 
value is supported by the theory. The inference to fair value from the theory does 
not presuppose fair value-as-operationalised in existing standards is perfected 
current value. Independent of the outlined theoretical precepts, fair value’s 
momentum recommends it over rival, potentially superior, current valuation 
methodologies. In this sense pragmatism balances a purist theoretical position. It 
is not envisaged that prevailing fair value is other than progressive in the 
evolution of accounting. Arguments thus, that certain refinements may enhance it 
are granted but only with an intentional conviction in relation to a conceptually 
coherent fair value. What we seem to experience is objections to the incoherence 
of elements of implemented fair value which has necessarily had to evolve and 
adapt to survive political pressures for compromise. 
 
 The proposed theory implies fair value as a relation between current value 
and its correspondence to underlying economic value. The theory does not operate 
on the assumption of the current implementation of fair value in the standards 
developed by major standards setters. This is not a conceptually based exposition 
of fair value but it is confused, in itself, mixed attribute, accounting valuation 
base. I explicitly reject the characterization of fair value as systematically 
undervaluing firm-specific value. From the same base the case made by Hitz, that 
fair value adds no information increment to otherwise readily available market 
information, is rejected. In terms of reliability, the conceptual case for fair value is 
strangely undemanding. In the first case, fair value accents relevance and, thus, 
indicates a minimum possession of reliability. This standard seems likely to be 
satisfied by disclosure of assumptions central to valuation models, and by 
confirmation, or revision and explanation, of past level two and three valuations. 
For these reasons Hitz’s challenge is rejected. 
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 Arguments challenging fair value on the basis that it is inherently 
procyclical are also rejected. This argument is linked to the case that fair value 
increases reported volatility and may increase real volatility. The view that GPFR 
should reflect elevated market volatility seems justifiable. Moreover, evidence 
exists that fears of the excessive reflection of real volatility by fair value in GPFR 
are challenged empirically by (inter alia) Alkon (2006) and Dhaliwal, et al 
(1999). The case is made that offsetting fair values potentially increase financial 
statement stability and, that markets discount certain elements of income inherent 
to fair value comprehensive income. Given the trend of economies and markets to 
long-term growth, the procyclicality of fair value is an argument for systematic 
net market overvaluation. This entails that competing objections to fair value 
accounting measurement are that, in terms of Hitz’ and Plantin, et al’s (1997) 
position, fair value systematically undervalues companies and, in the case of 
Boyer (2007), it systematically overvalues companies and markets. In both cases 
the bases for challenging fair value are rejected.  
 
 Fair value, in the form preferred by this discussion, satisfies the theoretical 
criteria established here as the basis for a general theory of accounting. It provides 
information useful for investors to make rational economic decisions, concerning 
whether they should buy, sell, or hold equities in a company. The information is 
incremental to market information but it is conceptually sufficiently reliable to 
underwrite its relevance to investors. Fair value information can increase market 
efficiency in the allocation of scarce, economic resources by means of cost 
effective aggregation, by confirmation, and by reducing market inefficiencies. 
Fair value does not require perfected market efficiency. More pointedly, the fair 
value prescription specifically targets efficiency enhancement. The more 
persistent objections to fair value typically relate to its specification rather than an 
effective challenge to its conceptual foundations. Collectively, these reasons 
secure fair value against conceptual, fundamental objections but indicate certain 
overdue enforcement and accountability enhancements, including extending the 
liability of agents for culpable errors or misstatements. 
 161 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 Financial information markets have become increasingly competitive with 
the proliferation of myriad sources of such information, facilitated by the growth 
in communications technology and financial asset markets. These factors have 
created the means and motivation for a competitive market. In this environment 
accounting does not have any sacrosanct claim to a non-negotiable share of this 
market. It cannot simply hide behind its governmental mandate. Accounting must 
compete for its claim as a unique provider of useful financial information. The 
inference is available that accounting as an arcane pseudo-science has presumed 
an ability to hide behind its mandated role. To a considerable extent the intuition 
behind this assertion finds support in the debate surrounding accounting 
regulation. At its best a highly politicized debate, subject to a sub-optimal 
trajectory by the partisan arguments of vested interests, accounting risks 
marginalizing itself. Short-termism characterizes the debate. This is reflected in 
arguments for ‘obcurantist’, ritualistic accounting treatments such as historical 
cost that frustrate clear insight into the underlying economic substance of a 
company’s operations. The preparer community’s ability to capture accounting 
regulation risks making its capture a pyrrhic victory If this interpretation is 
allowed, positive accounting theory’s study of accounting choice will be nothing 
more than a narrow aspect of accounting history which, as a consolation will 
become all of accounting that is available to study. It is in this context that the 
preceding normative accounting theory is proposed. 
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Glossary 
AAA American Accounting Association 
AIA American Institute of Accountants 
AICPA American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
APB Accounting Principles Board 
ASOBAT A Statement of Basic Accounting Principles 
CAP Committee on Accounting Principles 
CFA Certified Financial Analysts 
COCOA Continuously Contemporary Accounting 
EMH Efficient Market Hypothesis 
FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board 
FEI Financial Executives International 
GASB Governmental Accounting Standards Board 
GPEAFR General Purpose External Accounting and Financial Reporting 
GPFR General Purpose Financial Reporting 
IASC International Accounting Standards Committee 
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
IAS International Accounting Standards 
ICAEW Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales 
ICAS Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland 
PAT Positive Accounting Theory 
SFAC Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts 
SFAS (FAS) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
SEC Securities Exchange Commission 
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Appendix One: A brief chronology of major developments in conceptual 
frameworks 
 
 
1929 Economist Canning proposes the ‘True income approach’ to accounting, 
advancing an economic income concept of profit. This proposal was informed by 
the work of Professor Irving Fisher and is perhaps the earliest precursor to fair 
value as it is presently conceived. 
 
1933 Securities Act, Administered by the Federal trade Commission (FTC) in 
response to the general market breakdown beginning with the stockmarket crash 
in 1929. 
 
1934 Securities Exchange Act: establishes the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) as the United States Securities Markets’ Regulator. This body was 
empowered with ultimate responsibility for control over the quality of financial 
reporting. 
 
1936 The American Accounting Association (AAA) produces A Tentative 
Statement of Accounting Principles Underlying Corporate Financial Statements. 
This statement used a deductive approach to the development of accounting 
principles. 
 
1940 WA Paton and WC Littleton produce a monograph elaborating on the 
AAA’s 1936 statement. 
 
1949 AIA Committee on Accounting Procedures (CAP) proposes a 
comprehensive statement of generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP) but 
later abandons the project as unfeasible. 
 
1955 RJ Chambers “Blueprint for a Theory of Accounting may have been the 
origin of decision-usefulness. Subsequent to this Chambers expounded his theory 
of optimal accounting valuation, Continuously Contemporary Accounting 
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(COCOA), which advanced the case for presenting accounting reports based on 
exit values. 
 
1956-1960 A succession of proposals is made to establish the postulates 
underlying accounting. In 1958 the CAP is superceded by the Accounting 
Principles Board (APB). In 1958 a report to the council of the AICPA argued that 
the basic assumptions of accounting must be drawn from the political and 
economic environment. This view significantly informs the proposal herein. 
 
1961 Accounting Research Study No. 1, The Basic Postulates of Accounting. 
AICPA. This study, authored by Maurice Moonitz, proposed extending the use of 
current values in accounting. It also established (asserted) the need for a coherent 
theory of accounting. 
 
1962 Accounting research Study No. 3, A Tentative Set of Broad Accounting 
principles for Business Enterprises, co-authored by Moonitz and RT Sprouse, 
builds on the 1961 study. This study detailed elements in the general environment 
that it held would have to be accommodated by a general theory of accounting. 
These included the private ownership of most productive resources, the primacy 
of the market as a means of distributing goods and services, and the existence of 
free labour. 
 
1966 AAA monograph A Statement of Basic Accounting Theory is published. 
(ASOBAT). 
 
1970 APB issues statement No. 4: 
‘Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying Financial 
Statements of Business Enterprises.” 
This was the culmination of a five year study. 
 
 197 
1971 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) commissioned 
two major studies. These were chaired respectively by Francis Wheat and Robert 
Trueblood.   
 
1972 The Wheat Commission recommended the establishment of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) under the auspices of the Financial 
Accounting Foundation (FAF), with technical guidance by FASAC (Financial 
Accounting Standards Advisory Council). The proposal included a 
recommendation for seven fulltime staff and a budget of $2.5-$3 million for the 
FASB. The proposed FASB was a response to the perceived inadequacy of the 
APB, particularly in relation to its failure to develop a conceptual framework. 
Wheat also identified an underlying need for an exposition of assumptions as 
accounting theory postulates. 
 
1973 The Trueblood Commission Report issues Objectives of Financial 
Statements. The commission identified a preference for forward-looking financial 
accounting information. This clearly favoured decision-usefulness over 
stewardship. Notably, the Commission had in contemplation a diverse range of 
users. It also emphasized the economic substance of events and proposed a 
narrower focus on investors and creditors as key users. This possibly established 
the basis for the ‘primary user’ device in standards. Further, the Trueblood Report 
tacitly softens the qualitative characteristic, reliability, by allowing that 
information influenced by judgment naturally has some bias. Trueblood takes the 
view that the concern for accounting reports is that there is no systematic bias, 
favouring any group over any other. 
 
1973 AICPA declares that the FASB has replaced the APB, ushering the era of 
professional standard setting. SEC (ASR No. 150) declares that the standards and 
practices of the FASB have substantial authoritative support. The APB rejected 
the 1961 and 1962 Moonitz and Sprouse and Moonitz studies because they were 
too far from GAAP. A primary motivation behind the establishment of the APB 
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was that GAAP was widely perceived as unsatisfactory. The timorous nature of 
the APB is centrally implicated in its demise. 
 
1973 The FASB commences a Conceptual framework project. A Report by a 
study group of the AICPA publishes Objectives of Financial Statements, 
highlighting the importance of the decision-usefulness of GPFR. 
 
1974-1985 The FASB Conceptual Framework Project. In 1978 the Seaview 
Symposium (FASB) re-affirms the primacy of objectivity (reliability) over 
predictive value (relevance). It was felt unreliable information should be 
presented outside of financial statements. 
 
1975 The Corporate Report is produced in the UK (ICAEW) as a response to the 
Trueblood Report. It identifies GPFR users as those with a reasonable right to 
information (Macve, p. 66), but indicates that although there are many users, they 
have similar information needs. This anticipates the view articulated in 
subsequent standards that information satisfying equity investors will meet the 
needs of other users. The public’s right to information is emphasized. The report 
identifies numerous qualitative characteristics, some of which it allows, may be 
mutually exclusive. 
 
Mid 1970s-early 1980s Historical cost weathers an inflation ‘storm’, leading to 
growing calls and research into a departure from the traditional accounting 
valuation basis. Globally, inflation recedes from about 1983, and the pressure for 
inflation-adjusted accounting declines. This heralded a growing interest in current 
cost accounting, although the default status of Historical cost remained intact. 
 
1976 The FASB issues a discussion memorandum as a response to the Trueblood 
Report. 
 Conceptual framework for financial Accounting and reporting 
 
1977 AAA issues Statement of Theory and Theory Acceptance 
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This explicitly identified the importance of present and potential investors as 
users of financial accounting information. It was seen as a significant step towards 
the development of a conceptual framework. 
 
1978 SFAC 1, GPFR targets, “investors and creditors and other users”, by 
inference from the explicit reference to investors and creditors, prioritizing them.  
[para. 34. FASB. 1978]. However, it does identify 34 user groups. Further, the 
statement refers to financial reporting’s aim to aid, “rational investment, credit 
and other similar decisions”. Specifically, SFAC 1 targeted external uses without 
the power to specify the information required. It is unclear what ‘similar’ decision 
the Board has in contemplation. The inference is available here that the FASB is 
dissembling here and has no other decisions in contemplation. If we were to 
assume ‘labour supply decisions’ or ‘goods/services supply decisions’, as 
examples of similar decisions, it remains doubtful that the cost of supplying such 
greater specification of ‘similar decisions’ would have run foul of the pervasive 
cost-benefit constraint. 
 
1978-84 FASB produce a Conceptual Framework, SFACs 1-5. Wanting to avoid 
the appearance of an overreliance on pure theory, the concepts statements drew on 
many traditions, including: stewardship, capital maintenance, true and fair, and 
prudence. 
 
1980 Stamp Report (who earlier co-authored the British “Corporate Report”) was 
the Canadian (CICA) response to the Trueblood Report. It reiterated the view of 
diverse GPFR users, including: shareholders, creditors, analysts, employees, non-
executive directors, customers, suppliers, unions, industry groups, government, 
public, regulators, other companies and standards’ setters. 
 
1980 SFAC-2, Qualitative Characteristics. The FASB Conceptual Framework is 
to serve the public interest by providing a structure to financial information that 
enables the efficient allocation of resources. This development is important in that 
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it relates the broadest possible stakeholder perspective to the narrowest possible 
view of ‘users’-the investor. 
 
1980  AAA (American Accounting Association) advance the view of verifiable, 
perhaps the most intransigent aspect of reliability, as values that are able to be 
reproduced by experts working independently of each other. This tentatively 
offers the basis for a departure from the transactions basis to reliability of 
historical cost. 
 
1988 MacMonnies Report for the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland 
(ICAS), Making Corporate Reports Valuable, accents decision-usefulness of 
prospective information. 
 
Late 1980s  Fair value gained progressive support in the wake of the Savings and 
Loan crisis in the United States, as the deficiencies of historic cost were exposed 
by this event as companies ‘cherry picked’ assets for realization to support a 
positive view of their financial position and performance. 
 
1989 Solomons Report prioritises relevance. Minimum levels of the two primary 
characteristics are required for other to exist, that is, they are positive correlate. 
 
1988-9 The International Accounting Standards Council (IASC) Conceptual 
Framework.  
 
1989 Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements. 
Focus is decision-useful information. It describes various users, who are typically 
investors, suggesting support for fair value measurement.  
 
1990s FASB pushed for full fair value standards, including SFAS 142 
‘unverifiable fair value’. 
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1994 AICPA Jenkins Commission report delivers a focus on efficient capital 
markets, accenting investors and creditors, prospective information and decision-
usefulness. This report continued trends in the direction of financial reporting 
prescription. 
 
1998 Draft IAS-39 the inclusion of a full fair value option for financial 
instruments. 
 
2000 IOSCO recommends members allow member countries to use IASs. The 
IASB JWG (Joint Working Group) proposes all financial instruments should be 
valued at fair value regardless of the purpose they are held for. 
 
2001 The IASB is established, replacing the IASC. It argues that information that 
will meet the needs of investors will meet other users’ needs. (Framework F-9). 
 
2002 IASB/FASB Norwalk Agreement commits the two key accounting 
standards’ setters to the development of compatible standards. 
 
2005 By this time standards requiring fair value included (IASB): IASs 11, 16, 
17, 18, 18, 20, 26, 33, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41 and IFRSs 1,2,3,5. 
Standards that required fair value by reference to another standard: 
IAS 2, 21, 27, 28, 31, 32. IFRS 4, 7. 
IASB proposed replacing reliability with faithful representation. 
 
2005-2008 An increasing emphasis on the priority of the investor, on relevance, 
and on fair value as a logical derivative of earlier trends in conceptual 
frameworks. It is notable that one area of significant divergence between the 
IASB and FASB is in the more singular user definition preferred by the IASB 
(that is, the investor). 
 
2006 The FASB and IASB formally agree to work together on the development of 
accounting standards. IASB Qualitative Characteristics include relevance, faithful 
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representation, and comparability. Notably, verifiability is relegated to secondary 
status as an enhancing characteristic and comparability tends to support fair value 
due to the heterogeneous transaction dates of historical cost accounting. 
 
2006-2008 Continuing work on operation of fair value, i.e. What it applies to, the 
3-level hierarchy of valuation options, which market to reference and whether fair 
values should be based on entry/exit prices. 
 
2007 SFAC- 7; SFAS 157 Establishes a common definition of fair value. 
IASB conceptual framework discussion related to users is concerned with whether 
consideration should be extended beyond current investors to include potential 
investors. 
 
2008 The range of financial instruments measured at fair value, including those in 
less liquid markets requiring model-based valuations, is expanded. 
 
2008 The FASB are seeking an improved objective of financial reporting. ED 
proposes information useful to present and potential investors, lenders and other 
creditors. IASB have moved further, identifying the investor as GPFR user. This, 
importantly, eliminates a significant source of dissemblage by banks, as they have 
(inferentially) used their status as creditors to argue to a position that supports 
their interests as issuers. 
Verifiability is separated from faithful representation and identified as an 
enhancing characteristic rather than a primary characteristic. This continues a 
trend with the earlier introduction of ‘faithful representation’ which added 
‘completeness’ as an element of reliability, (inferentially) diluting the 
‘verifiability’ element of reliability which is strongly related to the historical cost, 
transaction-based conception of objectivity. 
Sources: Zeff, SA. (1979). Chronology. Significant Developments in the Establishment of Accounting Principles in the US 
1926-78 in TA. Lee and RH. Parker. The Evolution of Corporate Financial reporting. Melbourne: Thomas Nelson and 
Sons, Ltd; Samuels, Rickwood and Piper, 1989; IASB, 2008; FASB, 2008; Landsman, 2006; Deloitte, 2008; 
PriceWaterhouse Coopers, 2008; Smith, 1996; Bank for International Settlements, 2008; Ramana and Watts, 2008; Higson, 
2003; AICPA, 2008; CFA 2001; Miller and Redding, 1988; Schroeder, Clark and McCullers, 1991; Henderson, Pierson 
and Harris, 2004; Chorafas, 2006; White and McNally, 2006; Whittington, 2007;  Macve; IASB, 2006; FASB, 2005. 
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Appendix Two 
Developments in Accounting Theory, Regulation and Measurement 
 
 
Broad trends in Accounting 
Theory 
Trends in user definition Measurement Trends 
Until 1956: Accounting theory 
was  
Pre-1920s: 
shareholders/creditors 
 
essentially descriptive of 
practice 
1920s-1960: Users extended 
to share- 
 
 holders, investors, creditors & 
analysts 
 
1956-1970: Prescriptive 
theories 
  
predominated, including those 
of RJ 
 1960s-1990s: User status is 
extended 
 
Chambers, Staubus, and 
Sterling 
to shareholders, investors, 
creditors & 
Until the mid-1970s: 
 employees, suppliers, 
customers and 
Historical cost accounting 
measurement 
predominates, substantially 
unchallenged. This 
changes with elevated 
levels of inflation. Oil 
price/supply shocks, 
aggravated by loose 
monetary policy created an 
environment in which 
traditional historic cost 
accounting came to be 
seen as increasingly 
irrelevant 
Post-1970: Governments threatened by elevated 
inflation as it 
Descriptive theories come to 
the fore 
The rise of the malevolent 
influence of 
is seen as increasingly 
irrelevant 
again stakeholder theory, exerted 
an influence 
Proposals for general price 
level  
Positive Accounting Theory progressively expanding the 
GPFR user 
adjustment accounting 
arise 
Agency Theory definition. By mid-1980s inflation 
subdued 
This is the so-called 'new 
empiricism' 
This was reflected in: The pressure for price-level 
adjustment 
 1. Trueblood Report (1973) subsides. Current cost 
accounting 
 2. Corporate Report (1975) gains some support 
Note: In describing prevalent 
theoretical 
3. FASB SFAC 1     (1978)  
trends this is not to say they 
were 
4. Stamp Report      (1980) Late-1980s:residual interest 
in current  
total. However, we might infer 
to an 
 cost accounting gains 
momentum 
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environment in which 
prescriptive theories 
 due to the Savings & Loan 
crisis 
failed to gain traction in 
predominantly 
  
descriptive eras. In the period 
to 1956  
1990s-: The user definition is 
extended  
1990s-: Progressive rise of 
fair value 
theory was the articulation of 
practice. 
to include society, in addition 
to the  
FASB, IASC, and latterly, 
the IASB 
Despite this efforts to create a 
coherent 
Previously expanded 
definition 
push in favour of Fair value 
theory of accounting persisted 
over the  
  
entire period under 
consideration. Efforts 
1994: Jenkins Report 
(AICPA) shifts the 
 
included: focus to Efficient capital mkts, 
prioritis'g 
 
1. 1936 AAA A Tentative 
Statement of 
investors & creditors & 
decision- 
 
Principles Underlying 
Corporate 
usefulness. Std setters 
accommodate 
 
Financial Statements societal interest in GPFR by 
citing the 
 
Deductive approach 
advanced 
advantage of efficient capital 
allocation 
 
 This approach also 
incorporates 
 
1949: CAP proposes a 
comprehensive 
prevailing finance theory  
statement of GAAP. This 
project was 
 1998: Draft IAS 39 
proposes full FV  
abandoned as unfeasible  option for financial 
instruments 
   
1955: RJ Chambers Blueprint 
for a  
  
theory of accounting   
  By 2005: An extensive 
range of IASs/ 
1961: AICPA Study No. 1 The 
Basic 
 IFRSs require FV Work 
ongoing on  
Postulates of Accounting  specifying/operationalising 
FV up until 
Proposes deductive approach 2008: FASB: Users are 
investors and 
the present (2008) 
 creditors; IASB users are 
investors (the 
In the current era the 
debate around FV 
1962: AICPA A Tentative Set 
of Broad 
debate surrounds whether the 
focus 
at the FASB and IASB 
largely surround 
accounting Principles for 
Business 
should be on current 
investors or if 
its details. Issues such as 
working  
Enterprises it should be extended to 
include  
through individual FV 
applications by  
Proposes theory deduced 
from broad 
prospective investors each standard, to establish 
a common 
economic and political  definition are now at the 
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environment. fore. 
   
1974-85: FASB works to 
develop a CF 
  
to operationalise a general 
theory of accounting 
(normative). 
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Appendix Three 
IAS 2 Inventories 
IAS 3 Consolidated Financial Instruments 
IAS 6 Accounting Responses to Changes in Prices 
IAS 11 Construction Contracts 
IAS 12 Income Taxes 
IAS 15 Information Reflecting the Effects of Changing Prices 
IAS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment 
IAS 18 Revenue Recognition 
IAS 19 Employee Benefits 
IAS 20 Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of Government 
assistance 
IAS 21 The Effects of Changes in foreign Exchange Rates 
IAS 22 Accounting for Business Combinations 
IAS 25 Accounting for Investments 
IAS 26 Accounting and Reporting by Retirement Benefit Plans 
IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements 
IAS 28 Investments in Associates 
IAS 31 Financial Reporting of Interests in Joint Ventures 
IAS 32 Financial instruments: Disclosure and Presentation 
IAS 36 Impairment of Assets 
IAS 38 Intangible Assets 
IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 
IAS 40 Investment Property 
IAS 41 Agriculture 
IFRS 1 First-Time Adoption of IFRS 
IFRS 2 Share-based Payment 
IFRS 3 Business Combinations 
IFRS 4 Insurance Contracts 
IFRS 5 Non-current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations 
IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosure 
 
